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Revolution in Africa: The Case of Zimbabwe (1965-1980)

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REVOLUTION IN AFRICA: THE CASE OF ZIMBABWE (1965-1980)

by

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VITA

The author, Annette Seegers, is the daughter of Constanz F. Seegers and Nellie Maree (Hattingh) Seegers. She was born August 14, 1952 in East London, South Africa.

Her elementary education was obtained at public schools in East London and Boksburg (South Africa), and secondary education at the Afrikaans Girls High School of Pretoria (South Africa), where she matriculated in 1970.

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During 1976 and 1977 she was attached to the Institute for Strategic Studies at the University of Pretoria in the capacity of researcher. Between 1979 and 1982 she was a lecturer at the Loyola University of Chicago and DePaul University (Chicago). In 1982 she was granted an assistantship by the Inter University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society.

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CHAPTER I

SOCIAL REVOLUTION: A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

1. Introduction: The Rationale of This Study

The revolution in Zimbabwe is an interesting case in its own right, if only for its curious ending.[1] After a protracted period of guerrilla warfare, the revolution culminated in, of all things, an election.

Beyond this, the revolution in Zimbabwe raises the more general question: What kind of a revolution occurred in Zimbabwe and why? This is the key issue addressed in this study. In doing so, this study is informed by two theoretical traditions. The first is the theoretical literature on revolutions in general, particularly the literature that asks questions why certain kinds of revolutions occur. From this literature a theoretical approach can be selected to guide the examination of the events in Zimbabwe. The second tradition is the theoretical literature on African revolutions, particularly the work of those scholars who argue that social revolutions in Africa are rare.[2] These scholars point

[1] In the past, Zimbabwe was known as Southern Rhodesia, Rhodesia and Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. The name Zimbabwe will be used throughout this study.

[2] For a review, see Ian R. Phimister, "Zimbabwean Economic and Social Historiography Since 1970" African Affairs 78 (April 1979): 253-268.

out that revolutions in Africa are neither caused by nor lead to socio-economic transformations. They argue instead that African revolutions occur in the context of decolonization and struggles against racial exclusivism. Thus the revolution in Zimbabwe brought a black regime to power but left much else intact.

Thus, while this study is best seen as a case study, it is informed by general theoretical concerns. The remaining sections of this chapter will explore these concerns by offering a working definition of revolution, a discussion of the theoretical conception of social revolutions, an examination of the theoretical literature, a summary of the theoretical approach, and an outline of the subsequent chapters and their content.

2. Revolution: A Working Definition

Studies of revolution have spawned a myriad of terms, definitions and associated typologies, reflecting and contributing to confusion as to what constitutes a revolution. This proliferation has resulted in a situation where similar events are alternatively defined, and disparate sets of events similarly defined. Indeed the definitions and terminology of revolutionary studies has become a study in itself.[3]

[3] See Lawrence Stone, "Theories of Revolution", World Politics 18 (January 1966): 159-176; and Isaac Kramnick, "Reflections on Revolution: Definition and Explanation in Recent Scholarship," History and Theory 11 (January 1972): 26-63.

Yet definitional differences are useful insofar as they reveal the nature of and differences between accompanying theoretical statements. Definitional differences are also useful insofar as they reveal that revolutions are multidimensional phenomena involving characteristic social, psychological, economic, political and military events that are intertwined on individual, group and societal levels, all of which are subject to international influences as well. Even if useful, definitional differences should nevertheless not be overplayed, for studies of revolutions also reveal two major areas of agreement.[4]

First, revolution is consistently connected with change in a causal and consequential sense. In its premodern usage, this change was seen as a part of the cyclical order of human events, with no expectation that the change would cause a qualitative change in the condition of men or societies.[5] Since the 17th century, however, the cause and consequences of revolutions are associated with progressive socio-economic and political change. This modern conceptualization of revolution is

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[4]See Carl Leiden and Karl M. Schmitt, The Politics of Violence: Revolution in the Modern World (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1968), pp. 3-9.

[5]For a good study on the history of the notion of revolution see Peter Calvert, Revolution (New York: Praeger, 1970).

> inextricably bound up with the notion that the course of history suddenly begins anew, that an entirely new story, a story never known or told before, is about to unfold.[6]

Qualitative changes on the order of societies are thus an integral component of revolutions, leading to much debate as to how much and what types of changes are necessary to produce a revolutionary situation.

Most recent[7] scholars do not insist that sweeping or fundamental change necessarily accompany revolutions. Davies, for example, defines revolutions as "violent civil disturbances that cause the displacement of one ruling group by another that has a broader popular basis for support."[8] Gurr, similarly, de-emphasizes the change component of revolutions.[9] The debate about the extent of change involved in revolutions has led some scholars to distinguish between social and political revolutions. A social revolution, in the words of one such scholar,

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[6]Hannah Arendt, On Revolution (New York: Viking Press, 1965), p. 21.

[7]An exception in this regard is Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1968). Revolution is a "rapid, fundamental and violent change in the dominant values and myths of a society in its political institutions, social structure, leadership, and government activity and policies."

[8]James C. Davies, "Toward a Theory of Revolution" in James C. Davies, ed., When Men Revolt and Why (New York: The Free Press, 1971), p. 338.

[9]Ted R. Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1970), pp. 7-12. (Hereafter referred to as WMR).

> is set apart from other sorts of conflicts and transformative processes above all by the combination of two coincidences: the coincidence of societal structural change with class upheaval; and the coincidence of political with social transformation.[10]

A political revolution, "transforms state structures, but not social structures."[11] Mark Hagopian warns, however, against overdrawing the boundaries between social and political revolutions, since they are separated not by the amount or extent of change involved but as to when and how different types of changes come about.[12] These differences are useful in distinguishing revolutions from non-revolutionary phenomena such as civil wars and coups,[13] and between types of revolutions.

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[10] Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolution: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China (London: Cambridge University Press, 1979), p. 4 (Hereafter referred to as States and Social Revolution).

[11] Ibid.

[12] Hagopian states: "Marx' stipulation that social revolutions are ipso facto political revolutions helps to clarify the problem from one side. We can furthermore point out that a revolution which is primarily political will have great difficulty in refraining from intervention in the economic and status systems (i.e., in the areas usually termed 'social')." Mark N. Hagopian, The Phenomenon of Revolution (New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1975), pp. 105-106.

[13] A civil war can be defined as "a formal, organized military clash between two competing governments or political authorities or armed factions within the same territory." Mostafa Rejai, The Comparative Study of Revolutionary Strategy (New York: David McKay Company, 1977), pp. 21-22.

Second, the term revolution is consistently associated with overt conflict and violence. Some scholars, indeed, prefer to subsume revolutions under the general category of violence or conflict rather than change. Gurr and Tilly, for example, see violence as the definitive property of revolutions,[14] while the use of the concept internal war has gained wide currency as a synonym of revolution.[15] These scholars are nevertheless careful to point out that although revolutions are rare events, the violence accompanying them is not. To demonstrate this point, continua of violence are constructed reflecting the magnitude and intensity of violent incidents in the political life of societies. Revolutions are, then, typically seen as an extreme case of intense and widespread violence[16] or conflict,[17] while less intense forms of violence (like riots and violent strikes) are more common.

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[14] Ibid., pp. 7-12 and Charles Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution (Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley, 1978), pp. 189-222.

[15] Internal war has been defined as "any resort to violence within a political order to change its constitution, rulers, or policies." Harry Eckstein, "On the Etiology of Internal Wars," History and Theory 4 (1965): 133.

[16] Gurr's requirement is "highly organized political violence with widespread popular participation, designed to overthrow the regime or dissolve the state and accompanied by extensive violence." Gurr, WMR, p. 11.

[17] Tilly's requirement is that a revolution starts when "a government previously under the control of a single, sovereign polity becomes the object of effective, competing, mutually exclusive claims on the part of two or more distinct polities." Tilly, p. 191.

Although there is agreement that violence and conflict accompany revolutions a close identification of revolution with violence makes it difficult to distinguish revolutionary from non-revolutionary events like coups and civil wars:

> Left out of this definition is all that gives revolution its distinctiveness and its impact upon contemporaries. It lacks the sense of the profundity of the crisis in a society undergoing revolution. Of the stakes in revolution only political power is considered; economic and status stratification seems beneath consideration. There is no inkling of what is to be done with power after the insurrectionaries take over.[18]

Finally, a close identification of violence and revolution makes it difficult to distinguish between types of revolutions except on the basis of the strategic-instrumental considerations in the struggle for power.[19]

In summary, it is easy to exaggerate definitional differences, but such exaggeration neglects areas of substantive agreement about the change and violence characterizing revolutions. Definitional differences can best be seen as the vanguard of theoretical differences about the types of change and violence involved, its extent, timing and interrelationship. In suspending the question of theoretical differences, a working definition of revolution then reads as follows:

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[18]Hagopian, pp. 71-72.

[19]See Sheldon S. Wolin, "The Politics of the Study of Revolution," Comparative Politics 5 (April 1973): 343-358 on the theoretical fascination with techniques of revolutionary violence.

Revolution is a form of change simultaneously affecting several societal dimensions. Since several societal dimensions - the economic, political, social and psycho-cultural - are affected, it is possible to speak of the change as "far-reaching," and since these dimensions together define society, it is possible to speak of the change as "basic" and "fundamental". Although these changes may occur over a period of decades, the process of change contains a violent struggle for national political control. Since the political groups seeking a transfer of power use violence and since their goals reflect many recent socio-economic changes, their actions can be described as "illegal". Finally, revolutions are marked by their "mass-character", i.e. a significant amount of the population is affected by the process of societal change and the violent struggle for power is affected by popular participation.[20]

3. Social Revolution: A Structural Perspective

As previously indicated, the multi-dimensional character of revolutions has resulted in a vast array of theories attempting to explain revolutions. There are indeed so many

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[20]This working description of revolution closely resembles that of Rejai. It is not identical to his definition, however, mainly because he holds a voluntaristic conception of revolution, that is, revolutions are fundamentally the product of the will of determined revolutionaries. See Rejai, pp. 7-8. Throughout this paper, revolutions are seen as fundamentally the product of political and socio-economic relationships or structures.

theories that they can be divided into well-stocked categories.

One categorization divides theories according to the questions raised about revolutions. Why men are willing to engage in violent behavior is addressed by Gurr, when men are willing to do so by Davies, and what the properties are of a revolutionary course of events after men have decided to do so by Brinton[21] and Edwards.[22] Another categorization focuses on the attributes of theories. Some use concepts of social psychology (Gurr), others that of political interaction (Tilly), and that of systems analysis (Johnson),[23] socio-economic and political class analysis (Skocpol, Barrington Moore[24] and Paige[25]), and utilitarian decision-making

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[21]Crane Brinton, The Anatomy of Revolution, revised and expanded edition (New York: Vintage Books, 1965).

[22]Lyford P. Edwards, The Natural History of Revolution (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970).

[23]Chalmers Johnson, Revolutionary Change (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1966).

[24]Barrington Moore, Jr., Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966).

[25]Jeffrey M. Paige, Agrarian Revolution (New York: The Free Press, 1975).

(Leites and Wolf).[26] Yet another categorization focuses on the setting of revolutions, with theories applicable to western settings (Brinton) and others to non-western settings (Sarkesian[27] and Wolf).[28] Finally, a categorization can be made between theories focusing on the causes[29] of revolutions (Gurr and Johnson), those focusing on the course[30] of revolutions (Brinton and Tilly), and those attempting to explain the outcomes[31] of revolutions (Barrington Moore, Eisenstadt,[32] Skocpol, Trimberger[33] and Wolf).

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[26]Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf Jr. Rebellion and Authority: An Analytic Essay on Insurgent Conflicts (Chicago: Markham, 1970).

[27]Sam C. Sarkesian, "Revolutionary Guerrilla Warfare: An Introduction" in Sam C. Sarkesian, ed., Revolutionary Guerrilla Warfare (Chicago: Precedent Publishing, 1975), pp. 1-21.

[28]Eric R. Wolf, Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century (New York: Harper and Row, 1969). (Hereafter referred to as Peasant Wars).

[29]The term cause typically refers to events before the outbreak of violence.

[30]The term course is often used to denote the historical sequence of revolutionary events between the precipitants of a revolution (a violent strike, riots, or a defeat in war) and the cessation of violence (usually after there has been a governmental change) or Thermidor. The causal periods of revolutions are often called preconditions, i.e. they precede precipitant events. These demarcations are, however, problematic because they depend not only on different views of the historical sequence of revolutions but also on the conception of the revolution overall. See Hagopian, pp. 194-250 and Tilly, 216-219.

This summary of theories is not exhaustive, but it does serve the purpose of pointing out that there are no complete theories of revolution, explaining the causes, course and consequences of revolutions in all dimensions with universal applicability. Theories typically attempt to explain a particular question or set of related questions about revolutions, the nature of which influences - if not determines - the focus of the theory. The question Why men rebel, for example, leads logically to a focus on individuals' state of mind in the presence of distressing socio-economic circumstances, as well as a focus on the early or causal

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[31]Outcomes refer to the consequences or effects of revolutions. There are different types of outcomes, depending on the focus and concepts of the analyst. Gurr, for example, notes that a categorization exists between immediate outcomes and long-term outcomes. Immediate outcomes are often used to describe changes in the distribution of political power between groups, social classes or other organizations. Long-term outcomes are used to describe changes in larger societal features, such as growth rates, demographic patterns, distribution of societal resources and international position. Ted R. Gurr, "On the Outcomes of Violent Conflict" in Ted R. Gurr, ed., Handbook of Political Conflict (New York: The Free Press, 1980), p. 138.

[32]S. N. Eisenstadt, Revolution and the Transformation of Societies (New York: The Free Press, 1978).

[33]Kay E. Trimberger, Revolution From Above: Military Bureaucrats and Development in Japan, Turkey, Egypt, and Peru (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Books, 1978).

period of the revolutionary process. The question why a particular kind of revolution occurred can lead to class analysis or to the analysis of the interaction between socio-economic conditions and the use of political power as reflected in the work of Skocpol, Trimberger and Paige.[34] It is to the work of this latter group of scholars, here grouped under the term of structuralists,[35] that this study refers in its analysis of social revolutions.

3.1. The Causes of Revolution

Analysts like Skocpol, Trimberger and Eisenstadt reject many of the presumptions and findings of earlier causal theorists, particularly those of Gurr and Johnson, while being more sympathetic - although not wholly so - to those of Tilly and Marxian analyses. Inequalities in an objective and subjective sense, the political offensives of ascendant classes, organizational theory, and the irreparable rupture of a society's value consensus are all rejected as adequate causal perspectives. Instead, analysts adopt a

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[34]On the distinction between class analysis and the structuralism of Skocpol, see Theda Skocpol, "A Critical Review of Barrington Moore's Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy" Politics and Society 4 (Fall 1973): 1-34.

[35]The subsequent sections are strongly influenced by Jack A. Goldstone "Theories of Revolution: The Third Generation" World Politics 22 (April 1980): 425-453.

structural perspective[36] on revolutions' causes, stressing the view that revolutions occur in societies with particular political and socio-economic features, both sets of which can be objectively determined. It is the relationship between political and economic forces that produces a crisis in a society's system of social control (that is, a political or governmental crisis) which renders that society revolution-prone.

What is the nature of the political-economic nexus? All the societies that have experienced revolution, scholars argue, were exposed to the historical forces of modernity, especially the intrusion of the international capitalist economy in domestic life and with resultant changes in political and socioeconomic structures and ideas. The shape

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[36] In distinguishing structural analyses from other perspectives, Skocpol states: "Three major principles of analysis need to be established as alternatives to features shared by all the currently prevailing theories of revolution. In the first place, an adequate understanding of social revolutions requires that the analyst take a nonvoluntarist, structural perspective on their causes and processes...In the second place, social revolutions cannot be explained without systematic reference to international structures and world-historical developments...In the third place, in order to explain the causes and outcomes of social revolutions, it is essential to conceive of states as administrative and coercive organizations - organizations that are potentially autonomous from (though of course conditioned by) socioeconomic interests and structures." Skocpol, State and Social Revolution, p. 14. By a structural perspective is meant an "impersonal and non-subjective viewpoint - one that emphasizes patterns of relationships among groups and societies" or a focus simultaneously on "institutionally determined situations and relations of groups within society and upon the interrelations of societies within world-historically developing international structures." Ibid., p. 18.

of the intruding forces may take many forms; in the non-Western world, for example, it took the form of colonialism with its allied economic and political ideas and forms. Regardless of the differences in the shape of the intrusion, however, the results are broadly similar: these forces engender substantial economic, political and social changes in domestic structures and ideas. The introduction of colonialism, for example, leads to the introduction of the notion of private property in societies previously characterized by communal systems of landownership.[37] It may also lead to a polarization between developed and underdeveloped sectors of societies, or to changes in the system of peasant production.[38] Collectively, these changes produce instability.

To move out of the realm of instability and into a revolutionary situation requires a consideration of the state's political structures. Here scholars view the states' political structure neither as the executive committee of a

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[37]Wolf, Peasant Wars, pp. 276-286.

[38]Structural analysts are to a large extent in agreement with many of the views of dependency theorists. See, for example, Andre G. Frank, "The Development of Underdevelopment" in Robert I. Rhodes, ed., Imperialism and Underdevelopment: A Reader (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1970), pp. 89-100; Paul A. Baran, The Political Economy of Growth (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1957); and Johan Galtung, "A Structural Theory of Imperialism," Journal of Peace Research 8 (1971): 81-117.

particular class (or interests), with inevitable "intransigence", nor as a vacuous political arena where conflict takes place. The state's political structure is viewed as an administrative entity, staffed by bureaucrats, which is - to a varying degree - dependent on certain social groups for the supply of political support and economic resources in order to fulfil its goals. Although administrative structures may vary, it is their weakness in the face of a (typically international) crisis that produces a revolutionary situation. A crisis is typically brought on by the need to increase societal resources when the state encounters external military or economic challenges, that is, wars or market competition.[39]

An interstate war, for example, induces the state's central political machinery to stimulate economic production, to seek state revenues from such increased production, and to exercise greater central control over resources. If the central political machinery fails to accomplish these goals - either because of the political opposition of the state bureaucracy's support groups (like the landed aristocracy) or the inherent weaknesses of the type of economic organization (like the type of peasant production) - the state is

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[39]Another way of explaining the administrative incapacitation is to view it as a clash between state and rural elites. Normal tensions exist, but are increased when state elites under pressure of war want to modernize political and socio-economic practices and organizations. If the state elite is closely linked to rural elites and encounters resistance from them, the state is incapacitated.

administratively incapacitated.[40]

The collapse of the government or at least its administrative incapacitation is thus not the function of an "intransigent" elite. There is a wide range of elite behaviour, even within one state. Typically it is the landed aristocracy that balks at the reforming efforts of bureaucrats and if the latter relies on the former for political and economic cooperation the reforms are doomed. The collapse of the government also does not come when frustrated and mobilized masses launch an assualt on the capital. Rather, there is an administrative incapacity which results from political goals not being met in a time of foreign military and economic challenge because of domestic political opposition and weaknesses in economic organization.

3.2. The Course of Revolution

A society marked by administrative incapacity, weaknesses in economic organization, the landed aristocracy's opposition to political and economic reforms, and the experience of foreign economic or military challenge is in a revolutionary situation; but this does not necessarily lead to the experience of revolution. Skocpol, for example, includes in her analysis a study of societies that were in a revolutionary situation but did not experience revolution,

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[40] Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions, pp. 47-51 and Eisenstadt, pp. 195-206.

such as nineteenth century Japan.[41] Trimberger also addresses this question by studying how certain societies' bureaucracy may move out of a revolutionary situation by instituting a "revolution from above", that is, successfully instituting reforms.[42]

Although there has been no attempt thus far to develop stage-type theories, most structural analysts agree that revolutions have three critical developments in common.

First, for a revolutionary situation to develop into a revolution a popular revolt has to coincide with the incapacitation of central state machinery. Typically this revolt is rurally-based and consists of portions of the peasantry becoming politically conscious and active. Although there is agreement among scholars that peasants[43] play a decisive role, there is disagreement as to which portion of the peasantry is most likely to be active. Skocpol emphasizes the political autonomy of certain portions of the

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[41] Skocpol, States and Social Revolution, pp. 99-104.

[42] Trimberger, p. 156.

[43] The definition of the term peasant varies, with some viewing them as a population category while others use the term as a class. Wolf states that peasants are "populations that are existentially involved in cultivation and make autonomous decisions regarding the process of cultivation. The category is thus made to cover tenants and sharecroppers as well as owner-operators, as long as they are in a position to make the relevant decisions on how their crops are grown. It does not, however, include fishermen and landless laborers." Wolf, Peasant Wars, p. xiv. Paige uses a wider definition of "rural cultivators". Paige, pp. 25-40.

pesantry:

> Peasants always have grounds for rebellion against landlords, state agents, and merchants who exploit them... If they are to act upon, rather than silently suffer, their omnipotent grievances, peasants must have 'internal leverage' - some organized capacity for collective action against their exploitative superiors. In my view, the extent to which peasants have had such internal leverage, particularly during historical political crises of agrarian states, is explained by structural and situational conditions that affect: (1) the degrees and kinds of solidarity of peasant communities; (2) the degrees of peasant autonomy from day-to-day supervision and control by landlords and their agents; and (3) the relaxation of state coercive sanctions against peasant revolts...it is never enough merely to identify different strata of property holders, abstracting away from institutional contexts.[44]

Wolf also notes the role of institutional or power relations, but argues that it is neither the poor peasants and landless labourers nor the rich peasant that will have internal leverage.

> The only component of the peasantry which does have some internal leverage is either landowning 'middle peasantry' or a peasantry located in a peripheral area outside the domains of landlord control. Middle peasantry refers to a peasant population which has secure access to land of its own and cultivates it with family labor. Where these middle peasant holdings lie within the power domain of a superior, possession of their own resources provides the holders with the minimal tactical freedom required to challenge their overlord.[45]

The middle peasantry thus is the pivotal group in the popular uprising and any factor, like ethnicity and geographic location, which adds to its "tactical mobility" also reinforces

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[44]Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions, pp. 115-116.

[45]Wolf, Peasant Wars, p. 291.

its revolutionary potential. Poor peasants, landless labourers and rich peasants are unlikely to engage in revolutionary activity, unless an "external force, such as the Chinese Red Army, proves capable of destroying...the power which constrains."[46]

Paige, on the other hand, notes that peasants dependent on income from wages, whether from sharecropping or migratory labour, are likely to engage in revolutionary action. This statement is qualified, however, by the requirement that the particular type of income has to be combined with a particular type of income of rural classes in order to be a revolution. Thus

> A combination of noncultivators dependent on income from land and cultivators dependent on income from wages leads to revolution. Such a combination of income sources is typical of sharecropping and migratory labor estate systems. The revolutionary movement demands the redistribution of landed property through the seizure of the state... A combination of noncultivators dependent on income from capital and cultivators dependent on income from wages leads to a reform labor movement.[47]

For Paige they types of rural income and the combination of types is thus critical.

Second, it is important to understand that the peasantry (or rather critical portions of the peasantry) and their actions do not constitute a self-liberating, ascendant class in the Marxist mold, though they do have common interests.

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[46] Ibid., p. 290.

[47] Paige, p. 71. See also Theda Skocpol, "What Makes Peasants Revolutionary?" Comparative Politics 14 (April 1982) 1982): 351-375.

The peasantry functions as a pivotal population group with similar interests which establishes a coalition with or is led by marginal elites. The revolutionary coalition incorporates the peasantry, elites and other population groups. In this coalition the marginal elites are important, for they in effect constitute a revolutionary leadership, shaping both the ideas that animate the revolution and the organizational forms of the coalition itself.[48]

With regard to the revolutionary ideology generated by the revolutionary elite, structural analysts note the consistent appearance of radical nationalism or varieties of it.[49] They contest, however, that an understanding of ideology is necessary to explain the practical strategies of revolutionaries during the struggle for power or for explaining the outcomes of the revolution. In part the de-emphasis of ideology is due to the structural perspective of outcome-oriented analyses, which opposes the notion that revolutions

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[48]In describing revolutionary elites, Skocpol emphasizes that they should not be viewed as representatives of classes or as willful individuals struggling to implement a particular ideological vision of society. They should be viewed as "that which political leaderships in revolutionary crises are above all doing - claiming and struggling to maintain state power." Skocpol, States and Social Revolution, pp. 164-165. But this still begs the question of why some individuals lead revolutions while others are followers. Here Wolf states that they are "marginal" men because they have been barred from positions of power by virtue of their unused skills or social positions. Wolf, Peasant Wars, pp. 287-289.

[49]Paige, pp. 59-71 and Skocpol, States and Social Revolution, pp. 168-171.

are caused or carried out by a "determined, organized vanguard," though revolutionary elites may be determined and well-organized. From the structural perspective, revolutionary ideology is seen as a resource, insofar as its nature projects a broad appeal to diverse segments of the population and it facilitates the proselytizing efforts of the revolutionary elite to encourage broadly-based popular participation.[50]

There is significant variation in the political organizations generated during the revolutionary process. In his study of the organizational forms of six revolutions, Wolf notes that two forms are common, namely a military organization (or army) and a para-military party. Within these organizational forms, however, there are different types of political-military interaction.

In the Mexican and Algerian cases, the revolutionary organization took the form of an army organized, respectively, by a civilian-military leadership and a wartime coalition of nationalists. Since this type reflects the primacy of military needs during the struggle for power, later efforts to transform the army into a political party may meet with some difficulty. In the Russian, Chinese and Vietnamese revolutions a different type emerged, where the "roles of the

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[50]Skocpol, States and Social Revolution, pp. 169-171.

army and party were reversed."[51] The direction of the revolutionary struggle was by a political party with a para-military nature:

> In these three cases, it was the political parties of middle-class revolutionaries who engineered the seizure of power and created the social and military instruments which conquered the state, and ensured transition to a new social order. It is probably no accident that these are also three countries which were characterized by patterns of conspiratorial and secret societies before the advent of revolution...It is here - and only here - that the party as a separate body comes to dominate the other organizations thrown up by the revolution.[52]

The political party may be based in urban areas, as in the case of Russia, or rural areas like China and Vietnam.[53] A third type emerged in the Cuban revolution, and consisted neither of an army nor a para-military party but "a small group of armed rebels who, very much by accident, had established themselves in the one part of the island inhabited by a tactically mobile peasantry. Once in power, this rebel group made use of the Communist party apparatus..."[54] This type is uncommon and has been criticized for its strategic inefficiency.[55]

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[51]Wolf, Peasant Wars, p. 297.

[52]Ibid., pp. 297-298.

[53]Ibid., p. 298.

[54]Ibid., p. 299.

[55]Ibid.

Thus there are two major organizational types, namely the army or military organization and the para-military party. Whether the para-military party is based in rural or urban areas also results in organizational differences. Two questions logically emerge from these organizational differences. One is why some revolutions generate a particular organizational form. The other question is what the implications of organizational forms are for revolutionary outcomes.

In addressing the question of why one revolution generates a particular organizational form, Wolf notes that there is no easy solution in the offing, but argues that particular patterns are a function of the development of revolutions, which includes support groups, ideological proclivity, strategic thinking, and the locus of warfare. In the Russian revolution, for example, the development of an organizational form was influenced by the existence of secret societies before the revolution, the fact that the party drew its main support not from the peasantry but from industrial workers in key regions, and that industrialization as an ideological goal necessitated the development of cadre that could occupy key economic positions in the post-violent stages of the revolution. In the Chinese revolution, however, there

> seem to have been tensions between groups in the party which favored the Russian model of development, and those

> who, during the years of protracted war, had learned to put their faith in a peasant army with an egalitarian ideology. The experience of war in the hinterland had taken them far from the cities and industrial areas; it had taught them the advantages of dispersal, of a wide distribution of basic skills rather than a dense concentration of advanced skills. The citizen-soldiers of the guerrilla army had, in fact, lived lives in which the roles of peasant, worker, soldier, and intellectual intermingled to the point of fusion.[56]

The result was that a party did emerge, but that it contained a military sub-organization that was increasingly powerful.[57]

With regard to the later implications of organizational forms, Wolf notes that the Russian case is exceptional. Here the development of a strong party and political component to the revolutionary movement coincided with the development of an "effective managerial class and a population of skilled industrial workers."[58] The outcome is "a strongly hierarchical society, operated by technocrats, 'experts and Red', but above all experts."[59] Where the party component is not as strongly developed during the revolutionary struggle for power, as in the Algerian case, the army forged during the struggle has to stabilize the society."[60]

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[56]Ibid., p. 300.

[57]Ibid., pp. 300-301.

[58]Ibid., p. 300.

[59]Ibid.

[60]Ibid., p. 297.

Even in the case of the Chinese revolution, where a party did emerge during the struggle, the army may become increasingly important and do so at the expense of the party.[61]

Organizational forms are not the only factor to influence the outcomes of revolutions and have to be considered along with such factors as international market forces and domestic resources. Yet it is during the revolutionary process that political groups and ideas are defined: an elite emerges, as well as followers, which are linked in an organizational form with political goals.

Third, structural analysts insist that the reaction of the state to revolutionary challenge is a critical ingredient of the course of revolutions. There are several reasons for this key role. Perhaps the most important of these is that the state's response to revolutionary challenge influences - if not determines - the immediate outcome of the struggle for power. Changes by the challenged regime of policies, laws, practices or resource distribution results in a redistribution of groups' power once the violent phase of the struggle for power has ended.[62] Here it is noted that the regime will not be toppled if it manages to maintain centralized control over its armed forces, prevents the disintegration of these forces,

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[61] Ibid., pp. 300-301.

[62] Gurr, "On the Coutcomes of Violent Conflict", pp. 254-255.

and effectively uses them to counter the revolutionaries' actions.[63]

Another reason for the key role of the state in the process of revolution is that, although the revolutionary process was precipitated by administrative incapacitation and the revolutionary crisis "does entail institutional breakdowns and class conflicts that quickly change what is possible in a given society, many conditions - especially socio-economic conditions - always 'carry over' from the old regime."[64] During the revolutionary process the challenged regime is, in other words, never totally dismantled. Some portions of the old regime remain, others are transformed, and another portion of it may disappear.

The importance of the remnants of the old regime is underscored by the fact that clearcut victories (or losses) are rare in revolutionary struggles for power. In studying internal wars which were begun or in progress in 119 nations or colonies between 1961 and 1965, Gurr notes:

> There were forty-eight distinguishable guerrilla, civil and revolutionary wars, not counting coups, military

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[63]See John Ellis, Armies in Revolution (New York: Oxford University Press, 1974); Katherine Chorley, Armies and the Art of Revolution (London: Faber and Faber, 1943); and D.E.H. Russell, Rebellion, Revolution and Armed Force: A Comparative Study of Fifteen Countries with Special Emphasis on Cuba and South Africa (New York: Academic Press, 1974).

[64]Skocpol, States and Social Revolution, p. 171.

> rebellions, or isolated instances of armed resistance. By 1978 three were still major conflicts, while fragmentary accounts indicated that sporadic resistance continued in nine other instances...clear-cut revolutionary victories are uncommon. It is also evident that decisive outcomes are not as common in most internal wars as they have been in the best-known historical examples, for instance, France 1789 and 1848, the United States 1865, Russia 1917, China 1949, Greece 1949, Cuba 1959, Nigeria 1970 and Vietnam 1974. Dramatic victory and defeat have impressed these examples on political memory. The more numerous revolts that have ended in compromise and mutual exhaustion are less often remembered...[65]

In studying the "endings" of revolutionary struggles marked by the use of guerrilla warfare as a means, Pirouet comes to a similar conclusion about their indecisive nature. Here it is noted that there are four different types of endings:

The first type of ending is a formally negotiated settlement of the conflict between the regime and the revolutionary leaders, such as the Sudan. All revolutionary leaders are not necessarily involved in the negotiations or included in the final settlement. The reason is that the challenged regime usually prefers to negotiate with the moderate faction of the opposition, whether actual or perceived. If the regime has decided that it cannot win and concludes a formal settlement, such a settlement therefore usually brings moderates to power. A second type of ending is an informal or unofficial negotiated settlement. An example of this type is the ending of the Mau Mau Emergency

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[65]Gurr, "On the Outcomes of Violent Conflict," pp. 266-267.

in Kenya. The challenged regime again prefers to negotiate with moderate factions or leaders of the revolutionary movement. The possibility of such negotiations however depends on whether the moderate faction holds positions of power within the revolutionary movement or organization. Even if they do hold powerful positions, they may not be willing to negotiate with the regime; willingness to negotiate depends on whether the regime has managed to redress the grievances associated with the moderate faction. A third type of ending consists of a military victory by the revolutionary movement which, although there are some dramatic examples of military takeovers, are in fact uncommon. Here attempts at settlement -informal or formal - may have been made during the course of the conflict, but have failed to resolve the conflict. Since military victory is often a necessary condition of political takeover, this type of ending favours the radical factions of the revolutionary movement who usually have a narrow political support base. A final type of ending consists of a regime victory, such as Malaya, with military defeat avoided.[66]

A final reason for the focus on the state in the revolutionary process is that the regime's response to

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[66]Louise Pirouet, "Armed Resistance and Counter-Insurgency: Reflections in the Anya Nya and Mau Mau Experiences" in Ali A. Mazrui, ed., The Warrior Tradition in Modern Africa (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1977), pp. 205-210.

revolutionary challenge may initiate political and socio-economic changes with longlasting effect. Although the regime initiates changes to avoid political or military defeat, its ultimate effect is on society as a whole when the violent phase of the revolution has ended. Examples of this type of change can be found, especially in counterinsurgency strategies which may include population removal, land reform, economic growth or foreign dependency.[67] It has indeed been argued that such changes initiated by regimes during the revolutionary process in an effort to survive have the effect of transforming the regime and - to varying degrees - the society as well. As such it is one of the important factors affecting revolutionary outcomes.[68]

Although structural analyses thus have not attempted to develop stage-type explanations of the revolutionary process, they do stipulate three critical factors in the course of revolutions' development: A popular uprising coincides with the incapacitation of the central political machinery, usually consisting of a peasant revolt in rural areas. The peasants do not act as a self-liberating class but enter into

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[67]For a summary of the basic types of counterinsurgency or counter-revolutionary guerrilla warfare see Eqbal Ahmad, "Revolutionary Warfare and Counterinsurgency" in Norman Miller and Roderick Aya, eds., National Liberation (New York: The Free Press, 1971), pp. 137-213.

[68]Gurr, "On the Outcomes of Violent Conflict," p. 255.

a revolutionary coalition with other societal groups. This organizational form of the revolutionary movement usually reveals an elite, followers and political goals. Finally, the response of the existing regime is crucial to the development of the course of revolutionary events.

One implication of this view of the course of revolutions is that it collapses many of the distinctions other scholars, like Huntington, make between Western and Eastern revolutions. As indicated earlier, Huntington argues that Western revolutions have an urban focus and Eastern ones have a rural focus. Skocpol, however states:

> Urban workers, whether preindustrial or industrial, have often played highly visible parts in (failed as well as successful) revolutions. And their aims and achievements have been linked to those of self-consciously revolutionary leaderships. Hence insurrectionary urban workers seem like true revolutionaries compared to peasants who merely 'rebel' in the countryside, far from the centers of national-political consciousness and decision. Nevertheless, peasant revolts have been the crucial insurrectionary ingredient in virtually all actual (i.e. successful) revolutions to date, and certainly in the French, Russian and Chinese Revolutions. This is not surprising, given that social revolutions have occurred in agrarian countries where peasants are the major producing class. Without peasant revolts, urban radicalism in predominantly agrarian countries has not in the end been able to accomplish social-revolutionary transformations.[69]

Thus rural occurrences are crucial - although not necessarily the most visible - parts of even Western revolutions.

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[69] Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions, pp. 112-113.

3.3. The Consequences of Revolution

The preceding outline of the structural analysts' conception of the causes and course of revolutions makes it clear that revolutions do not ensconce willful revolutionaries or particular classes in positions of total governmental power. If this were the case, the consequences of revolutions would not be problematic. The intentions or ideology of revolutionaries would be the major influence on outcomes, or the interests of certain classes would make future directions a foregone conclusion.[70]

Although the view of outcomes in studies by Skocpol, Eisenstadt, Paige and Trimberger differ in many respects, they share one important generalization: the consequences of revolutions are determined by the policies followed by the new political elite.[71] Policy-making in the post-violent stages of the revolution is, however, subject to a number of structural constraints. Perhaps the most important structural constraint is that the international pressures which triggered the incapacitation of the central administration continue to exist. Although interstate wars and political conflicts may abate, international economic forces continue to exert a powerful influence. This influence is evident in

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[70] Ibid., pp. 6-18.

[71] See also Gurr, "On the Outcomes of Violent Conflict", p. 291.

two dimensions. In the international dimension the state and its economic organizations encounter the economic organizations, interests and influence of more powerful states. This structure of inequality, it is argued, is a logical product of the nature of the capitalist world economy, where the development of one state's economy, particularly in North America and Western Europe, is systematically related to the underdevelopment of agrarian states in Latin America, Africa and Southeast Asia. In the domestic dimension there is also a pattern of inequality between the more developed, usually urban centers and the underdeveloped hinterland.[72] Together the international and domestic structures of inequality constrain the actions of the new elite in achieving their goals. Production, for example, may still be based on the output of the rural or peasant sectors of the society, where efforts to increase production may arouse the animosity of both the landed classes and the peasantry. Even if the production of these sectors could be increased, however, the products tend to be of an agricultural (or primary) kind for which the world prices fluctuate. Perpetually unsure of its foreign exchange earnings, the new elite finds it difficult to engage in longterm planning in pursuit of its goals. In short, conditions of economic

[72]See Galtung, pp. 81-90.

dependence and inequality limit the policy-making options of the new regime.[73]

Another constraint is the political nature, resources and abilities of the new elite. One reason for this constraining influence is that the new regime also incorporates members of the old regime. Revolutions, and particularly revolutions marked by the use of guerrilla warfare, typically produce negotiated endings to the violent phase of the revolution. Consequently members of the old regime may - to varying degree - retain their positions in executive, legislative, judicial and bureaucratic bodies. In addition to actions of the new (or old revolutionary) elite being subverted from within governmental areas, the social support base of the revolutionary elite also constrains its options. Trimberger, for example, notes that since revolutions "from above" occur without the mobilization of mass support the regime relies on the political support of specific groups in society, such as the military establishment and landed aristocrats. Landed aristocrats then may exercise political veto power over policies that threaten their position or at least may refuse to cooperate with, for example, a land reform program.[74] Skocpol,

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[73]See Gunner Myrdal, Rich Lands and Poor: The Road to World Prosperity (New York: Harper and Row, 1957); and H.W. Singer, "The Distribution of Gains between Borrowing and Investing Countries," American Economic Review 40 (May 1950): 473-485.

[74]Trimberger, pp. 156-174.

similarly, argues that the interests of the new regime's supporters constrains its actions. The political support base of the French National Assembly, for example, was composed of peasants, skilled labourers and small businessmen, all of whom sought to either acquire or consolidate property. The French National Assembly then could not follow policies which denied the principle of private property or redistributed property.[75]

While Skocpol and Trimberger stress the political resources of the new regime, Einsenstadt stresses its nature. Here the reference is to nature as it is revealed in the political actions of the revolutionary elite during the causal and course-stages of the revolution. Eisenstadt notes that revolutionary elites that are most isolated from both the elites of the old regime and other revolutionary groups do not hesitate to follow policies marked by coercion and centralized state power. Isolated revolutionary elites, in other words, tend to monopolize power. Revolutionary elites with well-developed ties with either pre-revolutionary elites or other revolutionary groups, on the other hand, tend towards consensus and democratic policy directions.[76]

Finally the relation of the political and organizational resources of the new regime to the socio-economic base

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[75]Skocpol, States and Social Revolution, pp. 178-179.

[76]Eisenstadt, pp. 245-246.

of the regime may act as a constraint. In particular, the direction of economic policies is influenced by the abilities of the regime to control the activities of the industrial sectors of the society. If the pre-revolutionary order witnessed the growth of powerful industries, redistributive economic policies are unlikely. If industries do exist but are not powerful, on the other hand, the new regime may be able to control their activities through centralization and socialist policies,[77] or may seek to encourage industrial growth through state intervention in the economy.[78]

The outcomes of revolutions are thus the consequences of the new regime's policies, but this policy-making is subject to a number of constraints embedded in the structure of the new regime and the society at large. The state's position in the international political economy and the pressures resulting from it, the political composition of the new regime and the contradictory pressures contained in it, and the relation of the socio-economic remnants of the old order to the resources of the new regime act as constraints upon the - not altogether new - regime. Indeed, an old regime attempting to maintain its position in the face of revolutionary challenge may initiate as many changes as does a "new" regime. Although

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[77]Skocpol, States and Social Revolution, pp. 206-281.

[78]Russia is a good example of this type. Ibid., pp. 206-235.

qualitative changes thus may emerge, they are not attributable to the willful actions of new regimes nor do they constitute dramatic historical breakpoints in the development of societies.

4. Revolutions in Africa

Revolutions in non-Western settings are often seen as a crises in modernizing societies. Best presented by Huntington, this perspective argues that revolutions are likely neither in highly modernized nor in traditional societies, but in transitional societies that have experienced some exposure to modern socio-economic and political forces. Revolution is an extreme case of the lag of political-institutional development behind socio-economic development. When a political institution, like a political party, cannot absorb the popular participation engendered by socio-economic development, instability results. Revolution is seen as an extreme case of this instability.[79]

Distinctions between revolutions in Western and non-Western settings are particularly evident as regards their course. Huntington argues that "Western"[80] revolutions occur in societies marked by monarchical political rule combined

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[79]Huntington, passim.

[80]The terms Western and Eastern are not used in a geographic sense. Ibid., p. 266.

with the political and socio-economic influence of the landed aristocracy. One or another crisis then causes the collapse of the old political order. "Eastern" revolutions occur during later historical periods, when previously traditional societies have been exposed to modernizing influences (mainly through colonialism). A "Western" revolution typically witnesses - in sequence - the collapse of the old regime's political institutions, the mobilization of new groups into political life and then the creation of new political institutions.[81]

In contrast, an "Eastern" revolution

> begins with the mobilization of new groups into politics and the creation of new political institutions and ends with the violent overthrow of the political institutions of the old order...In general, the sequence of movement from one phase to the next is much more clearly demarcated in the Western revolution than in the Eastern type. In the latter all three phases tend to occur more or less simultaneously...In the Western revolution, political mobilization is the consequence of the collapse of the old regime; in the Eastern revolution it is the cause of the destruction of the old regime.[82]

It must be pointed out that the differences in the course of Western and Eastern revolutions reveal dramatic differences in geographic focus and strategy. The geographic focus of Western revolutions, according to Huntington,[83] is urban areas

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[81] Ibid., pp. 266-267.

[82] Ibid.

[83] This view is contested by most structuralist analysts. See Skocpol, States and Social Revolution. pp. 112-113.

where governmental collapse creates an arena for political conflict and provides strategic incentives for competing groups. At the outset of Eastern revolutions, however, the government is strong, forcing contenders to

> withdraw from central, urban areas of the country, establish a base area of control in a remote section, struggle to win the support of the peasants through terror and propaganda, slowly expand the scope of their authority, and gradually escalate the level of their operations from individual terroristic attacks to guerrilla warfare to mobile warfare and regular warfare. Eventually they are able to defeat the governmental troops in battle. The last phase of the revolutionary struggle is the occupation of the capital.[84]

Thus the geographic focus of Eastern revolutions is the countryside and their strategic hallmark is revolutionary guerrilla warfare.

It is obvious that Huntington's views are influenced by those of Mao. The writings of Mao on guerrilla warfare, along with their apparent applications in revolutions during the post-1945 period in fact attracted much attention, with most scholars studying the strategic dimensions of those revolutions. Foremost in this genre is the work of Leites and Wolf, as well as works by Galula, Pustay, Paret, Thompson, Shy and others.[85] Much of the work of the strategic theorists

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[84]Huntington, pp. 271-272.

[85]David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare, Theory and Practice (New York: Praeger, 1964); J. S. Pustay, Counter-insurgency Warfare (New York: Free Press, 1965); Peter Paret and John Shy, Guerrillas in the 1960's (New York: Praeger, 1962); and Sir Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency The Lessons of Malaya and Vietnam (New York: Praeger, 1967).

has been subject to criticism, particularly as to its tendency to overgeneralize[86] and its lopsidedness.[87] Perhaps the most important contribution of these scholars nevertheless is the development of a view - albeit strategic and biased toward the actions of revolutionaries (that is, excluding governmental actions) - of how guerrilla warfare progresses in stages.

According to this view guerrilla warfare starts (in Stage 1) as societal penetration by guerrilla cadre. Societal penetration embraces a variety of techniques, all of which are designed to develop and firmly entrench a covert organization capable of administrative control over the local population. The military wing of this structure engages in occasional acts of violence which underline governmental inefficiency (or revolutionary efficiency) while providing the revolutionaries with supplies and recruits. In Stage II the revolutionaries expand both the administrative-political and military wings of their organization. As an administrative entity the revolutionary organization attracts increasing loyalty from greater numbers of the local population, and becomes more open in its operation. Its increasingly

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[86]See J. Bowyer Bell, The Myth of the Guerrilla (New York: Knopf, 1971) and Chalmers Johnson, Autopsy on Peoples' War (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1973).

[87]Theories were lopsided in the sense that they emphasized one or the other side in the revolutionary conflict; conflict as a dialectic was ignored.

overt nature is due to the fact that the revolutionaries' military wing has managed to force the withdrawal of government forces to urban areas. Ensconced in their base areas, the revolutionaries are in a position to start institutionalizing their notions of governmental and economic efficiency. During Stage III the administrative capabilities of the revolutionaries continue to expand. The most important change in this phase is that of the military wing, which becomes conventional in posture and tactics, and engages governmental forces in conventionally styled battles. If the revolutionaries achieve success during Stage III, the government's defeat is a foregone conclusion. Stage IV indeed consists of the revolutionary takeover of the central governmental machinery and the national institutionalization of the revolution.[88]

The history of African states attest to the frequency of various kinds of violent upheavals. Traditional societies in the pre-colonial era, for example, were often governed by warrior elites, whose existence depended on and led to the cultivation of martial traditions. Among others, the cultivation of martial traditions included the conduct

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[88]Mao Tse-tung, Guerrilla Warfare, translated by Samuel B. Griffith (New York: Praeger, 1961). Mao did not formulate a stage theory in explicit terms; explication has come from interpretations of Mao's works and military practice. See John J. McCuen, The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War (London: Faber and Faber, 1966), pp. 50-73.

of military campaigns against neighboring societies.[89] The later imposition of colonial rule was frequently met by violent resistance from these warrior elites and by others who refused allegiance to European rule. Although this resistance did not prevent the imposition of colonial rule, colonial history was also punctuated by violent episodes aimed at the overthrow of colonial regimes and pacification campaigns to counter such attempts.[90] In the period between 1955 and 1965 virtually all African colonies acquired independence. With a few exceptions, the achievement of independence however was a relatively peaceful affair, conducted by political parties.[91]

In the period since 1965 the political leaders and parties of independent African states have been challenged

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[89]See, for example, Eugene V. Walter, Terror and Resistance (London: Oxford University Press, 1969); and Adda B. Bozeman, Conflict in Africa (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976).

[90]Opposition to the imposition of colonial rule is often called "primary resistance". Later attempts to overthrow colonial rule took many forms. See Robert I. Rotberg and Ali A. Mazrui, eds. Protest and Power in Black Africa (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), pp. 3-142.

[91]There is growing opposition to using such broad categories as "Third World", "non-Western world" or even "African Conflict" because they contain many diverse components despite geographic proximity. When the term African Revolutions is here used, it refers primarily to sub-Saharan Africa or Black Africa. Of the Islamic African countries and revolutions in them, only Algeria is included, because of its similarity to the other settler colonies of Africa.

by the military, leading to a rash of military coups, several of which were marked by violence.[92] Independent African states have also been confronted by army mutinies (such as those in Tanzania and the former Congo-Kinshasa), attempted secessions (like that of Katanga from Congo-Kinshasa and Biafra from Nigeria), civil wars (Chad and the Sudan), violent border disputes (for example, between Somalia and Kenya), violent clashes over disputed territories (such as Western Sahara), and interstate wars (between Uganda and Tanzania).[93] Despite the contention that Western social science theory does not apply to African forms of conflict,[94] this wide

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[92]On the role of the military establishment in African politics, see William F. Gutteridge, The Military in African Politics (London: Methuen, 1969); and J. M. Lee, African Armies and Civil Order (London: Chatto and Windus, 1969). On coups, see Samuel Decalo, Coups and Army Rule in Africa: Studies in Military Style (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1976).

[93]See William Eckhardt and Edward Azar, "Major Conflicts and Interventions, 1945-1975," International Interactions 5 (1978): 75-110; Mohammed Ayoob, ed., Conflict and Intervention in the Third World (London: St. Martin's Press, 1980); Robert F. Gorman Political Conflict in the Horn of Africa (New York: Praeger Press, 1981); and Aristide Zolberg, "The Structure of Political Conflict in the New States of Africa," American Political Science Review 62 (March 1968): 70-87.

[94]Bozeman, p. 219. While Bozeman's argument is that Western social science is inapplicable to African conflict because Africans' mental view and social practice of conflict is radically un-Western, others have criticized Western social science theory on the grounds of its counter-revolutionary, bourgeois, dogmatic, and superficial nature. This has led many scholars to amend and supplant Western scientific theories and concepts. For a review, see Peter Waterman, "On Radicalism In African Studies," Politics and Society 3 (Spring 1973): 261-281.

range of violent phenomena in Africa have been studied from a variety of scholarly perspectives, including relative deprivation theory, mobilization theory, class analysis, civil-military relations, pluralism, race relations and culture.[95] Causal questions tend to dominate these theoretical explanations, with less attention paid to the course

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[95]For explanations using concepts related to the study of civil-military interaction, see Claude Welch, ed., Soldier and State in Africa (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1970); and Decalo. Class analyses is found in, for example, Brian Bunting, The Rise of the South African Reich (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1969) and Samir Amin, Unequal Development: An Essay in the Social Formations of Peripheral Capitalism (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1977) Probably the best use of pluralism is contained in Leo Kuper and M. G. Smith, eds., Pluralism in Africa (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1969). The relative deprivation explanation is widely used. For criticism of this view, see Nkemdirim, who points out that the relation between relative deprivation and political violence in Africa is neither close nor consistent. Bernard A. Nkemdirim "Reflections on Political Conflict, Rebellion and Revolution in Africa" Journal of Modern African Studies 15 (March 1977): 75-90. Lofchie stresses the role of organizational forms and resources, powershifts and the reaction of the regime to challenge as more critical factors. See Michael F. Lofchie Zanzibar: Background to Revolution (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965). In a study of the Mau Mau Emergency Berman also points to the importance of the regime's response to challenge, and the structural determinants of that response. See Bruce J. Berman, "Bureaucracy and Incumbent Violence: Colonial Administration and the Origins of the 'Mau Mau' Emergency in Kenya," British Journal of Political Science 6 April 1976): 143-175. The factors of race are usually the centerpiece of studies on South Africa. Racial factors are also stressed in countries containing a population of both black and Arab Africans. See M. O. Beshir , The Southern Sudan: Background to Conflict (New York: Praeger, 1968) and Victor Olorunsola, ed., The Politics of Cultural Sub-Nationalism in Africa (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1972). For criticism of the view that ethnic diversity is strongly related to political instability, see Walter L. Barrows, "Ethnic Diversity and Political Instability in Black Africa," Comparative Political Studies 9 (July 1976): 139-170. For mobilization

or outcomes of episodes of violent conflict. A notable exception in the latter regard is the well-developed debate about the consequences of military coups.[96]

Although various forms of conflict occur in Africa, few of these violent occurrences are described as revolutions. The term revolution is nevertheless often used to describe events in Algeria, Kenya, Mozambique, Angola, the former Portugese territory of Guinea, Zanzibar, Namibia, Zimbabwe and South Africa.[97] Since conditions commonly associated with violence are prevalent in Africa, this raises the question of why some African societies are revolution-prone while others are merely conflict-prone.

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theory, see Huntington and Raymond Duvall and M. Welfling, "Social Mobilization, Political Institutionalization and Conflict in Black Africa," Journal of Conflict Resolution 17 (December 1973): 673-702.

[96]For opposing viewpoints in this regard, see Henry Bienen, ed., The Military Intervenes: Case Studies in Political Development (New York: Russel Sage, 1968); R. D. McKinlay and A. S. Cohan, "A Comparative analysis of the political and economic performance of military and civilian regimes," Comparative Politics 8 (1975): 1-10; and Huntington, pp. 192-263.

[97]The inclusion of Namibia and South Africa should be qualified. In the case of Namibia, the issue of decolonization as an international-legal matter, as well as the geographic concentration of guerrilla attacks and South Africa's presence, makes it difficult to view the occurrences there simply as a revolution-in-progress. In the case of South Africa, it is widely accepted that the preconditions for revolution exist, but that the course of the revolution has not entered a phase of intense and widespread violence. Some have even argued that it is unlikely to enter such a phase. See Russel.

If the term revolution is used in the sense of widespread and intense violence,[98] it is easy to see why the occurrences listed above are described as revolutionary. All the societies mentioned share a history of settler colonialism, characterized by the presence of substantial numbers of whites and by the political self-government exercised by those whites in colonial territories. This monopoly of state power and influence led to certain socio-economic changes as well.[99] Although Zanzibar varies from this pattern in some respects, it also was governed by an ethnically distinct minority who monopolized state and socio-economic control.[100] These entrenched minorities

> have been formidable adversaries resisting claims for equality or self-government. Constraints that inhibit a more powerful metropolitan power's employment of force are virtually absent in the case of a settler regime. For settlers, the issue is not whether to fight, but how.[101]

Legum indeed has argued that the degree of violent resistance to majority rule depends on two variables, namely the size of the white population and their degree of economic and political

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[98] Gurr, WMR, p. 11.

[99] For the development of the idea of settler colonialism, see Kenneth Good, "Settler Colonialism: Economic Development and Class Formation," Journal of Modern African Studies 14 (December 1976): 597-620.

[100] See Lofchie.

[101] Kenneth W. Grundy, "Black Soldiers in a White Military: Political Change in South Africa," The Journal of Strategic Studies 4 (September 1981): 296. See also Andrew J.R. Mack, "Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict," World Politics 27 (January 1975): 191.

control.[102]

Yet there are other scholars who argue that change is the definitive property of revolutions, entailing qualitative socio-economic and political changes. The use of these theories to describe revolutions and potential revolutions in Africa has led to disagreement. One school of thought holds that the requisite causal socio-economic and other changes have taken place, but that there are several conditions which discourage concerted action by revolutionaries. Tribal and regional animosities are cited, for example. Here the existence of primordial attachments in urban and rural areas make it difficult for revolutionaries to form a united front.[103] Another critical obstacle to revolutionaries' concerted action is the repressive capabilities of the regime in power. By effectively using the military and police establishments the regime manages to prevent opposition movements from developing to revolutionary proportions.[104] The existence

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[102]Colin Legum, "Looking to the Future" in Gwendolen M. Carter and Patrick O'Meara, eds., Southern Africa in Crisis (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1977), pp. 258-259.

[103]Richard Gibson African Liberation Movements (London: Oxford University Press, 1972).

[104]See, for example, B. F. Jundaian, "Resettlement Programs: Counterinsurgency in Mozambique," Comparative Politics 6 (July 1974): 519-540; and Gerald J. Bender, "The Limits of Counterinsurgency: An African Case," Comparative Politics 4 (April 1972): 331-360. The repressive actions of the regime, however, are often also seen as causing further violence and rebelliousness. See Donald Barnett and Karari Njama, Mau Mau From Within: Autobiography and Analysis of Kenya's Peasant Revolt (London: MacGibbon and Kee, 1968).

of these domestic obstacles to revolutionary action is complemented by international obstacles. Pirouet, for example, notes that the success or failure of revolutions in Africa is determined not by why and how they occur, but by when. The historical timing of revolutions is critical, because it is related to the possibility of outside support. States that achieved independence before 1965 are now all members of the Organization for African Unity which, except for the case of white minority-ruled states, accords basic regime legitimacy to the governments of fellow member-states of the OAU. Thus opposition movements in black-ruled states are denied legitimacy and support.[105]

Another school of thought holds that the requisite socio-economic, psycho-cultural political changes to cause revolutions in most African states have not taken place. Bozeman stresses the requisite psycho-cultural dispositions, arguing that a promethean "inner order" is absent. The form and frequency of African conflict is in fact not a result of deprivations, but of resilient traditional perceptions of the positive value of conflict and war. This results in curious paradox. Africans are comfortable with conflict, even of the protracted kind, but have thus far failed to adopt views of the progressive value of certain forms of change and violence.[106]

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[105]Pirouet, pp. 197-198.

[106]Bozeman, p. 371.

Another explanation states that although there are sufficient degrees of deprivation, governmental powers have increased. Since a critical administrative crisis is absent, the regime manages to at least postpone a revolution. An example of this situation is the South African regime's ability to keep its armed forces intact and under centralized control.[107] Marxian analysts stress the absence of the requisite class development, either with regard to urban classes or to peasants. With regard to urban classes, scholars argue that a revolution is unlikely until urban workers, particularly those in heavy industries, have developed the requisite class consciousness. The absence of industrialization, tribal and regional animosities, and other factors however discourage the political ascendance of an urban class-for-itself.[108]

The question whether the peasantry of African states have revolutionary potential is a controversial subject. On the one hand, scholars like Chaliand argue that the African peasantry does not have revolutionary potential. There are several reasons for this situation. With the exception of West African states, Chaliand argues, there are no land-related pressures on peasants. The abundance of land, low population

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[107]See Russel.

[108]See Kenneth W. Grundy, "The 'Class Struggle' in Africa: An Examination of Conflicting Theories," Journal of Modern African Studies 2 (October 1964): 379-393.

density, the fact that the land permits a subsistence economy and that ownership is allowed, and the absence of plantations collectively produce few demands for agrarian reform. Work-relationships in the agrarian areas, moreover, are paternalistic and hierarchical. Subjective conditions reinforce this lack of revolutionary potential. African peasants' worldview is characterized by magico-religious beliefs, ignorance, a passive acceptance of authority, and a lack of self-direction and initiative. A new rationality is required, stressing secular, optimistic and promethean views, but the elites of Africa have failed to do so. Leadership is drawn from the ranks of bourgeois classes and have shown themselves to be self-indulgent and complacent. Although the leadership lacks the appetite for a "real" struggle, they do lead ostensibly revolutionary movements, which are then characterized by mechanical strategic thinking, overreliance on foreign aid and external bases, intra-factional struggles, and abstract and unrealistic verbalization. This combination of revolution-by-exile and liberation-in-speech condemns the movements to political powerlessness.[109]

On the other hand there are those who argue that at least certain portions of the peasantry in African states do

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[109]Gerard Chaliand, Armed Struggle in Africa, translated by David Rattray and Robert Leonhardt with an introduction by Basil Davidson (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969), pp. 101-125 and Chaliand, Revolution in the Third World: Myths and Prospects, with an introduction by Immanuel Wallerstein (Hassocks, Sussex: The Harvester Press, 1977).

have revolutionary potential. In his study of Algeria, Wolf states that peasants suffer from the impact of three crises. First, population increases and the restriction of the available land produces a demographic crisis. Second, there is an ecological crisis which threatens the security of peasants, because the introduction of colonial and capitalist notions and practices transform the previously secure resources of peasants into market commodities. Although such apsects as private property may increase the opportunities of peasants, other aspects like taxes, rent and land-seizures and-restrictions threaten peasants' security. Third, changed notions of authority produce a crisis. Whereas previous rural power-holders exercised substantial power over the distribution of goods, colonial practices turn them into powerless bureaucrats unable to oppose, for example, the redistribution of land. A political gap between the rulers and ruled consequently exists.[110]

Although all peasants are subject to these three crises, it is the middle peasants who are most likely to participate in uprisings, that is, those with landholdings and some freedom from immediate political control. Rich or landless peasants may also come to participate in uprisings, but only if the particular revolutionary organization can challenge

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[110]Wolf, "Peasant Rebellion and Revolution" in Miller and Aya, pp. 49-66.

the power of local rulers. Thus virtually all peasants can participate in popular uprisings; it is simply that middle peasants are the first to do so.[111] Peasant uprisings, however, are not always revolutionary events, as witnessed by the jacqueries of the middle ages. Here Wolf stresses that the organizational changes wrought by the three crises also result in the adoption of a new worldview, as well as the role of "middlemen" or marginal elites to cultivate such a worldview.[112]

Since the peasantry are not self-led, Wolf notes, their role ultimately is a tragic one. They may cause the old order to collapse, but rarely gain political influence in the new order. Yet they are at least capable of playing a key role in the collapse of the old order. Tribal and regional influences do not prevent this political role; in fact, ethnic and regional distinctions may contribute to the solidarity of peasant uprisings.[113]

Paige is in broad agreement with Wolf about the revolutionary potential of peasants in Africa, but argues that it is landless peasants who will participate in revolutionary movements. This view is derived from a theory of rural class conflict which holds that rurally-based movements "are

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[111]Ibid., pp. 54-55.

[112]Ibid., pp. 59-66.

[113]Wolf, Peasant Wars, pp. 293-294.

fundamentally a result of the interaction between the political behavior associated with the principal source of income of the upper and lower agricultural classes."[114] Revolutions are likely when the upper agricultural class is dependent on income from land and the lower agricultural classes are dependent on wages earned from labor on that land. A combination of these income types and the political behaviors associated with them are found in migratory labor estate systems, and are characterized by the demands for land redistribution, the tactic of guerrilla war and nationalism as a dominant ideology.[115]

With regard to Africa, Paige notes that migratory labor estate systems are found in the settler colonies of Algeria, Kenya and Angola. Here the political behavior of the upper agricultural class (i.e. settlers) was predicated on the need to secure necessary landownership and the labor needed to cultivate that land. In Kenya, for example, these needs were satisfied:

> large-scale land concessions were granted to British settlers, and members of the indigenous population unfortunate enough to live on the settlers' new lands were declared to be squatters and moved to 'native reserves' on inferior land...the hut tax, the poll tax, and direct conscription were all used to satisfy the settlers' demand for labour...the tactics created a disenfranchised, politically powerless agricultural labor force which was paid almost nothing.[116]

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[114]Paige, p. 70.

[115]Ibid., p. 71

[116]Ibid., p. 67.

Since the agricultural labor force migrates between the estate and the traditional subsistence sector (which has been reserved for the labor force), they are incapable of generating workers' organization. The organizational framework and ideology is provided by traditional elites in the subsistence sector, who are threatened by the expanding land claims of the upper agricultural class. Thus the combination of landless migratory labourers and landholding - but threatened - traditional elites form the basis of the revolutionary uprising.[117]

Thus the debate about the revolutionary potential of the peasantry in African states seems to turn on the question whether land-related pressures are present or absent. There is further agreement that such land-related pressures exist in West Africa (according to Chaliand) and in the settler colonies (Wolf and Paige). There is disagreement, however, about the nature of land-related pressures and, consequently, which types of peasants are most likely to engage in revolutionary uprisings.

The preceding discussion illustrates that the resolution of the question why some African states are revolution-prone

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[117] Ibid., pp. 66-71 and 211-277. For other contributions to the debate about the political role of the peasantry in Africa, see Govan Mbeki, The Peasants Revolt (London: Penguin Books, 1964); Colin Leys, "Politics in Kenya: The Development of Peasant Society," British Journal of Political Science 1 (July 1971) and B. P. Singh, "The Philosophic Foundations of Mao's Peasant Communism," Indian Journal of Political Studies 1 (1977): 59-70.

while others are merely conflict-prone depends on the particular conception of revolution. In turn conceptions result in particular views and debates about the course and causes of African revolutions. With regard to the outcomes of African revolutions, the influence of particular conceptions is also evident.

When conflict is seen as the definitive property of revolutions, it has been argued that, provided the level of violence does not become too high, internal war can stimulate the political development of a developing country. Popper, for example, states that internal war can have five consequences. First, it disorganizes traditional structures such as rural villages, tribes, families, castes and landed classes which by being uprooted, are compelled to aid developmental efforts. If the level of violence is too high and the village is destroyed in the process, however, the outcome is counter-productive. Second, internal war creates new developmental social structures like cities and urban classes and compels the centralization of the existing structures. This advances the cause of political centralization and the transfer of loyalties to the nation (as opposed to parochial loyalties to subnational groupings). Third, internal war may stimulate new political structures and centralize existing structures, particularly the civil service, political parties and security organizations. Fourth, internal war may add to the country's technological resources. Although initially

used to conduct war, these resources like those in the transportation and communication fields, may later be transferred to peaceful uses. Finally, internal war may have secondary effects in that propaganda, for example, may later allow the leadership to proselytize the nation.[118]

Popper then correlates the use of certain counter-insurgent strategies with the outcomes of internal wars. A scorched earth policy, for example, does result in population displacement and their migration to cities, but this a counter-productive urbanization because the cities cannot accommodate large numbers of refugees. Slums are the result. Strategies of rural relocation can also be counter-productive, if the population is forcibly relocated, but may stimulate development if the population participates in the decision-making on where they should be relocated. Reprisals by the government and terrorist tactics by the revolutionaries can also have a developmental effect: reprisals create shared suffering which may aid the cause of nation-building, while selectively used terror may weaken an unpopular opponent.[119]

The critical indicator in this analysis thus is the level of violence, although some attention is paid to the creation of groups, and it is clear that the notion of development is used as a synonym for Westernization. Examples of

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[118]Frank J. Popper, "Internal War as a Stimulant of Political Development," Comparative Political Studies 3 (January 1971) 415-417.

[119]Ibid., pp. 418-422.

cases in Africa where the level of violence became too high are the Biafran and Algerian internal wars.[120]

When change is seen as the definitive property of revolutions, outcomes again are seen as the consequences of events during the causal and course-phases of the revolution. Chaliand, for example, holds that the changes resulting from most African revolutions are superficial or "political", such as the control over a nation's resources, some industrialization, and the strengthening of the state's bureaucratic component. Land reform programs, however, are typically neglected. The reasons for the superficiality of change are that grass-roots mobilization of peasants did not take place during the revolution (leaving peasants with an unchanged and unpromethean worldview) and that the leadership spawned by the revolution lacks the self-denying ideological firmness to perform the necessary tasks. The leadership was animated largely by wounded racial and national pride and fought to recapture racial and national identity, but the exaltation of national identity and other appeals to the nation's supposed solidarity do not remove more fundamental socio-economic cleavages.[121]

As indicated before, the view that African revolutions result in more - and unimportant - political changes than in fundamental socio-economic changes is not uncommon.

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[120] Ibid.

[121] Chaliand, Revolution in the Third World: Myths and Prospects, pp. 28-30, 70-74 and 109-117.

The reasons tend to be of two varieties: either the conditions for the ascendance of a particular class are absent, or the leadership produced by the revolution lacks ideological firmness (i.e. they lack "will"). This raises two questions: Are political[122] changes unimportant and Do revolutionary outcomes depend on class ascendance or willful revolutionaries?

With regard to the importance of political changes, it has been argued that they at least should not be underestimated. Kornhauser argues, for example, that revolutions emanate from certain structures of authority and that their outcomes change those structures of authority in negative or positive ways. Here there are four types: A revolution seeking to overthrow an alien or foreign authority may result in the achievement of political independence and the development of a political community, or it may merely result in the escape of alien authority. When a revolution seeks to strengthen a weak authority (i.e. a state with ineffective and fragmented administrative machinery) it may result in the strengthening of that state's administrative machinery or fail to do so. Revolutions emanating from the exercise of arbitrary authority may result in the establishment of constitutional

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[122]It was pointed out earlier that distinctions between "political" and "socio-economic" changes should not be overdrawn. When the term political is used in this section, it refers to formal aspects of political life, such as legal stipulations of citizenship, constitutions, the bureaucracy, the executive-legislative arrangements, the judiciary or formal relationships between them.

government or simply redress certain grievances. Finally, a revolution which results from exclusive structures of authority may result in the extension of common political rights or may merely grant special privileges to select groups.[123]

Skocpol also argues that political factors are no less important than socio-economic factors. Noting that there are major socio-economic changes that result from revolutions, she states:

> Equally if not more striking, however, are the changes that social revolutions make in the structure and function of states, in the political and administrative processes by which government leaders relate to groups in society, and in the tasks that states can successfully undertake at home and abroad. Nor are such changes in the 'state order' at all mere by-products of the changes in the social order. Indeed, to a significant degree, it is the other way around.[124]

The political changes resulting from the Russian and Chinese revolutions, for example, led to socio-economic changes. Here the revolutions brought parties to power which, by using state administrative power, sanctioned attacks on certain propertied classes and took over many economic functions previously performed by those classes.[125]

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[123]William Kornhauser, "Rebellion and Political Development" in Eckstein, Internal War, pp. 142-155.

[124]Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions, p. 164.

[125]Ibid.

Are revolutionary outcomes the result of class interests or the will of revolutionary elites? As indicated earlier, outcome-oriented analysts contest the importance of class interests and willful revolutionaries. Yet they have stressed that the use of outcome-oriented analysis should not be mechanical. In using the analysis in African revolutions, for example, the analyst should be forewarned that African states have a history marked by colonialism, are small countries, and are in highly vulnerable positions in the international market economy. It should also be noted that many African states have strong military and police establishments with well-developed repressive capabilities, which make African revolutions less likely than when the state has poorly developed coercive instruments. If revolutionary violence is initiated, the conflict initially will be highly asymmetrical.[126]

5. Structural Analysis and African Revolutions

The preceding discussion pointed out that, although there are disagreements about how the term revolution should be defined, there is agreement among scholars that revolutions involve conflict and progressive change. It is common for analysts to place revolutions under the more general categories of violence and change, thereby bifurcating revolutionary

[126] Ibid., pp. 288-290.

scholarship, but most analyses view revolution nevertheless neither as an "extreme case of violence" or as an "extreme case of change." Most analyses - either implicitly or explicitly - produce a conception of revolution that is multidimensional, thereby casting doubt on the possibility of any one theory's ability to capture the full meaning of revolution.

With regard to the causes of revolutions, structural analyses argue that states contain many elites. A revolutionary situation is created when a state elite (i.e. elites attached to the state's central political machinery or its bureaucracy), typically under the pressure of internal forces like interstate wars or competition of other states in the world capitalist economy, encounter opposition from agrarian elites opposed to the state elite's modernizing efforts. Normal tensions between a country's elites exist, but when state elites under the pressure of war want to modernize socio-economic practices, centralize the distribution of societal resources, or increase its share of production, and these efforts are opposed by rural elites on whose political support the state elites are dependent, the state's administration is incapacitated.

A revolutionary situation produced by elite conflict and resultant bureaucratic incapacitation does not necessarily lead to revolution. The state elites may be able to institute a "revolution from above," i.e. manage to reform the

state's political machinery and institute changes in its dominant socio-economic forms. Yet even failure to do so does not necessitate a revolution. A revolution occurs when the incapacitation of the state's central political machinery coincides with a popular, usually rural or peasant revolt. These rural revolts are unlike the peasant jacqueries of the medieval period, because of the influence of the forces of modernity on thought patterns and forms of organization. There is disagreement, however, on which peasants are most likely to participate in revolutionary uprisings: some argue that peasants' political independence (or at least a degree of it) is critical, while others argue that landholdings are critical. Another school of thought argues that it is the combination of certain forms of wage labour with certain forms of ownership that is crucial to determine not only the likelihood of a peasant revolt, but also the type of goals that the revolutionary movememt will adopt.

Thus the course of revolutions is characterized by peasant revolts. The course is also marked by the development of a revolutionary coalition. Here most structural analysts argue that peasants do not constitute a self-liberating class, but forge political links with marginal elites from which the revolutionary leadership is drawn. The links between followers and elites are most visible in the organizations that the revolutionary movement generates. Revolutionary organizations tend to be of two types, namely the military organization

(or army) and the para-military party which, moreover, show different patterns of civil-military interaction within themselves. Although outcome-oriented analyses note that revolutionary organizations also generate an ideology, which tends to be a brand of radical nationalism, the role of ideology generally is de-emphasized. Ideology is seen as an organizational resource. More important are the organizations that are generated, because they influence outcomes.

Along with the conditions conducive to peasant revolts, structural analysts stress the importance of the response by the state to revolutionary challenge. Of particular importance is the regime's ability to use coercion effectively and, equally critical, to maintain cohesion of and centralized control over its armed forces. The response of the regime is also important in two other respects: although its response is mainly aimed at maintaining itself (or suppressing the revolutionary group), that response may initiate long-lasting socio-economic changes; and regime response determines the immediate outcome of the conflict. With regard to the immediate outcomes, it is pointed out that a redistribution of power among contending groups occurs, but that clearcut victories and losses are rare, especially in revolutions marked by the use of guerrilla warfare. Most endings of revolutions witness a "carry over" from the old regime: old regime personnel are still ensconced in bureaucratic and other governmental positions, the state of industrial development may not be

significantly altered, and rural elites may still be powerful.

In assessing outcomes, the analyst should thus be forewarned not to expect the complete dismantling of the old regime and the constructing of the new order. Broadly speaking, outcomes are the product of preceding political and socio-economic forces during the causal and course-phases of the revolution. The influences of these preceding events manifest themselves as constraints on the policy-making of the "new" elite. Here it is important to note the constraining influence of international pressures; these triggered the revolution in the first place, but continue to constrain the policy-making options of the new regime. Another constraint is the remnants of the old regime in respect to bureaucrats, industrial development, and the political and socio-economic power of rural elites. Finally, the regime is constrained by the very nature of the new elite, which has a particular political style, organization and organizational resources, and support groups.

Thus structural analyses have views of the causes, course and consequences that distinguishes them from analyses stressing that revolutions are fundamentally the product of class ascendance or the product of willful revolutionaries who want to reorder society in order to remove the conditions of relative deprivation. One of the most useful characteristics of structural analyses is that it seeks an understanding

of all phases of the revolutionary process, particularly in linking causes and consequences. Another positive feature is that it has collapsed the distinctions many scholars established between the "Great" and contemporary revolutions. Yet the range of cases included in structural analyses is still rather limited.

With regard to revolutions in Africa, there is usually agreement that although there are many conditions causing conflict, revolutions have occurred or are in progress in settler colonies or areas marked by the substantial presence and self-government of whites. There is disagreement, however, about the appropriate theoretical perspective used in order to explain these revolutions. Theoretical choices tend to be of two varieties, namely the relative deprivation thesis and theories stressing political structures of inequality. Disagreement also extends to the course of revolutions, particularly when it concerns the revolutionary potential of the peasantry in Africa. Even those who argue that this peasantry does have revolutionary potential disagree on why they do so.

When revolutions do occur in Africa, differences in the views of why they occur and how they proceed lead to differences in their outcomes. Here some scholars argue that African revolutions' outcomes bring about many political changes, but there is disagreement whether such political changes are important in the development of societies.

Structural analysts usually argue that political changes are critical. Other scholars note that African revolutions do not bring about the more important socio-economic changes, even if a condition of war may, by itself, produce certain changes, because the conditions necessary for important socio-economic change (class formation and willful revolutionary elites) are lacking.

Structural analysts warn that the application of their theoretical conceptions should not be mechanical; they should be sensitive to debates among analysts themselves, as well as to disagreements within certain area studies. In applying their theoretical conception to an African case the analyses should therefore be especially concerned with, one, the impact of a history of colonialism and longstanding position of vulnerability in the international capitalist economy and, two, the ability of some African states to generate strong coercive instruments. Both sets of factors are likely to influence the causes of African revolutions (i.e. the nature of the crisis of the regime), its course (the conditions for peasant revolt and the response of the regime to challenge), and its consequences (the conditions constraining the new regime).

6. The Plan of This Study

This study, then, views revolution as a form of change that simultaneously affects several dimensions of society in a fundamental and progressive manner and which, while it may last over a period of decades, culminates in a violent

struggle for political control. With this working definition as a point of departure, the subsequent analysis follows the structural approach. Several scholars, such as Eisenstadt, Paige, Wolf and especially Skocpol were grouped under this approach. The structuralists emphasize the patterns of relationships among groups or societies which, broadly speaking, consist of the coincidence of a crisis in the government or state power with a popular revolt by peasants, here simply seen as rural dwellers. In the Zimbabwean case this requires an examination of the emerging crisis within successive Zimbabwean regimes between 1888 and 1965, the conditions of black political action in roughly the same period, the subsequent struggle for power, and a discussion of the ending of the conflict.

With regard to the political crisis, the state primarily is seen as a bureaucratic entity. This entity may be closely related to powerful socio-economic groups or may operate independently of them. When the state is pressured, most often from external sources, it may or may not attempt to institute reforms. Should the state attempt reforms, the ability to do so successfully requires financial resources and political support. These the state may receive. However, the reforms may engender a reaction, most likely from powerful rural groups; if these groups deny the state of financial resources and political support, the state is in a crisis condition.

The next chapter, chapter 2, examines whether the Zimbabwean government was by 1965 in a condition of crisis. Zimbabwean history from 1888 to 1965 is explored in an effort to determine the role of the whites and their relation to the state and the economy as well as to external pressures.

With regard to the popular revolt of rural dwellers, the focus of the analysis is on their political awakening and their willingness to engage in popular action. Here the analysis is sensitive to the debate about which peasants are most prone to revolutionary action, those who have solidarity, autonomy and are temporarily free from regime repression (Skocpol), those who have tactical freedom (Wolf's "middle peasants"), or those who are landless. Popular action is analyzed not as the spontaneous ascent of a particular class but as activity that is encouraged and led by elites, who create organizations and coalitions for that purpose. The focus on popular action is complemented by an analysis of the state's reaction to it, particularly the state's repressive capabilities.

The political awakening and action of the rural dwellers (or peasants) in Zimbabwe, and the state's reaction to their activity, is discussed in chapters 3 and 4. Chapter 3 examines the black political activity and the conditions of black political activity in Zimbabwe between 1888 and 1962 to identify emerging elites, organizational forms, the influence of socio-economic considerations, and the effect of state

repression. Chapter 4 analyzes the struggle for power between 1962 and 1979 in order to determine the nature and effectiveness of black collective action, the organizational forms generated by the struggle, the key characteristics of the black nationalist elite, identifies the categories of rural dwellers most active in the struggle, and the nature and effectiveness of the state's reaction.

The discussion of the end of the revolutionary conflict focuses on the conditions under which the new regime assumed power. Of particular importance, the study in chapter 5 seeks to identify the constraints under which the new regime operates.

Chapter 6 summarizes the study. Here the analysis draws conclusions and discusses the theoretical implications of the Zimbabwean case both for the study of African revolutions in particular and for the study of revolutions in general. Finally, the implications of the Zimbabwean case for the structural approach is assessed.

CHAPTER II

ZIMBABWE 1888 - 1965:
THE EMERGENCE OF A POLITICAL CRISIS

This chapter examines the history of Zimbabwe since the granting of the Rudd Concession in 1888. It seeks to identify and explain the nature and causes of the political crisis that beset the Zimbabwean government in the years prior to the Unilateral Declaration of Independence on November 11, 1965. The nature of the political crisis, it is submitted, was a product of the nature of white Zimbabwean society and its relation to, on the one hand, the economy and, on the other hand, the state, as well as to international pressures. The subsequent discussion therefore focuses on - in order - the relation of white society to state power, the pre-1945 economy, foreign economic and political pressure, and the 1960-1962 governmental crisis respectively. Before turning to these matters, a brief outline of the major geo-physical features of Zimbabwe and a short historical overview is presented.

1. Major Geo-Physical Data

Zimbabwe is a landlocked state with territory amounting to 390,608.72 square kilometers. It borders on Zambia in the North, Mozambique in the east, South Africa in the south,

Figure I: Zimbabwe 1980

Source: Dennis Hills, The Last Days of White Rhodesia (London: Chatto and Windus, 1981), p.9

and Botswana in the west. The center of Zimbabwe is its extensive highveld area which averages above 1219.2m elevation, sloping northward to the Zambezi river and Lake Kariba, and southward to the Limpopo and Sabi Rivers. In the southern border regions, the elevation is about 609.6 meters. The highest area in Zimbabwe is in the mountains in the eastern border region. The climate is subtropical, with an extensive dry season in winter (May to August) and a rainy summer season (November to March).[1]

In 1974 the population was estimated at 6 million, with whites accounting for 4.5 percent, blacks for 95 percent, and Asians and Coloureds (persons of mixed racial origin) for the remaining 0.5 percent. Whites are of South African, British, or continental European ancestry, while blacks belong to Shona group (the Mashona) or the Ndebele group (the Matabele). The population groups speak English, Afrikaans, Shona, Ndebele or Fanogalo (a pidgin of black and white languages).[2]

Since Zimbabwe is landlocked it depends on Mozambican and South African ports and railways. The railway gauge is the standard South African width of about 1.1 meter. Until 1970 the currency was the Rhodesian pound (about US $2.80 in 1970), but since then Rhodesian dollars have been used

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[1]Harold D. Nelson (et al.) Area Handbook for Southern Rhodesia, first edition (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1975), p. vii, see Table I.

(about US $1.52 after 1971).[3]

2. Historical Overview

Although the area today known as Zimbabwe was not entirely devoid of population before 300 AD, increasing numbers of southward-migrating blacks began to enter the area after this time. By approximately 1,000 AD a Rozwi group of people arrived in the area, assimilated with the local population, and developed into a Shona-speaking dynasty that lasted to about the mid-fourteenth century. The Rozwi Empire gave way, after the arrival of the Karanga group, to the Mutapa Empire which incorporated various Shona-speaking groups united by the royal house and the royal-religious cult of the Mwari. By the time of the Portuguese arrival in southeast Africa in the sixteenth century, the Mutapa Empire had suffered considerable local challenge and disintegration and was geographically reduced to the northeastern part of Zimbabwe. These remnants were then incorporated in the Changamire or Rozwi Mambo Empire but by the early 1800s this empire also declined. Yet these successive empires established the predominantly agriculturalist Shona-speaking group as the

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[2]Ibid.

[3]Ibid., p. ix.

dominant population group in the area.[4]

The Mashona's political pre-eminence in Zimbabwe was challenged in the first half of the nineteenth century by northward-migrating factions of the Zulu Empire in South Africa. Led first by Zwangdaba and later by Mzilikazi, these Ndebele raiders conquered the declining Changamire Empire and established a political order centerd in the southwestern part of Zimbabwe. The Shona-speaking people were required to pay tribute to the Matabele king. The Matabele order was largely based on Zulu political notions, with military regiments headed by chiefs as the basic administrative structures. Chiefs owed allegiance (and indeed at first their appointment. itself) to the king, Mzilikazi at first and later Lobengula, who in turn allocated cattle and farmland. Compared to the decentralized Mashona political order, this focus on the royal house created a far more centralized dispensation. Greater similarity existed with regard to religion. The supreme deity of the Mashona was the Mwari and the Mlimo for the Matabele. These supreme deities communicated with the living by way of spirit mediums, such as the spirits of dead rulers, certain animals or local mediums who were consulted for all

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[4]Although many aspects of Zimbabwe's early history have been clarified by archeological and other research, many other aspects remain controversial. See N. Jones, Prehistory of Southern Rhodesia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1949), G. Caton-Thompson, The Zimbabwe Culture: Ruins and Reactions (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1931) and A.J. Hanna, The Story of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland (London: Faber and Faber, 1960).

important affairs.[5]

Besides the Portuguese penetration from Zimbabwe after 1505 and the activities of a small number of traders, hunters, missionaries and explorers, European interest in the interior of southern Africa did not exist until the latter half of the nineteenth century. At this time the discovery of gold and diamonds in South Africa sparked interest in the discovery of similar deposits in Zimbabwe, initiating a period when agents form the two Boer Republics and the Cape Colony attempted to secure mineral and other concessions from the Matabele king Lobengula. In 1888 agents of Cecil Rhodes, Prime Minister of the Cape Colony, secured a treaty with Lobengula which came to be viewed as granting mineral and metal concessions in the area today known as Zimbabwe and Zambia. Although this Rudd Concession was not the only one granted, it became the basis of Rhodes' request to the British government to grant a royal charter to a commercial company seeking to commerically exploit and administer the area. In 1889 the British South Africa Company (BSAC), entered Zimbabwe and established a settlement near present-day Harare (formerly Salisbury). In 1891 the government placed the area under the queen's protection (i.e. a protectorate was established), with BSAC-activities resorting

[5]See Terence O. Ranger, Revolt in Southern Rhodesia 1896-97 (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1967), pp. 1-45.

under the authority of the British High Commissioner in South Africa.[6]

2.1. 1889-1923: Company Rule

British interest in Zimbabwe was animated by a desire to thwart the possible northward expansion of the Transvaal Republic. Bringing the territory under British influence would not only block the geographic amibitions of the Transvaal, but "the anticipated discovery of a gold field richer than that of the Rand was expected to provide the basis for the building up of a strong, rich and loyal counterweight to the Afrikaner threat."[7]

Despite these ambitions and the declaration of protectorate status, the British were unwilling to engage directly in the administration of the territory, or to prepare for closer imperial control. Such involvement would require heavy financial expenditure and Britain expected the territory to be, if not wildly profitable, then at least self-supporting. Company rule was therefore privately financed and expected to maintain solvency in its administration of the area. Executive, legislative and administrative initiative

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[6]For an excellent discussion of this period in Zimbabwean history and especially race-related views, see Phillip Mason, The Birth of a Dilemma (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958).

[7]Martin Chanock, Britain, Rhodesia and South Africa 1900-45 (Totowa, New Jersey: Frank Cass, 1977), p. 12.

and authority was placed in company hands.[8]

The first ten years of BSAC-rule radically altered expectations about Zimbabwe's development. First, explorations in Matabeleland and later Mashonaland dashed hopes of a second Rand. Minerals were discovered, but deposits were of limited quantity and were dispersed in scattered sites that were difficult to exploit on a profitable basis. Second, the conquest of the Mashona and Matabele proved more difficult than expected. Economic interest in Matabeleland led to a Matabele War in 1893 and, although Lobengula's forces were defeated, a more serious war broke out in 1896 in both Matabeleland and Mashonaland. It was only with the help of imperial troops that separate peace treaties could be secured.[9] Third, the charter granted to the company was due to expire in 1914 and could not be renewed without the support of local settlers. These settlers expressed disapproval with company activities, which was matched by British government disapproval of the financial conditions of the company, as well as of the political involvement of company officials

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[8]There is much scholarly agreement on British motives in Zimbabwe during the late nineteenth century. See, for example, Claire Palley, The Constitutional History and Law of Southern Rhodesia 1888-1965 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966), pp. 3-127.

[9]For these wars, see Ranger, passim. and Robin H. Palmer "War and Land in Rhodesia in the 1890s" in Bethwell A. Ogot (ed.) War and Society in Africa (Portland, Oregon: Frank Cass, 1972), pp. 85-107. Hereafter referred to as "War and Land."

in South African political affairs.[10]

The result was a redefinition of Zimbabwe's future. Perhaps the most important redefined goal was the recognition that mineral exploitation alone would not suffice as the base of the Zimbabwean economy and that farming should supplement mineral exploitation. Agricultural production and the sale of farmland would not only recoup the company's losses in the short run, but also complement mineral proceeds in the long run. Imperial authorities also effected a constitutional reconstruction of local politics: a Southern Rhodesia Order in Council in 1898 imposed several restrictions on the activities of the BSAC, a legislative council was created with four elected offices and five company offices presided over by the BSAC-administrator, and a judicial system was established. The territory was placed under the executive authority of a Resident Commissioner as local representative of the British High Commissioner in South Africa, who in turn was responsible to imperial authorities in Britain. The civil service was also reformed, particularly with regard to the administration of the black population. A Native Affairs Department was created and it was represented in the two provinces of Matabeleland and Mashonaland by a Chief Native Commissioner, Native and Assistant Native Commissioners,

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[10]Palley, pp. 128-190.

Chiefs, Headmen and Messengers.[11]

Although it was thus accepted that the BSAC would still be responsible for the administration of Zimbabwe, the British government began to assert its imperial control over a company regarded as less than trustworthy. The British government further expected that company rule would be replaced by local settler self-government and would eventually be incorporated into the South African political order.[12] One of the first steps in this direction was the increase in the number of elected (i.e. settler) offices on the legislative council (to outnumber the BSAC-offices) in 1907, the encouragement of white immigration, and the aid given to land settlement.

For the black population the most important development in the 1890s came in the wake of the two wars with the introduction of land apportionment and native reserves to Zimbabwe. After the 1893 Matabele War, two areas of land north of Bulawayo were set apart for exclusive Matabele use. After the 1896 and 1897 uprisings, imperial authorities were determined that the BSAC would not further encroach on black

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[11]It is important to note that Britain did not implement the indirect mode of colonial administration in Zimbabwe. It was a form of direct rule through the Native Affairs Department whose personnel held discretionary power. For this reason it was stressed that NAD-personnel should be "honourable and capable men." Correspondence of Milner to Asquith, 1897, quoted by Palley, p. 140.

[12]Palley, pp. 132-199.

land. To ensure adequate black land, Native Commissioners were to demarcate reserved black land and in 1908 these demarcations were approved by the imperial authorities. Henceforth land ownership and use in Zimbabwe was determined by law. Some land was held by the BSAC, some by whites, and the remainder by blacks.[13]

The difficulties of the BSAC mounted. In 1918 the Privy Council ruled that all unalienated land in Zimbabwe belonged to the Crown, ending company hopes that it could recover its losses in the failed gold boom by the sale of land. The BSAC now hoped for incorporation with South Africa, for it hoped that South African authorities would compensate it more generously than the British Treasury, Between 1918 and 1922 negotiations concerning the constitutional future of Zimbabwe took place, finally reducing the options to responsible government under Crown authority or amalgamation with South Africa. In 1922 Zimbabwean voters rejected the option of amalgamation and in 1923 received a responsible government constitution.[14]

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[13]The causes, nature and consequences of land apportionment is the subject of many scholarly disagreements. The effect of land apportionment on black political activity will be discussed in the next chapter; its relation to the Zimbabwean economy and black poverty is discussed later in this chapter.

[14]The best account of this period is in Chanock, pp. 10-164.

2.2 1923-1965: Responsible Government

Unlike in Zambia, which moved from company rule to colonial status, the Southern Rhodesia Constitution Letters Patent of 1923 provided for "the establishment of responsible government subject to certain limitations."[15] Complete self-government, in other words, was not legally recognized: there was partial self-government with the British government reserving powers over the conduct of foreign policy, matters affecting railways, mineral extraction, and native affairs. The resident commissioner was replaced by the governor as the Crown's representative in Zimbabwe.[16]

The legislative authority was unicameral and resided with a Legislative Assembly similar to the House of Commons. The Legislative Assembly consisted of 30 members, with two members representing 15 electoral districts, but it could also elect a non-member Speaker who was entitled to vote. Franchise was qualified: a voter was required to have an annual salary of at least 100 pounds and property valued at 150 pounds, and to be literate in English.[17] Except for the reserve powers, the Legislative Assembly exercised full

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[15] Palley, p. 215.

[16] Ibid., pp. 236-271.

[17] The Voters Qualification and Registration Amendment Ordinance No. 14 of 1912 and the Women's Enfranchisement Ordinance of 1919 was the basis of the franchise of the 1923-constitution. Minor changes in electoral laws were made in 1928 and 1937.

legislative powers. The executive authority was exercised by a Cabinet headed by a Prime Minister and other Ministers drawn from the Legislative Assembly. As in the British model of parliamentary government, the Cabinet was not a creation of the constitution; it was simply stated that the Governor as representative of the Crown would select and be advised by an Executive Council. In practice this Executive Council came to be the Cabinet. As far as the judiciary is concerned, it was also modelled on the role of the judiciary in Britain and its political independence was guaranteed.[18]

In the 1923-elections the Responsible Government Association (RGA) won a majority and, later reconstituted as the Rhodesian Party, maintained this parlimentary majority until the 1933 elections, when it was defeated by the Reform Party. The Reform Party was created in the late 1920s and, after its electoral victory in 1933, absorbed the Rhodesia Party to become the United Party. The United Party was later renamed the United Federal Party. This United Party dominated partisan politics in Zimbabwe between 1933 and 1962, when it was defeated by the Rhodesian Front.[19]

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[18]Several constitutionl changes were later made. The most important of these was the elimination of the British reserve powers with regard to the railways and mining industry.

[19]Colin Leys, European Politics in Southern Rhodesia (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1959), pp. 131-189.

Although the United Party never lost its parlimentary majority - its leader Godfrey Huggins was Prime Minister from 1933 to 1953 when he became Prime Minister of the Central African Federation and was succeeded by Garfield Todd and he in turn by Edgar Whitehead - it did encounter significant partisan challenges. One such challenge came in the wake of the Second World War when the Liberal Party, led by former Finance Minister Smit, managed to attract support. Although the scheduled 1944 elections were postponed to give the United Party time for additional campaigning, the Liberal Party still managed to gain twelve seats as opposed to the 13 of the United Party in the 1946-election. The Liberal Party, though, later lost momentum, partly as a result of internal disagreements.[20]

Another serious partisan challenge came from the Dominion Party in the 1958-elections. Were it indeed not for the newly introduced preferential voting system, the Dominion Party would have won the 1958-election, for it won a majority of first preferences votes.[21] The influence of the Dominion

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[20] Ibid., pp. 131-143. See also Lewis H. Gann and M. Gelfand, Huggins of Rhodesia (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1964), pp. 165-191.

[21] In the preferential voting system, voters could rank their preference of political parties. First preference votes would then be counted and second preference votes transferred from the least sucsessful candidate (in terms of votes polled) to ones more successful. Beyond first preference votes, in other words, successful candidates had to obtain a majority of all second preference votes. See Palley, p. 311 and

Party declined after 1958 and in 1962 it amalgamated with the Southern Rhodesia Association and the United Group to form the Rhodesian Front. The Rhodesian Front was first led by Winston Field, but he was replaced by Ian Smith, who was Prime Minister when Zimbabwe unilaterally declared itself independent from Britain.[22]

While the voting population in Zimbabwe was a small percentage of the total population, voting turnout since 1933 has always been high.[23] Franchise qualifications were raised in 1951, increasing annual income requirements to 240 pounds annually, property to 500 pounds, and literacy to include the ability to speak and write English.[24] In 1957 an Electoral Amendment Act preserved the high qualifications, but introduced a special roll of voters (besides the existing common roll) with lower qualifications. Special roll voters did not, however, have the same voting power as common roll voters.[25]

Although some gerrymandering did occur, especially after

F.M.G. Wilson (ed), Source Book of Parliamentary Elections and Referenda in Southern Rhodesia 1989-1962 (Salisbury: University College of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, 1963), p. 180.

[22]Larry W. Bowman, Politics in Rhodesia: White Power in an African State (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1973), pp. 33-37.

[23]Leys, pp. 195-198.

[24]Palley, p. 246.

[25]See Ibid., pp. 308-312 on the complex voting system of 1957.

the 1946 elections, the most conspicuous bias in Zimbabwe was its rural weight: before 1951, at least 14 of the 30-member parliament had to represent rural districts. This number was later reduced to eleven, but it still overrepresented rural districts especially in the post-1945 period when immigration swelled the population of whites in urban areas.[26]

There have been attempts to correlate party support among white Zimbabweans with factors such as occupation, language and regional divisions.[27] This is a problematic enterprise in view of a number of considerations. First, the electorate after 1945 was of a continually changing nature because of rapid white population increase through immigration. Between 1946 and 1948, for example, 10,000 new voters appeared on the voting roll.[28] Second, the electoral system of Zimbabwe underwent frequent changes with regard to the number of districts, types of voting, and the number of

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[26]Leys, pp. 190-195 and 210-211.

[27]For example, Cyril A. Rogers and Charles Frantz, Racial Themes in Southern Rhodesia: The Attitudes and Behavior of the White Population (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1962) and A.K.H. Weinrich, Black and White Elites in Rural Rhodesia (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1973), pp. 62-85.

[28]Leys, p. 209.

parties contesting elections.[29] Since there are so many factors influencing voting results, voting behavior is difficult to assess.

2.2.1. The Central African Federation (1953-1962)

After the 1923 failure to incorporate Zimbabwe into a South African political order, efforts to incorporate Zimbabwe into a larger political unit shifted their focus to the northern territories of Zambia (then Northern Rhodesia) and Malawi (then Nyasaland). The benefits of such a union, it was argued, would be economic (the creation of a common market, a central banking system, and the economic development of Nyasaland in particular) and political (a union with imperial sympathies and acceptable race policies acting as a counter to the nationalist and segregationist race policies of South Africa).[30]

For its part, the Zimbawean government advocated the amalgamation of Zambia and Zimbabwe. The discovery of minerals (copper) in Zambia and the generally complementary nature of the two economies made closer union economically

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[29] Ibid., pp. 210-211.

[30] See Robert U. Rotberg, "The Federation Movement in British East and Central Africa," Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies 2 (1964): 141-160 and also Palley, pp. 322-324.

attractive, especially after the lapse of the Customs Agreement with South Africa in 1936. Even when it was in operation, this agreement could not prevent South African-imposed tariffs so that northern markets became more attractive after its lapse.[31] The desire for closer union with Zambia was indeed a well established part of white politics in Zimbabwe after 1923; it was simply that events after 1945, especially events related to the rise of the Afrikaner movement in South Africa, provided it with an additional impetus.[32]

The British government made several prewar inquiries into the possibilities of a central African political order but these mainly concluded that, despite the economic, political and strategic advantages Britain would gain from such a union,[33] dissimilar race-policies made a union impossible. British policy toward its African dependencies was stipulated in the Passfield Memorandum of 1930: native (or black) interests and not those of whites (settlers or immigrants) would be considered paramount in the future development of those territories. Accordingly, race policy in

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[31]Chanock, p. 217,

[32]Ibid., pp. 190-248.

[33]Ibid., pp. 190-210.

Zimbabwe was an illiberal anomaly.[34] Yet by the advent of the Second World War, the British government's Bledisloe Commission accepted the idea of closer union in principle[35] and, following the commission's recommendations, a Central African Council was created in 1944 to act as an advisory board on interterritorial matters. By 1948 British policy officially adopted the view that a federation between Zambia, Malawi and Zimbabwe was desirable. Following negotiations, the Central African Federation became a reality in July 1953.[36]

Under the Constitution of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, the different territorial constitutions of the constituent territories remained in effect. In a complex division of powers, territorial governments retained the right to legislate on many matters (including race-relations), while other powers were held concurrently, and others by the federal government exclusively. The federal government could exercise only those powers specifically granted to it, such as

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[34]See the Report of the Commission on Closer Union of the Dependencies in Eastern and Central Africa, Cmnd. 3234, 1929 (the Hilton Young Commission) on the criticism of Zimbabwe's race policies. For the statement on the paramountcy of black interests, see Memorandum on Native Policy in East Africa, Cmnd. 3573, 1930 (the Passfield Memorandum) and the earlier Devonshire Memorandum in Indians in Kenya-Memorandum, Cmnd. 1922, 1923.

[35]Rhodesia-Nyasaland Royal Commission Report, Cmnd. 5949, 1939 (the Bledisloe Commission).

[36]Palley, pp. 345-409.

agricultural policy-making. The federal executive was a prime minister (Huggins and later Roy Welensky), who presided over a unicameral Federal Legislative Assembly composed of a fixed number of black and white members and a number of racially unspecified members. A party-system was called for and in the 1953 elections the United Federal Party gained a majority. A federal court system also came into existence, as territorial courts were allowed to enforce both federal and territorial laws. The Central African Federation (CAF) was not self-governing: it exercised qualified self-government with the Crown represented by a Governor-general.[37]

The CAF-period in Zimbabwean history lasted nine years. It generated considerable economic benefits for Zimbabwe. These included the absorption of all its public debt by the federal government, the development of joint energy resources (chiefly the Kariba Dam hydro-electric project), disproportionate federal spending on Zimbabwean affairs, and the enlargement of the market for Zimbabwean goods.[38]

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[37] Ibid.

[38] Arthur Hazlewood, "The Economics of Federation and Dissolution in Central Africa" in Arthur Hazlewood (ed.), African Integration and Disintegration: Case Studies in Economic and Political Union (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), pp. 185-250. See also Bowman, pp. 22-26 and William J. Barber, "Federation and the Distribution of Economic Benefits" in Colin Leys and Cranford Pratt (eds.) A New Deal in Central Africa (London Heineman, 1960), pp. 81-97.

As was indicated in the preamble of the CAF-constitution, the British government hoped that the new political order in Africa would eventually achieve independence - if it were desired by the majority of all its inhabitants (i.e. not merely the majority of voters).[39] This option would be considered at the Federal Review Conference in 1960. In 1957 the British government did upgrade the international legal status of the federation, but hereafter prospects for the achievement of federal independence dimmed. British territories elsewhere in Africa began to achieve independence and pressures from black African nationalists in Zambia and Malawi for independence for their respective territories increased. Following upheaval in Malawi in 1959 the British government sent a commission of inquiry, which concluded that the existence of the federation was the chief cause of the unrest.[40] Subsequently the Monckton Commission, sent to prepare documents for the Federal Review Conference, concluded that federation in its present form was unviable because of black opposition. Federation should be either dissolved or totally restructured.[41]

In Malawi and Zambia negotiations between the Colonial

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[39]Palley, pp. 345-409.

[40]Report of the Nyasaland Commission of Inquiry, Cmnd. 814, 1959 (the Devlin Report).

[41]Report of the Advisory Commission on the Review of the Constitution of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Cmnd. 1148, 1960 (the Monckton Commission).

Office and black nationalist leaders led to the formation of black-dominated governments in, respectively, 1961 and 1962. Formerly protectorates, they now became independent states. In Zimbabwe, however, the political situation was more complicated. The territory was not a protectorate nor a colony proper; it had a white government which, despite the existence of a so-called "multi-racial"-strategy,[42] did not attract black support. Black support, as far as electoral activity was concerned, focused more on the National Democratic Party (NDP) of Joshua Nkomo.[43]

To resolve the political situation in Zimbabwe, the British government convened a constitutional conference to devise a new constitution for Zimbabwe and invited all the major political parties to attend. The outcome of this conference was a new constitution, based on "the concepts of British parliamentary democracy, the British Cabinet system and constitutional guarantees of civil rights,"[44] and the deletion of the reserve powers formerly held by Britain. A major aim of the new constitution was to increase black political participation and to express a constitutional

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[42]This will be discussed more fully in later sections of this chapter.

[43]The National Democratic Party was an outgrowth of the banned African National Congress.

[44]Palley, p. 413.

commitment to improvements in the material conditions of blacks.[45] Despite its participation in the creation of the new constitution, the NDP and the Dominion Party later opposed it. The new constitution was nevertheless ratified by the Zimbabwean electorate in July 1961, and it came into effect in November 1962.[46]

The UFP's electoral fortunes declined after the 1961-referendum. It claimed that the 1961-constitution amounted to independence: the British government had approved the document as a whole and specifically agreed to rescind its reserve powers.[47] In reply, the British government stated that independence required a new set of negotiations; it was not tantamount to the 1961-constitution. This led to charges of electoral deceit on the part of the UFP, who proclaimed the 1961-referendum as an "independence" referendum, and suspicion and mistrust arose towards the British government. In the December 1962 elections the Rhodesian Front, created a scant nine months earlier, defeated the UFP. In

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[45] See Ibid., pp. 413-628 for the 1961-constitution.

[46] James Barber, Rhodesia: The Road to Rebellion (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), pp. 79-111.

[47] Barber argues that the Zimbabwean electorate were genuinely confused as to whether the 1961-referendum was on independence or simply the ratification of the 1961-constitution. Ibid., pp. 92-98.

the same month, the CAF was officially dissolved.[48]

2.2.2 The Rhodesian Front and Independence

Upon the dissolution of the CAF, the Rhodesian Front government formally applied for independence from Britain,[49] marking the start of "protracted and often bitter negotiations" that would lead to the unilateral declaration of independence (UDI).[50] In the pre-UDI negotiations, the Rhodesian Front government accepted the 1961-constitution as a basis for independence, despite its opposition to it in the preceding elections. The British government, on the other hand, argued that further changes were required to ensure expanded black participation in Zimbabwean political life. Yet neither governments required a black-dominated government to precede the granting of independence; a white government could achieve independence, provided that it did so with constitutional and other guarantees for increased black political participation.[51]

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[48] Ibid., pp. 147-195.

[49] Cmnd., 2073, March 29, 1963.

[50] James Barber, p. 178.

[51] This is evident in the principles, privately conveyed to the Zimbabwean government, according to which the British government would grant independence, namely:

(i) The principle and intention of unimpeded progress to majority rule, already enshrined in the 1961-constitution, would have to be maintained and guaranteed.
(ii) There would have to be guarantees against retrogressive amendments of the constitution.
(iii) There would have to be immediate improvements in the

After March 1961 several meetings took place between the Zimbabwean and British governments, as well as meetings with black leaders in Zimbabwe, but all ended in failure. In April 1964 Prime Minister Field became a political casualty of the failure to achieve independence,[52] and he was replaced by Ian Smith who, unlike Field, had a reputation for vigorous independence demands. These demands included the possibility of UDI, which Smith viewed as a "three-day-wonder" with no serious political or economic consequences.[53]

In opposition the UFP reconstituted itself as the Rhodesia National Party (RNP) and later renamed itself the Rhodesia Party (RP) but it could not match the electoral appeal of the Rhodesian Front, losing two by-elections during 1963 and 1964.[54] Confident of its parliamentary

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political status of the black population.

(iv) There would have to be progress toward the abolition of racial discrimination

(v) The British government would have to be satisfied that any proposed basis for independence was acceptable to the people of Zimbabwe as a whole.

See Southern Rhodesia - Documents Relating to the Negotiations between the United Kingdom and Southern Rhodesian Governments, November 1963 to November 1965, Cmnd. 2807, 1965. Hereafter cited as Cmnd. 2807.

[52]Other criticisms of Field were his autocratic political style and his failure to deal more decisively with domestic black opposition. James Barber, pp. 192-195.

[53]For the differences between Field and Smith on independence, see Ibid., pp. 249-252 and Bowman, pp. 63-90.

[54]James Barber, pp. 175-177 and 252-261.

majority, the Smith government called for a referendum on independence in May 1964. In answer to the question "Are you in favor of independence based on the 1961 constitution?", 89.1 percent of the registered voters (in a 61.6 percent poll) voted affirmatively.[55] It must be noted that the referendum was not fashioned as a popular vote on UDI; it simply confirmed that the majority of registered voters (i.e. whites) desired independence.

The 1964 referendum outcome was cited by the Smith government in its negotiations with Britain to show that it at least had the support of the majority of whites. Since the British government stipulated that the granting of independence be acceptable to the Zimbabwean population as a whole, the Smith government set out to secure the support of the majority of the blacks and did so by convening a meeting of tribal leaders in October 1964. At this meeting the tribal leaders gave their support to independence and, since the Smith government regarded the tribal leaders as representatives for the black population as a whole, it now claimed support from both black and white majorities.[56]

The British government rejected both the referendum and the indaba with tribal leaders as adequate indications of majoritarian support. Faced with this opposition from abroad

[55]Bowman, p. 74.

[56]This meeting (or indaba) has been criticized for its possibly coercive nature. See Ibid., pp. 72-73.

and a declining white opposition at home, the Smith government called another general election in May 1965. In this election the issue of independence was dominant but it again was not an election about UDI. Although the opposition did charge that the RF was preparing for it, the RF replied that it would only consider UDI if it were faced with the prospect of a black-dominated government - which the British government did not demand. The outcome of this election gave the RF all A-roll seats (50); of the B-roll seats, the RP won 15 with five independents. The results clearly were a triumph for the RF and a personal victory for Smith.[57]

Between May and November of 1965 negotiations with the British government again proved fruitless. The British government of course was opposed to a possible UDI and threatened sanctions, though not military force, if this were to come about. To remove the deadlock in negotiations it further offered the Smith government some concessions, and attempted to persuade the black nationalist leaders to co-operate on the basis of the 1961 constitution. By October 1965, however, the Smith government decided upon UDI and declared it officiallv on November 11, 1965.[58]

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[57]James Barber, pp. 268-294.

[58]Ibid., pp. 295-305.

2.3. Summary

The foregoing discussion shows that the original population of Zimbabwe (the Shona-speaking people) encountered, first, the arrival and political challenge of the northward-migrating Matabele and later the arrival, again from the South of white settlers under BSAC-aegis. Both of these developments, as has been the case throughout Zimbabwean history, were produced by the dynamics of the South African society, in these cases, the dynamics of the Zulu Empire and the discovery of the mineral wealth of South Africa. The initial development of Zimbabwe was indeed predicated on the hope that Zimbabwe housed a second Rand, that its exploitation would be a success, and that it would lead to the establishment of a political order with imperial sympathies. Events during the late nineteenth century dashed all of these hopes and by the end of the First World War it was expected that Zimbabwe naturally belonged to the Union of South Africa.

This expectation was also to fail. In 1923 the settlers opted for qualified self-government and acquired a Westminster-style constitutional government. Self-government was not complete, since Britain exercised its reserve powers, though in an unobtrusive manner. Local political activity was the reserve of whites, and in particular the reserve of the United Party which held a parliamentary majority for almost thirty years. Yet significant electoral white challenges did exist, particularly after the Second World War.

After the Second World War, efforts to incorporate Zimbabwe into a larger political unit focused on the territories to its north, leading to the creation of the CAF. Like the early Zimbabwe itself, the CAF was designed as a counterweight to South Africa but it contained centrifugal political forces that ensured its demise. It did nevertheless bring considerable economic benefits to Zimbabwe in particular. The breakup of CAF coincided with the defeat of UFP and its replacement by the Rhodesian Front, which attempted to secure British consent to its independence demands. Despite the fact that the British government did not demand an immediate government recomposition in Zimbabwe, negotiations were marked by its consistent failure, as well as by mistrust, acrimony, intransigence, suspicion and genuine misunderstanding. Finally the Smith government declared UDI.

The foregoing discussion is a brief overview of Zimbabwean history before 1965. It emphasizes white politics and serves the purpose of identifying certain landmark events in the history of white politics. The underlying dynamics of this historical development is the subject of the remaining sections of this chapter.

3. A Government in Crisis?

A common interpretation of UDI is to see it as the racist reaction of whites to black demands and the support of those demands by the British government. In the 1950s, so

the interpretation goes, nationalist movements in Africa achieved political success, including the nationalist movements in the former territories of CAF. White leaders in Zimbabwe, as well as the white population in general, felt threatened by these developments and the possibility that similar events could occur in Zimbabwe. This British-backed black challenge engendered a racist reaction: rather than negotiate with the British government or black leaders, the Zimbabwean government descended into willful political intransigence and prepared to defend white minority rule against all odds.[59]

This study does not contest the importance of increased black political activity in Zimbabwe, nor that the support that blacks received from abroad was important. The nature and extent of black political activity will be discussed in the next chapter. It does argue, however, that the events that accompanied the dissolution of the CAF, like the RF electoral victory and UDI, cannot be understood exclusively

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[59]For examples of this view, see Martin Loney, Rhodesia: White Racism and Imperial Response (Baltimore, Maryland: Penguin Books, 1975), pp. 127-133; Bowman, pp. 33-61 and 154-155; James Barber, pp. 268-294; and B. Vulindlela Mtshali, Rhodesia: Background to Conflict (New York: Hawthorn Books, 1967), pp. 120-132. These views are a logical extension of Leys' view of racism as the "inner law" of white Zimbabwean politics.

as a racist reaction by whites.[60] The remainder of this chapter is thus an examination of the question whether successive pre-UDI governments, on encountering foreign economic and political challenge, attempted political and socio-economic reforms, and whether rural based opposition to those reforms resulted in a governmental crisis in the early 1960s.

3.1. White Society and the State

That the state (or government) was the executive committee of Zimbabwean whites in pre-UDI politics is, as stated, a common interpretation. This view raises two questions: How was public policy-making in this period actually conducted? and What was the relation of public policy-makers to the white community?

How was public-policy making conducted in pre-UDI Zimbabwe? The institutional context of policy-making was at first derivative of colonial rule: a legislative council with elected and appointed officials was presided over by the BSAC administrator who in turn was responsible to the High Commissioner of South Africa and he, in turn, to the British

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[60] Arrighi criticizes the racism thesis for its ignorance of the economic roots of UDI. See Giovanni Arrighi, "The Political Economy of Rhodesia" in Giovanni Arrighi and John Saul, Essays in the Political Economy of Africa (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1973), pp. 366-367.

Murray criticizes the thesis because it overlooks serious white divisions; it was the existence of those divisions and attempts to overcome them that was the animating factor in white politics. See D.J. Murray, The Governmental System in Southern Rhodesia (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970), pp. ix-xxi.

government. Later, responsible government established a unicameral legislature wherein the dominant party produced the executive. Responsible government in general and a Westminster-style institutional context in particular is usually associated with party government. Political parties come into existence, win a majority in the legislature and by convention compose the executive. The mode of governing then is in essence party-government, with policy-making located in the party's parliamentary caucus, the cabinet (as senior party members), or even an "inner" cabinet of the most senior party members. Yet under neither company rule nor later self-government did Zimbabwean policy-making and political initiative reside with the legislatures or with the political parties that controlled them. The center of gravity of policy-making was the chief executive, working in close harmony not with the cabinet but with the bureaucracy.

The absence of strong political parties, in the sense of nation-wide and hierarchically structured organizations, and by implication the relative weakness of the legislature is the subject of several studies of pre-UDI politics. One interpretation holds that strong political parties did not exist because a partisan impetus was absent from white politics. The white population constituted a "white island in a black sea", that is; a possible partisan division resulting from occupational, ideological, regional and other white cleavages were negated by common perceptions with regard to

the race-issue. Political cohesion resulted from the need to unite against the black threat; Leys indeed suggests that this racially motivated political cohesion was the "inner law" of white politics and, since there could be no authentic divisions among whites, a "one-party-system" existed. In support of this thesis, he cites the long dominance of the United Party, while the existence of opposition parties is explained by the fact that they often consisted of disaffected former members of the UP.[61] White consensus thus turned politics into public administration with minor partisan squabbles over the means of the implementation of white dominance. This accounts for the dominance of the chief executive and the importance of the bureaucracy.

Another interpretation holds that it was exactly because serious divisions existed within the white community (for example, agricultural versus manufacturing interests) that a strong executive was called for. Mediation between interest groups was the main function of the chief executive, which under the long reign of Huggins led to an essentially oligarchical mode of governing known as the "Hugginsbureau" of the "Establishment". This "no-party-system" view of

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[61]Leys, pp. 131-177.

Murray[62] is further developed by Bowman:

> The Rhodesian Front is the first Rhodesian party to mobilize whites into an effective political organization and involve them in public policy decisions. Huggins, Welensky, Whitehead, Todd - none of these prime ministers ever built (or even tried to build) a party organization that lasted more than a month or two before and after elections. Once elected, all (to somewhat differing degrees) felt free to make nearly any political decision without reference to anyone except perhaps a few senior colleagues...[the RF party organization] far more than the political party shift in the 1962-elections, constituted the real internal revolution in white Rhodesian politics. Decision-making within the white community became more complex and more inflexible.[63]

Thus policy-making resided with the executive and, within it, with the chief executive more than with other members of the

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[62]Murray, pp. 344-358. The term oligarchy is used by Clements, who comments:

> Rhodesian settlers invoked the democratic traditions of the Motherland to support their claim for 'Responsible Government'...(but having) established the principles which entitled them to control of their own affairs, their immediate task was to abandon them in the exercise of that control...Rhodesian democracy, in fact, most closely resembled the British eighteenth-century oligarchy in its political manifestations....there was no strong party system; personalities counted for more than policies...Conflicts of interest were settled by bargaining and compromise, and never allowed to become as sharp as to threaten the structure of society. Maize prices, railway rates, cattle marketing, tobacco exports, rural roads and telephones, state lotteries, mineral rights, hospitals and school facilities - such were the issues which won or lost elections. Frank Clements, Rhodesia A Study of the Deterioration of a White Society (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969), pp. 44-45.

[63]Bowman, p. 91. Gann and Gelfand attribute the absence of a party system to the smallness and instability of the electorate. See Gann and Gelfand, pp. 88-89.

cabinet.[64]

In the absence of a strong populist democratic tradition in white politics, the public or civil service bureaucracy also became a powerful political actor. The public service in Zimbabwe was first established under BSAC-rule, partly to demonstrate that it was not merely interested in commercial profits but was a public-spirited, responsible representative of the Crown interested in the development of the area.[65] Accordingly a public service was created, organized on a departmental basis and governed by regulations with regard to the terms of service, appointments and internal discipline. This foundation of the public service was closely modelled after and largely staffed by bureaucrats from the public service of the Cape Colony, which was a highly professionalized bureaucracy.[66]

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[64]On the absence of an "inner cabinet" and the consistently authoritarian political style of Zimbabwean prime ministers, see Palley, pp. 458-460. Leys similarly describes cabinet government as feeble. Leys, p. 60. See also Barber, who states:

> Because political activity was confined mainly to a minority distinguished by its race and economic strength, the ebb and flow of politics was based on attempts to balance the interests and groups within that minority... The ruling group in government and politics was a tight circle of men who knew each other intimately. James Barber, p. 9.

[65]Correspondence of Milner to Chamberlain quoted in Palley, p. 137.

[66]The notion that the civil service should be staffed by career civil servants was a reaction to "amateurish" bureaucrats of the BSAC. See Palley, pp. 137-138.

Except for the Native Affairs Department[67] (one of the reserve powers of the British government), the public service departments were constitutionally responsible to the BSAC-administration and later to the executive. By 1923 the political influence of the public service increased beyond political advice and expertise offered through the advisory committees to the cabinet. A Rhodesia Civil Service Council became an official advisory body to the cabinet, uniting the various public service spokesmen of the advisory committees. The latter committees were reconstituted. In addition to the access that the Civil Service Council offered to political influence, several public service associations like the Rhodesia Post and Telegraph Association, the Rhodesia Teachers Association and the Public Service Association were created that engaged in political activities beyond the supply of specialized advice. This activity included partisan politics; in the 1923 elections, for example, they opposed incorporation with South Africa.[68]

Another reason for the political influence of the bureaucracy was its size. Even under BSAC-rule, the size of the public service in relation to the size of the population

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[67]The NAD was known as the "government within the government". See Murray, pp. 271-343.

[68]Ibid., pp. 20-35.

was large,[69] and after the 1923 elections there were pressures - expressed in the legislature - to decrease its size. In response, the different public service associations and the Civil Service Council set out to subvert the efforts of individual ministers to exert cabinet control over the different departments, while seeking to establish its influence with the chief executive. By 1933 the public service effectively circumvented the imposition of legislative control and by individual ministers' control over the public service departments, and also established close links with the chief executive, mainly through the Public Service Board (which controlled public service appointments and promotions) and the various public service associations. Henceforth it exercised "unparalelled control over their own affairs."[70]

Between 1933 and 1965 the public service continued to grow in size, administrative capacity and public responsibility. This growth is related to three developments: First, the depression of the early 1930s invested the public service with responsibility concerning the supply of goods,

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[69] Ibid. and Michael Bratton, "The Public Service in Zimbabwe", Political Science Quarterly 95 (Fall 1980): 445. The size of the public service in 1923, Bratton states, "seemed small and simple, employing just over 2,000 settlers and comprising only six administrative departments. Yet compared with the settler population of 33,620 at that time, or with the 1500 administrators responsible for Nigeria at the peak of British rule, the early administrative presence was substantial." (p. 445)

[70] Murray, p. 39. The Public Service Association was dominated by senior civil servants. Ibid., p. 49.

services and employment.[71] Second, World War II and the economic growth that is associated with it made resource mobilization a public responsibility. Third, the creation of the CAF established a large and complex bureaucracy, prompted the development of public work projects, and led to an increase in public investment in the private sector.[72]

The extent of public service growth can be illustrated by the following figures: In 1921 the public service employed 15 percent of the white population, 25 percent of a substantially larger population by 1951, and 27 percent of an even larger population by 1961. If the number of public transportation employees is added to these figures, the public service in 1951 employed 33 percent of the white population, and 38 percent by 1961.[73] The extent of administrative capacity is partly revealed in employment figures, but also in the increase in specialization (six departments in 1923 as against 32 in 1957),[74] public ownership (for example, energy resources like electricity, transportation,

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[71]Bratton, p. 445.

[72]The nature of the Zimbabwean economy and its historical development will be discussed in the following section of this chapter.

[73]Murray, pp. 16-19.

[74]Leys, pp. 62-64.

communication, and even some industries like cotton and sugar),[75] public regulation (production and marketing control boards like the Tobacco, Dairy and Maize Control Boards), as well as tariffs, quotas and export and import controls.[76]

Even before the Second World War the Zimbabwean public service thus had the administrative capacity and was invested with responsibility to intervene in the social, economic and other dimensions of Zimbabwean society. This interventionist posture stood at the direction of the executive and specifically the prime minister: it had defeated the imposition of popular-legislative control even before the 1930s and was consequently largely divorced from the legislature and the party that controlled it. Since public policy-making thus emanated from an executive-bureaucratic alliance, it raises the question of how autonomously this alliance operated from either metropolitan influences or local interests expressed through non-parliamentary avenues.

The extent to which Britain exercised its reserve powers is a subject surrounded by much disagreement. The debate is almost exclusively centered on race-related matters.

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[75]The Zimbabwean government bought the railway companies in 1947 and negotiated a repeal of the reserve clause with Britain. The later purchase of sugar- and cotton-industries aroused considerable criticism; government assistance, it appears, was acceptable to whites, but only a limited degree of public ownership. See Murray, pp. 162-197.

[76]For the most part, government regulation was a product of the Depression in the 1930s.

Here scholars like Palley argue that Britain did exercise its reserve powers but, since it did so in an unobtrusive manner, British influence on Zimbabwean public policy was not noticeable.[77] Others contend that the constitutional reserve powers were in practice rarely exercised and that complete policy-making freedom existed.[78] In pre-UDI negotiations the Zimbabwean government also claimed that a practice of complete self-government existed.[79]

British influence on Zimbabwean public policy, it is submitted, did not take the form of public policy directives delivered to the Zimbabwean executive or its legislature. It consisted, rather, of a sustained and broad agreement between the two governments on the nature of British imperial policy in southern Africa and Zimbabwe's part in those imperial designs. Except for a brief period in which incorporation with South Africa was considered, British policy toward Zimbabwe was grounded in the desire to develop an economic and political counterweight to South Africa. This imperial aim was the major cause of British support for the establishment of a white settlement in Zimbabwe and was sustained after 1923 and especially after 1945 with the

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[77]Palley, pp. 236-271.

[78]See, for example, Bowman, pp. 6-8.

[79]Palley, pp. 738-746.

creation of the CAF. Had the British government imposed its desire to create a pro-British unit in southern Africa by coercive means, it probably would have encountered resistance, but there never was a need to do so for the Zimbabwean government and white population alike were enthusiastic supporters of imperial aims.[80]

The voluntary Zimbabwean participation in imperial designs in southern Africa created a self-imposed constraint on Zimbabwean public policy-making, including race-related policy. There are several manifestations of this influence. With regard to the native reserves, the British government during the period of BSAC-rule accepted it as a means of "protecting African possession of land, of defining rights and increasing security"[81] against white encroachment. Yet it resisted attempts to finalize the reserves in a legal form, as well as attempts to limit the amount of land available for future black use.[82] By 1918, however, the British

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[80]Chanock, passim.

[81]Ibid., p. 137.

[82]Thus the creation of the reserves was a defensive measure. The problem is not that the British government attempted to defend black interests, but that they entrusted the selection of suitable areas to local Native Commissioners who were susceptible to local white political pressures and largely ignorant of population-land-ratios and possible soil depletion, as well as of black methods of cultivation. See Palmer, "War and Land", pp. 85-107. Others argue that the reserves were created with the deliberate intention of impoverishing blacks and consequently forcing them into wage-labor. See Giovanni Arrighi, "Labor Supplies in Historical

government accepted the report of the Rhodesian Land Commission to reduce and consolidate the 104 reserves. The reason for this retreat, Chanock states, was that imperial policy now favored incorporation with South Africa and that this would cause an influx of South African whites (particularly Afrikaners), which would increase and radicalize white land demands in Zimbabwe. The future South African government that would administer the area would, moreover, demand a political concession from Britain to lower the land demands, possibly the total removal of black participation in white politics (i.e. the establishment of a racially exclusive franchise). This fear of the possibility of disenfranchised and landless blacks led the British government to seek legal guarantees for "what it regarded as a reasonable minimum of African land."[83] In this manner the British government contributed to creating the centerpiece of the future Zimbabwe's economy and society.

Although the situation is somewhat different, similar dynamics are exhibited in the attempt to create the CAF. In this case, Zimbabwe was seen as the more "illiberal" unit and, at least initially, the British government exerted pressure on Zimbabwe to "liberalize" its race policies.[84]

Perspective: A Study of the Proletarianization of the African Peasantry in Rhodesia" in Giovanni Arrighi and John S. Saul pp. 180-234. Hereafter cited as "Labor Supplies".

[83]Chanock, p. 137.

[84]Ibid., pp. 214-228.

British imperialism is also evident in Zimbabwe's immigration policies, which always aimed at ensuring the presence of a large number of "loyal British subjects" in Zimbabwe.[85] This led to the discouragement of immigration from South African sources, as South African immigrants would include Afrikaners with questionable imperial sympathies. Even public policy with regard to the franchise was influenced by imperial designs, for the literacy requirements barred Afrikaners who, though perhaps literate in Afrikaans, did not have full command of the English language.[86]

Thus the executive-bureaucratic alliance was, largely by its own volition, subject to influences from the British government. British policy in southern Africa was an imperial one, for it attempted to seek a counter to the segregationist and, most importantly, nationalist directions of South African public policy. Zimbabwe therefore became the nucleus of a pro-British and, hopefully, a liberal counterweight to South Africa - and consented to its role by incorporating these aims into its public policies.

In the absence of a populist political tradition in white politics, was the executive-bureaucratic alliance more closely connected with some whites than with others?

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[85]Clements, pp. 40-94.

[86]Ibid. See also Chanock, pp. 141-164 and Palley, pp. 206-211 and 322-344.

Some scholars, like Arrighi, argue that the white society was characterized by class divisions, derivative of economic considerations. Prior to the Second World War, there were four classes, namely the rural bourgeoisie (white minners and agriculturalists), large-scale capitalists engaged in controlling transport- and power-industries, primary production and land speculation, a white wage-earning class (administrative employees, clerical workers, foremen, artisans and semi-skilled workers) essentially engaged in service industries, and a petty bourgeoisie (shopkeepers, small employees and tradesmen). Although the interests of these classes were not identical, they were compatible. This compatibility of interests led to a class coalition opposed to the interests of the large-scale capitalists on the one hand and the black class on the other hand. Pre-1945 white politics was thus characterized by the ability of the white class coalition to capture state power and to use it to limit the competition of the black underclass and international capital.[87]

Instead of the formal class divisions suggested by Arrighi, Murray argues that divisions were more informal and

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[87]Arrighi, "The Political Economy of Rhodesia", pp. 336-348. For modified versions of this thesis, see Kenneth Good, "Settler Colonialism: Economic Development and Class Formation", Journal of Modern African Studies 14 (December 1976): 597-620; Kenneth Good, "Settler Colonialism in Rhodesia" African Affairs 73 (January 1974): 10-36; and Loney, pp. 51-58.

included non-economic groups. The most important of these groups centered on the public service (the Public Service Association), white agriculture (first the Rhodesia Agricultural Union and later the Rhodesia National Farmers Union), mining (the union of small working miners and the major companies), commerce (the local chambers of commerce and the national Associated Chamber of Commerce) and industry (the Federation of Rhodesian Industry). All these groups found formal incorporation in the government control boards. In the Pre-1945 era, the interests of agriculture and mining usually prevailed over that of commerce and industry. The reason, Murray suggests, was that commerce and industry were locally organized groups with demands that could be satisfied on a local or municipal level. Lacking a strong national organization and focus, they could not prevail over the well-organized agricultural, mining and public service associations.[88]

As the preceding discussion indicates, there is wide agreement[89] that mining and agricultural interests in pre-1945 Zimbabwe have leverage within the executive-bureaucratic

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[88]Murray, pp. 344-352.

[89]See also, Leys, pp. 98-105; and Robin Palmer, "The Agricultural History of Rhodesia" in Robin Palmer and Neil Parsons (eds.) The Roots of Rural Poverty in Central and Southern Africa (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1977), pp. 239-243.

alliance. Disagreement about this leverage does exist, and focuses on the conceptualization of the powerful interests (classes or interest groups), the considerations that animate their activity (economic self-interest or the satisfaction of group interests), and on the formality or informality of these groups' access to state power.

3.2. The Pre-1945 Economy

As stated before, Zimbabwe was opened to white settlement in the hope of discovering great mineral wealth, but although deposits were found, they did not lead to the creation of a second Rand. The BSAC had, in anticipation of a gold rush, acquired land and sold it at inflated prices to incoming settlers. To then offset BSAC capital losses, agricultural development was encouraged.

The ecological environment for farming in Zimbabwe is, as in most parts of southern Africa, harsh: most suited to farming in Zimbabwe is the flat, high, cool and well-watered highveld running diagonally - northeast to southwest - across the interior; from this highveld the middleveld slopes east and westward, and is less conducive to crop farming; and the lowveld is infested with the tsetse fly and virtually waterless. For most of the year, in fact, there is no rain in Zimbabwe. After 1900 there were other obstacles: a lack of capital, equipment, infrastructure and a small domestic market (mainly the mines). Yet the BSAC encouraged farming

Figure II: Farming Potential of Zimbabwean Land (1962)

Natural Farming Region (suitable for)	Total Land Area	African Areas	Non-African Areas*
I–Intensive specialized and diversified farming	1.6	0.7	2.2
II–Intensive crop farming with subsidiary livestock	18.7	9.9	25.3
III–Semi-intensive mixed farming with livestock dominant	17.4	14.7	19.5
IV–Semiextensive farming based on livestock and drought-resistant crops	33.0	36.6	30.4
V–Extensive livestock grazing	26.2	33.4	20.8
X–Unsuitable for agriculture	3.1	4.7	1.8
	100.0	100.0	100.0

*Total non-African area of 52.1 million acres included European (white) Areas (35.7 million acres), Unreserved Land (5.9 million acres), and National Land (10.5 million acres). Most of the last two categories occurred in the poorer regions. The African areas comprised 44.4 million acres in 1962.

Source: Nelson, p.275.

by developing land settlement schemes, created a Department of Agriculture that offered extension services, and created a Land Bank with lending and credit facilities. Settling on the fertile highveld, the new white farmers selected maize and tobacco as their main crops.[90]

Like the mining industry, agriculture was labor-intensive and for a while competed with the mines for black labor.[91] Another source of competition was black farmers, who also supplied maize to the mines, and it is indeed argued that they were more successful suppliers of mine-needs than white farmers.[92] The initiation of white cattle ranching further exacerbated the competition between black and white farmers. White agricultural production nevertheless rose and by the First World War "was firmly established as a central sector of the Rhodesian economy."[93]

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[90]Palmer, "Agricultural History of Rhodesia", pp. 221-230.

[91]See Arrighi, "Labor Supplies", pp. 180-206.

[92]Palmer, "Agricultural History of Rhodesia", pp. 228-230; Ian Phimister, "Peasant Production and Underdevelopment in Southern Rhodesia, 1890-1914, with Particular Reference to the Victoria District" in Palmer and Parsons, pp. 255-267 and Barry Kosmin, "The Inyoka Tobacco Industry of the Shangwe People: The Displacement of a Pre-Colonial Economy in Southern Rhodesia, 1898-1938" in Palmer and Parsons, pp. 268-288.

[93]Palmer, "The Agricultural History of Rhodesia", p. 237.

Agricultural production, however, suffered from extreme fluctuations:

> After the collapse of tobacco through overproduction in 1913-1914, the industry slowly recovered and production rose from 426, 423 lb in 1914-15 to a record 5,659,809 lb in 1925-6...Tobacco enjoyed another brief boom, following an increase in imperial preference, and production soared... (to) 24,943,044 lb in 1927-8. But once again, as in 1913-14, Rhodesian growers had over-reached themselves, for the overseas market was saturated, vast unsaleable stocks accumulated in British warehouses, the order books were closed and a great many tobacco farms were abandoned, with some 700 producers, three-quarters of the total, eliminated.[94]

With regard to maize:

> A similar pattern can be observed in regard to the maize industry, where production rose from 1,393,654 (203 lb) bags in 1925-6 to 1,985,848 bags in 1935-6, and exports rose from 434,592 (200 lb) bags in 1926 to 745,010 in 1930. But by the beginning of 1931, with the export price falling from 11s to 3s 4d, most European maize-growers were facing bankruptcy.[95]

Cattle farmers also became geared to meat exports after the introduction of refrigeration in the Rhodesian Railways and government bounty, but suffered an immediate setback with the outbreak of foot-and-mouth-disease. This outbreak led to a two-year suspension of all agricultural products except citrus and tobacco.[96]

The generally unstable agricultural production led to government intervention. In 1931 and 1934 the government

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[94] Ibid., pp. 236 and 239.

[95] Ibid., p. 240.

[96] Ibid.

promulgated the Maize Control Acts, designed to stabilize maize prices and to provide protection to white farmers against black farming competition in the higher-priced domestic market. The Tobacco and Dairy Control Boards similarly protected white agricultural production against overproduction and falling prices. In 1933 the government further declared a moratorium on farmers' payments for land purchases, enacted a Farmers Debts Adjustment Act that provided loans to farmers, and provided subsidies for road-building and conservation efforts.[97]

The white agricultural economy was also of a generally static nature. Whites owned land under the provisions of the initial land apportionment that was enshrined in the 1923-constitution. Hereby land was divided into native reserves (approximately 22 percent of the total land), white land (about 31 percent) and unassigned land (about 47 percent). Unassigned land formerly belonged to the BSAC, but after 1923 it could be purchased by either blacks or whites. By 1925 a new land commission (the Morris Carter Commission) recommended readjustments, since few blacks bought land in unassigned areas and since whites then bought the best farmland. The result was the Land Apportionment Act of 1931, which extended white land ownership to about 51 percent of the total land while preserving native reserve land at about 22 percent.

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[97]Loney, p. 57.

Unassigned land was divided into African Purchase Land (about 8 percent), while 19 percent remained unassigned. This land division remained in place until 1969, when it was replaced by the Land Tenure Act. White land was almost entirely situated in the fertile highveld close to railroad links.[98]

Despite the extensive and fertile land held by white agriculturalists,[99] only a small proportion of the land was actually cultivated before the Second World War. White agricultural production's twin pillars were maize and tobacco, as well as some cattle ranching, which used large amounts of land to produce a relatively small yield of crops or grazing. Land ownership clearly did not equal land cultivation. Land cultivation, moreover, was semi-primitive: extensive rather than intensive black labor was used in conjunction with rudimentary tools (like hand hoes) and a lack of mechanization (single disc ox plows rather than tractors). Lack of adequate soil conservation measures and resulting soil depletion[100] further added to the generally uneconomic nature

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[98]George Kay, Rhodesia: A Human Geography (London: University of London Press, 1970), pp. 37-58.

[99]The number of farmers was 2042 in 1914, and rose to 3052 by 1932 and to 3640 by 1944. D.G. Clarke, Agricultural and Plantation Workers in Rhodesia (Gwelo, Zimbabwe: Mambo Press, 1977), p. 21.

[100]Soil depletion in white areas was mainly due to the lack of rotational cultivation and fertilizer. Palmer, "Agricultural History of Rhodesia", p. 240.

of white agricultural production.[101]

The absence of modern agricultural methods in pre-1945 Zimbabwe is directly attributable to the lack of capital (either foreign capital or local profits) and the small size of the domestic market. The initial market in Zimbabwe consisted of urban areas and mines, but these needs were met - largely by black farmers - before the First World War. Further expansion of the domestic market did not occur until the Second World War. The export market was, as shown, highly unreliable and the overproduction it encouraged led to boom-bust periods in white agricultural production, which led to increasing government regulation of marketing and production.

The mining industry was more explicitly geared to the export market. Minerals were exploited by large companies and smallworking miners, who concentrated on the exploitation of gold in about 1,750 workings. By the late 1930s, minerals contributed approximately 25 percent of the national income of Zimbabwe.[102]

Before 1945 the Zimbabwean economy thus resembled colonial economies of the export-type: it had a mining industry almost totally geared to exports and a white-dominated

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[101] Ibid., pp. 239-243; Loney, pp. 53-58 and Arrighi, "Labor Supplies", pp. 191-198.

[102] Arrighi, "Political Economy of Rhodesia", p. 354.

agricultural industry. Few secondary industries existed, largely because of the small size of the domestic market; secondary needs were largely met by South African and British manufacturers.[103]

3.3. Foreign Pressure

As the preceding discussion shows, pre-1945 Zimbabwe was vulnerable to foreign pressures in at least two major respects: First, it was vulnerable to British imperial actions in the southern African region. Second, given the nature of its economy, it was vulnerable to developments in the world economy. The latter vulnerability indeed prompted a government inquiry (the Danziger Memorandum of 1943), which questioned Zimbabwe's future as an export-oriented economy and suggested the development of secondary industries instead.[104]

3.3.1. Economic Pressure

Zimbabwe entered the Second World War as a Commonwealth component of the Allied war effort. The effect of the war on the Zimbabwean economy was explosive. As Arrighi states:

> The lack of internal demand represented a brake on industrialization and development, and the progressive decrease

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[103]British trade with Zimbabwe was a result of Commonwealth preference. Trade between Zimbabwe and South Africa proceeded under several customs agreements. Zimbabwe also relied on South African ports and railroads for the export of its goods.

[104]Gann and Gelfand, pp. 175-176.

> of overall peasant productivity worsened this obstacle. World War II was the external stimulant which more than offset the hindrance and started economic growth in Southern Rhodesia after the stagnation of the 1930s.[105]

The Second World War created a virtually insatiable demand for Zimbabwean goods, as the Allied war effort required manufactured goods, agricultural products, and minerals like chrome, gold and asbestos.[106]

The Zimbabwean economy, however, given its structure, was ill-equipped to meet rapid increases in demand. There were few secondary industries and the agricultural economy was, as shown, static. The boom conditions of the Second World War were, moreover, sustained after 1945 as the shortage of raw materials and United States currency continued. European states did not wish to spend United States capital by buying American-made goods, like tobacco.

The Zimbabwean government responded to these foreign pressures by encouraging the development of secondary industries within Zimbabwe. It set up anti-inflationary devices and publicly financed the creation of iron- and steel-industries. The government's efforts were complemented by a sudden and unexpected influx of British capital. Whereas

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[105]Arrighi, "Political Economy of Rhodesia", p. 350.

[106]In its most direct form the increase in demand came from the placement of an allied air training scheme in Zimbabwe, resulting in an influx of allied capital and a demand for Zimbabwean supplies to air stations, quarters, land, and buildings. Ibid.

a considerable amount of British capital was previously invested in South Africa, the rising tide of Afrikaner nationalism in South Africa made Zimbabwe, with its imperial sympathies a more politically suitable investment area. Foreign investment, which amounted to 13.5 million pounds in 1947, was more than double that in 1949 and reached 50.7 million pounds in 1951.[107] The result was the development of a manufacturing industry in Zimbabwe, as can be gauged from the following figures:

> The contribution of manufacturing to national income rose from 9 percent in the late 1930s to about 15 percent in the early 1950s to over 18 percent in the early 1960s... the industry passed from the small family-shop stage to the large-scale, mechanized, corporate-owned factory.[108]

This rise of secondary industry in Zimbabwe was to have several economic and political consequences. One was the transformation of the white population structure in Zimbabwe. In 1921, for example, 25 percent of white Zimbaweans were farmers, eleven percent were employed in the mining industry, 26 percent were public service employees (11 percent of which were railway workers) and 17 percent were employees of commercial and industrial enterprises. By 1951, however, only 12 percent were farmers, mining employees were reduced to five percent, while public service employees rose to 33 percent (including transportation workers) and commercial and

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[107] Ibid., p. 351.

[108] Ibid., p. 353.

industrial employees rose to 49 percent. By 1961 these patterns were further accentuated. Farmers declined to five percent and mining employment to three percent, while the public service rose to 38 percent (including transportation workers) and commercial and industrial employees to 54 percent.[109]

In summary, the pre-1945 population structure was characterized by the numeric preponderance of farmers and public service employees. In post-1945 Zimbabwe, public service continued to account for a high proportion of white employment, but it was first rivalled and then surpassed by commercial and industrial employment. Farmers were numerically eclipsed.

Since these figures are given as percentages, it is important to note that there was spectacular white population growth after 1945. As a result of slow economic growth and a selective immigration policy, the white population grew from 33,600 in 1921 to 69,000 by 1941. Five years later, however, the population of whites grew to 82,400 and reached 135,600 by 1951, reaching 177,100 by 1956 and 221,500 by 1961.[110]

An immediate political consequence of this population increase was the expansion of the white voting roll.

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[109]These figures are adapted from Murray, pp. 16-19.

[110]Bowman, p. 13.

Although not all immigrants registered as voters, immigrants did emerge as an electoral force, particularly since most did not settle as farmers, but entered public service, manufacturing and industrial employment. The number of farmers actually remained stable; it is as a percentage of the total population that they declined.[111]

Besides its efforts to stimulate the development of secondary industries, the Zimbabwean government also acted to stimulate agricultural production. These efforts fell into two categories, namely efforts to promote the productive capacities of black farmers and efforts to promote white agricultural production. Black agriculture itself fell into two categories, namely production in the African Purchase Land and in the Native Reserves.

As indicated before, black agriculturalists had responded well to the market- and cash-economy (centered on the mines) during the 1890-1910 period. Subsequently the productive capacities of black farmers declined progressively, chiefly because of soil depletion in the reserved areas,[112]

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[111]See Clements, pp. 40-95 and William G. Kuepper, G. Lynne Lackey and E. Nelson Swinerton, "The European Departure from Rhodesia: Migration in a Crisis-Situation", paper presented at the Third World Conference, Chicago, Illinois, March 29, 1979, pp. 2-5.

[112]Since the soil in the reserves was less fertile than in white areas, more land would be required for blacks - even without population pressure. Nelson, pp. 272-276.

traditionalist cultivation methods,[113] and population pressure in the reserves. Apart from the hard-pressed reserves,[114] some blacks lived on purchased land, bought in competition with whites in the unassigned areas before 1931 or allocated as African Purchase Land. Although these farmers occupied larger farms and employed non-family labor, their methods of cultivation were similar to that of farmers in the reserves, that is, nonmechanized labor-intensive cultivation and cattle-holding.[115]

Initially political interest in the productive capacities of black agriculturalists were confined to the creation of a Native Education Department (later renamed the Native Development Department), but the promotion of black agriculture consisted of the inspection of mission schools and the encouragement of local, traditionalist industries (like weaving and woodcarving). The Native Development Department was later absorbed by the Native Affairs Department in 1933. Up to the Second World War, the objective of

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[113]Ibid., p. 294. Agriculturalists in the reserves occupied small plots, cultivated crops with family and nonmechanized labor, or tended to small herds of cattle.

[114]The annual reports of Chief Native Commissioners regularly mentioned "overcrowding", "general overstocking" and a "vicious and expanding circle of destruction." Quoted by Arrighi, "Labor Supplies", p. 207.

[115]Nelson, p. 294.

the Native Affairs Department was to preserve law and order in the black rural areas, to collect taxes and to support the "traditional way of life."[116]

During the Second World War, government policy toward the development of the black areas changed. One of the first indications of this change was Huggins' Statement on Native Policy in 1941, which expressed interest in increasing black agricultural output. Subsequently, government policy was characterized by efforts to increase black agricultural production.

In 1943 a survey of the reserves by the Department of Native Agriculture estimated that out of the 98 Reserves, 62 were overpopulated) (19 were more than 100 percent overpopulated) and 50 were overstocked."[117] With regard to overpopulation, the government's response was to appoint the McIlwaine Commission to investigate soil conservation under the recently enacted Natural Resources Act of 1941, who recommended that soil conservation measures should be implemented through a Natural Resources Board and through local Native Commissioners. In addition to these measures the government appointed the Danziger Commission in 1948, with responsibility to investigate land allocation. While

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[116]On the history of the Native Affairs Department and the general administrative machinery for black affairs, see J.F. Holleman, Chief, Council and Commissioner, Some Problems of Government in Rhodesia (Assen, the Netherlands: Royal VanGorum, 1969) pp. 3-43.

[117]Arrighi, "Labor Supplies", p. 208.

the native reserves and the African Purchase Land had not increased since the Land Apportionment Act of 1931, the black population by 1941 had increased by 40 percent. Consequently a 1950 Amendment to the Land Apportionment Act designated four million acres of unassigned land as Special Native Areas. These areas, which were later somewhat enlarged, were to relieve the population pressure of the native reserves. However, these areas were also to absorb "unproductive" squatters on white farms.[118]

In 1944 the Zimbabwean government appointed another commission to investigate black agriculture and trade. This Godlonton Commission produced a report that used the categories of developed and undeveloped rather than the familiar black-white categories in describing Zimbabwean agriculture, and criticized black production, marketing and trade. The principal causes of poor black production, the report argued, were bad animal husbandry practices and the failure of local leadership (i.e. traditional chiefs) to promote such practices. The Godlonton Commission's "Report of the Commission on Native Production and Trade" led to the enactment of the Native Development Fund Act and the Native Production and Marketing Development Act in 1948; it created government funds

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[118]Kay, Rhodesia: A Human Geography, pp. 37-58.

for the support of black agricultural initiatives, attempted to improve black marketing conditions and also created an administrative machinery designed to centralize all efforts to promote black agriculture. Efforts to promote black production were to be compulsory which, in a local context, placed much of the executive burden on traditional chiefs, local black councils, and Native Commissioners.[119] Perhaps the most radical measure to promote black agriculture came with the enactment of the African Land Husbandry Act of 1951, designed to secure individual black farming and grazing rights to destock black cattle holdings. In 1956 all these efforts were capped by a "Five Year Plan", incorporating many of the previous marketing, production and trade reforms.[120]

Government efforts to promote black agricultural production had little, if any, economic effect and was confirmed by government reports.[121] Although very little

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[119]Murray, pp. 303-312 and Holleman, pp. 44-76.

[120]Holleman, pp. 45-54. See also the What the Native Land Husbandry Act Means to the Rural African and to Southern Rhodesia: A Five Year Plan That Will Revolutionize African Agriculture (Salisbury: Government Printer, 1955). Government expenditure on black agriculture in the 1941-1949 period was about 2.5 million; it rose to 15.8 million in the following nine years. Montague Yudelman, Africans on the Land (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964), p. 159.

[121]First and Second Report of the Select Committee on the Resettlement of Natives (Salisbury: Government Printer, 1959 and 1960); A Note on the Economics of African Development in Southern Rhodesia with Special Reference to Agriculture (Salisbury: Government Printer, 1960); Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Alleged Discontent in the Mangwende

statistical information about black agriculture is available, it is estimated that cash sales of black producers after 1957 remained static.[122] There was a modest increase in black agricultural production overall, but a possible surplus-effect was negated by population increases in the reserves. There are other reasons for the economic failure of the government's reform efforts. One reason was the shallow and self-righteous government views on the reason for the limited black production, namely that it was caused by lack of commitment to the industrialized way of life. Another cause for the failure of rural black reform was the government's overestimation of its administrative capacity in rural areas. Although the government's administrative presence in the rural areas increased, it added responsibility to the already overburdened Native Commissioners. The government attempted to ease this burden by creating local black councils by the African Councils Act of 1957. These councils were composed of local chiefs and other local blacks, but they suffered from a lack of local support. The government also miscalculated the size of black holdings that would be suitable to intense cultivation. Black farmers on average were allocated six acres,

Reserve (Salisbury: Government Printer, 1961); and Report of the Advisory Committee: The Development of the Resources of Southern Rhodesia with Particular Reference to the Role of African Agriculture (Salisbury: Government Printer, 1962).

[122] Most figures consist of estimates. Only cash sales through official marketing agencies are recorded. Nelson, p. 293.

compared to the white farm size minimum of 750 acres of already deteriorated land. The result was that cultivation caused further soil depletion.[123]

Perhaps the most important reason for the failure of the government's reforms in general and the African Land Husbandry Act in particular was political opposition. The government attempted to secure individual black farming rights, but this aim conflicted with the customary basis of black society. By custom the allocation of black farmland took place within the context of tribal wards, where chiefs parcelled out communally-held land to individual use. Individual farming rights undermined the security of rural tenure (it indeed did not even recognize tribal ward distinctions) and undermined the tribal structure and authority. Destocking was also controversial: by custom cattle-holdings are indicators of rural black status and wealth and the slaughter or sale of cattle could not be accomplished by voluntary means.[124]

Given that the government's efforts to improve black agricultural production adversely affected all blacks' security in rural communal land, undercut the authority of local traditional leaders, and was implemented in a coercive manner, it is not surprising that these efforts

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[123]Holleman, pp. 56-72.

[124]Ibid.

encountered sustained black opposition from both the rural and urban areas. A nationalist leader indeed remarked that the African Land Husbandry Act was the best recruiter the nationalists ever had.[125]

The lack of political support and faulty economic reasoning thus undermined government efforts to effect a capitalist breakthrough in black agricultural production. Already overstrained by the 1950s, the structure of black agriculture could not absorb the population increases in rural areas. This resulted in the absence of young men from the reserves,[126] who sought wage labor opportunities elsewhere, and a reliance of rural dwellers on cash gifts from wage-laboring friends and relatives.[127] By the early 1960s it was indeed calculated that the reserves could not meet their own subsistence needs: the reserves then became net importers of subsistence food needs.[128]

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[125]George Nyandoro as quoted by Ken Brown, Land In Southern Rhodesia (London: Africa Bureau, 1959), p. 2.

[126]Weinrich, pp. 21-22.

[127]The transfer of funds from urban wage-laborers to rural friends and relatives is known as a "remittance nexus" and is expected to constitute a considerable proportion of rural dwellers' income. Clarke, pp. 44-51.

[128]Bratton remarks that this "destruction over time of the capacity of African agriculture to produce a surplus sets Rhodesia apart from Kenya...A reconstruction of African agriculture and a successful incorporation of African cultivators into a capitalist 'peasant' mode was undertaken after the Mau Mau rebellion by means of the spread of cash-cropping." Michael Bratton, "Structural Transformation in Zimbabwe:

As previously discussed, white agricultural technology before 1945 was similar to black agricultural technology; the differences between the two agricultures derived more from differential access to state aid and different farm size.[129] Large portions of legally reserved white farmland was also unoccupied (and hence uncultivated) and even large portions of occupied land were uncultivated.[130] The initial response to demand-pressures generated by the Second World War was thus poor: increases in production did occur but they fell short of demands and food rationing and imports were required.[131]

The government's response to these pressures was, first, to change its policy with regard to immigration. Although still selective as far as the origins of immigrants was concerned (i.e. "loyal British subjects"), a more vigorous immigration policy was adopted to attract potential farmers. Land acquisition was easiest for veterans of the Second World War, but acquisition was more difficult for younger immigrants who were required to first work on existing farms

Comparative Notes from the Neo-Colonisation of Kenya", Journal of Modern African Studies 15 (December 1977): 604-605. Hereafter cited as "Structural Transformation".

[129]Robin Palmer and Neil Parsons, "The Roots of Rural Poverty: Historical Background" in Palmer and Parsons, pp. 8-9.

[130]Before 1945 less than three percent of the arable land in white farming areas was under cultivation. Nelson, p. 283.

[131]Ibid., p. 285. Maize imports were required until 1952.

before qualifying for land-ownership.[132] The results of the farming-oriented immigration policy were generally disappointing, as most immigrants preferred to settle in towns as wage-labourers. While the number of farmers did increase, much of the best farmland remained uncultivated.[133]

Second, the government encouraged better cultivation on existing farmland. White soil depletion was, like that of black farmers, criticized and similarly encouraged by the Natural Resources Board and extension officers of the Department of Agriculture. At the National Farmers Union Congress in 1946 Huggins switched public criticism of white farmers to their production techniques and stated that government policy henceforth would encourage more intense cultivation of holdings not exceeding 1,000 acres. In order to guarantee reasonable prices for increased production, the government would continue its support of rational marketing practices and also maintain export controls.[134]

In terms of output and value, agricultural production by white farmers did increase: between 1937 and 1958 the volume of production increased by 259 percent, and its value

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[132]Ibid.

[133]The number of farmers in 1944 was 3640 and by 1965 it rose to 6266. Some of these white farmers owned more than one farm. Clarke, pp. 21-22.

[134]Gann and Gelfand, pp. 193-195.

by 1,000 percent.[135] Before 1945 maize and tobacco were the twin pillars of agricultural production. Between 1944 and 1954 the volume of maize and other non-tobacco products increased by an average of 60 percent. In this period there was thus some agricultural diversification, as the sugar and cotton cultivation increased,[136] but maize and tobacco nevertheless remained the chief products: maize accounted for 39 percent of the total cropland, and tobacco accounted for 19 percent.[137]

Much of the increase in white agricultural production can be attributed to improved production techniques. With regard to tobacco, producers switched from burley and turkish tobacco to a flue-cured virginia-type, and increased their use of pesti- and herbicides and fertilizer. The two provinces of Mashonaland, which came to produce more than 80 percent of all white maize and tobacco production,[138] for

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[135]Palmer, "The Agricultural History of Rhodesia", p. 244.

[136]Nelson, p. 285.

[137]Bratton, "Structural Transformation" p. 602.

[138]Most of the crop production in Zimbabwe is geographically concentrated in Mashonaland North and South. In 1965, for example, these two provinces "produced 87 percent of all white-grown maize, 84 percent of the Virginia tobacco, and 58 percent of the milk". Nelson, pp. 288-289. The lowest crop yields are found in the Midlands, Victoria and Matabeleland provinces, where cattle ranching is the white agricultural pre-occupation. This is in large part a reflection of the ecological conditions: the more fertile Mashonaland

example uses 80 percent of all white use of fertilizer.[139] With regard to maize there were similar improvements as farmers adopted a locally developed hybrid maize type, and icnreased the use of fertilizer and herbi- and pesticides.[140]

The period between 1945 and 1965 also witnessed the increase of large-scale commercial farming. Foreign and domestic-owned plantation (or estate) farming increased especially in the southwestern and -eastern provinces (Matabeleland North and South, Victoria and Manicaland), where sugar, cotton, tobacco, tea and citrus are also locally processed. These vast estates of companies like the Lonrho Group, Liebig Corporation, Huletts and Anglo-American operated as competitors to individually and locally-owned mixed farms.[141] Despite the increases in agricultural production, white farming remained vulnerable in at least three respects.

First, white agriculture remained a labor-intensive industry. In the period between 1946 and 1974 the number of black farmworkers in fact increased by 252 percent, casting doubt on the use of improved managerial and production techniques as the sole explanations of improved production. The

has an average farm size of 3,000 acres while the more arid other provinces with its cattle ranching and mixed farms have an average farm size of 6,000 acres. Bratton, "Structural Transformation" p. 602.

[139]Nelson, p. 288.

[140]Ibid., p. 289.

[141]Bratton, "Structural Transformation" pp. 602-603.

number of black farmworkers rose from 142,000 to 272,000 between 1946 and 1961. The two Mashonaland provinces, where production is particularly high, employ 60.5 percent of all permanent black farmworkers.[142] Under these conditions it is not surprising that white farming organizations lobbied to secure an adequate supply of black laborers.[143]

Second, since the domestic and the CAF-created market remained small and tobacco especially enjoyed high world market prices, agricultural production became thoroughly geared to the export market. This shift is in large part due to the emergence of tobacco as the main agricultural crop; in 1945 the value of tobacco sales, for example, was 3.9 million pounds but by 1960 it rose to 29.5 million[144] pounds. This five-fold increase in value, coupled with the increase in tobacco production, made white agriculture the chief earner of Zimbabwean foreign exchange by the early 1960s.[145] This reliance on exports of a few agricultural primary products rendered Zimbabwe's economy vulnerable to

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[142]Clarke, pp. 24-26.

[143]Loney, pp. 69-73 and Arrighi, "Political Economy of Rhodesia," pp. 353-355.

[144]Palmer, "Agricultural History of Rhodesia," p. 244 (fn. 155).

[145]Tobacco accounted for 47 percent of the total value of agricultural production in 1965. Nelson, p. 286.

fluctuations in the world market economy.

Third, although cultivation was more extensive in 1965 than in the pre-1945 era, less than one-sixth of the total arable land in white farmland was under cultivation. The reason, the government reported, was that many white farmers preferred to increase but then maintain production at certain "target-income"-levels. This resulted in artificial land scarcity, uncultivated land and agricultural inefficiency.[146]

Thus white agricultural production under the impact of government pressure did increase dramatically after the Second World War. White agriculture became more capital-intensive and adopted improved production techniques. Yet it remained vulnerable. Compared to volume increases, value increases were disproportionately high, reflecting the high world market prices for tobacco. Farmers also continued to rely on increasing numbers of black farmworkers. The result, as confirmed by government reports, was that white agriculture not only operated at less-than-full-potential, but that it was also vulnerable in its lack of mechanization (or over-reliance on black labor) and the fluctuations of the world market economy.

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[146]Ibid., pp. 280-281.

3.3.2. Political Pressure and Reform?

During and after the Second World War efforts to incorporate Zimbabwe with the northern territories gained momentum, as the strategic, political and economic arguments for the creation of a central African union became more forceful. Zimbabwe desired a close form of such a union, in the form of amalgamation with copper-rich Zambia.[147] The British government investigated this possibility by way of the Bledisloe Commission in 1938 but concluded that although the socio-economic position of blacks in Zimbabwe was better than in the northern territories Zimbabwe's race policies were apparently set on a course more similar to South African race policy. The then existing and anticipated future direction of Zimbabwe's race policy made a close form of union impossible. The British government, as indicated before, hoped for a liberal counterweight in race policy in central Africa and hoped that Zimbabwe would "liberalize" its race policy so as to overcome its divergence from northern race policy.[148]

Zimbabwe's race policy between 1923 and 1945 has been described as a "dual", "two-pyramid"- or "gradual"-policy.

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[147] Chanock, pp. 190-248

[148] Ibid.

Race policy was rooted in the principle and practice of land apportionment, which created separate and legally specified land areas where land ownership was exclusive to one or the other race. The black population was seen as being naturally at home in the native reserves and the government had a pastoral view of the nature of rural black society. Government policy aimed at the preservation of the traditional political, social and economic way of life in rural areas. By implication politically active blacks in non-traditional ways and in non-traditional areas were viewed in a negative light.[149] This pastoral view of rural society also implied that blacks did not naturally belong to the urban areas - which was reflected in poor urban housing conditions, poverty and other unsatisfactory living conditions and the introduction of pass laws in 1936.

British policy between the Bledisloe Commission and the creation of the CAF witnessed the demise of the liberal counterpoise-idea. To a certain extent the Pledisloe Commission's findings about the socio-economic conditions of blacks in its northern protectorates already embarrassed the British government, who wished to contrast it with more illiberal conditions in Zimbabwe. Huggins nevertheless protested the

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[149]For a full discussion of pre-1945 race policy in Zimbabwe, see Leys, pp. 258-270, who argues that racial ideas permeated but did not dominate white political thought. See also Richard Gray, The Two Nations (New York: Oxford University Press, 1960), pp. 3-194.

commission's findings, which led to a one-man commission of inquiry of central African race policies by Lord Haley. In 1941 the confidential report of Lord Haley still maintained that divergent race policies existed, but argued that they were not conclusive differences and that there was increasing public and private recognition in Zimbabwe that blacks were an integral part of Zimbabwean society. There was also promise of improvement in the socio-economic conditions of blacks. At the same time the British High Commissioner in South Africa reported on the increase of anti-imperial and segregationist sentiments among Afrikaners. By comparison white Zimbabweans were more acceptable as imperial and, hopefully, racial allies. Such an alliance should not be precluded because of the "alleged errors" in racial affairs; in fact, white Zimbabweans should be given greater self-government in racial matters.[150]

The generally favorable tone of government inquiries between 1938 and 1945 about Zimbabwe's racial affairs diluted British pressures for race reforms. The hope of a harmonized, liberal and British-supported race policy for the CAF disappeared. By 1951 the conference negotiating CAF stated that the timing and method of the constituent territories' race policies still differed and that the new race policy of the

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[150]Chanock, pp. 230-238 and Palley, pp. 331-336.

CAF would simply be one dedicated to the economic, social and political advancement of blacks in partnership with whites.[151]

Zimbabwe's race policy of this period reflected the relaxation of British demands for racial concessions. Faced with electoral challenge from the Liberal Party in the post-war election, Huggins campaigned for a raise in voting qualifications, which would further restrict the number of black voters, while proposing to have black interests in parliament represented by two white members. In 1950 the government dropped the latter proposal, but it did raise the voting qualifications in 1951,[152] leading to a decrease in the number of black voters.[153]

The 1951 increase in voting qualifications was the high point of Zimbabwean governments' efforts to limit black political participation. In 1956 the commission on electoral reform (the Tredgold Commission) recommended another increase in voting qualifications, but suggested the creation of a "special roll" of voters with lower qualifications. Special roll voters could not, however, count for more than half

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[151]Palley, pp. 333-336.

[152]Ibid., p. 308. Property qualifications were raised to 500 pounds and annual income to 120 pounds as well as the ability to read and speak English. Citizenship was also now required.

[153]Leys, p. 192. Leys reports that more blacks could have participated, based on government reports on the number of blacks who met the voting qualifications. Ibid., p. 197.

of common roll votes.[154] While the Electoral Amendment Act of 1957 did not follow all the Tredgold Commission's recommendations, it did introduce a second preference voting system and did create a special voting role which could not count for more than 20 percent of common roll votes. By the end of 1960 the total number of black voters increased to 3,129 (out of a total electorate of 75,061) and by 1961 to 5,177 (out of a total electorate of 88,820).[155] Government policy to increase the number of black voters was part of the "liberal", "inter-racial", or "middle class" or "partnership" strategy. This middle class policy was largely prompted because the UFP faced electoral challenge and wanted to extend its support base. This extension would take the form of creating and then enfranchising a black middle class. The sequence of this policy was important: socio-economic improvement would precede black enfranchisement.

The government's middle class policy of the 1950s, it is submitted, can best be understood as a response to the loss of white political support the government experienced in the wake of its post-1945 reforms. These reform efforts included, among other things, the encouragement of black agriculture and secondary industries. With regard to black

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[154]Palley, pp. 308-312.

[155]Leys, pp. 270-277.

agriculture, this entailed an increase in government aid and services. With regard to secondary industries, its development implied far-reaching changes in race policy. Unlike white agriculture, secondary industries required a stable and skilled labour-supply, coupled with the need to provide adequate housing and other socio-economic opportunities for blacks in urban areas, which were judged as unacceptable by a government report in 1944.[156] A wave of strikes and urban labor problems accentuated the need for government-induced reforms of labor and living conditions.[157]

To stabilize and secure a skilled labor force, the government introduced a Native Urban Act, focusing specificially on better housing conditions and adequate wages. These reforms encountered significant white opposition emanating primarily from rural employers of cheap, seasonal

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[156] See the Report on the Question of Native Housing and Implementation of the Land Apportionment Act in the Urban Areas of the Colony (Salisbury: Government Printer, 1944).

[157] See Report of the Commission to Investigate the Grievances Which Gave Rise to the Strike amongst the African Employees of the Rhodesia Railways and Certain Other Matters Affecting Africans Employed in Industry (Salisbury: Government Printer, 1946) and the Report of the Commission Appointed to Inquire into and Report upon All Matters Concerning Recent Disturbances in the Colony (Salisbury: Government Printer, 1946). For a more complete discussion of the government's industrialization policy, see the Report of the Committee of Inquiry into the Protection of Secondary Industries in Southern Rhodesia (Salisbury: Government Printer, 1946) The government moved to secure white labor stability - after several white strikes - with the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1934. It facilitated the mediation of white labor problems, but excluded black workers.

and unskilled labor. White farmers resisted the imposition of rural minimum wages and complained (with smallworking miners) of the shortages caused by labourers leaving for better-paid urban wage labor. General shortages of black labor did indeed exist, leading to a national conference in November 1950 on labor shortages. In response the government introduced Labor Boards to regulate the supply of black laborers, but labor problems continued. White rural-based opposition thus remained strong and, finding expression in the Liberal Party, they waged a two-year battle over the imposition of the Native Urban Areas Act. The bill finally became law in 1946.[158]

Thus the Zimbabwean government did attempt certain race-related reforms in the 1950s. The policy changes were prompted not by direct pressures from the British government-if anything, British pressure abated--but by the indirect consequences of foreign economic pressure. Policy-changes also did not take the form of increasing formal black political opportunities, but rather aimed at improving urban black labor and living conditions. These latter improvements were the supposed roots of a black middle class. The government's reforms, however, generated significant rural opposition. Rural blacks opposed it because it threatened tribal structure, custom and authority and white farmers opposed it because it threatened their supply of cheap black labor.

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[158]Gray, pp. 209-314.

3.4. 1960-1962: A Government in Crisis

By the early 1960s government reform efforts had been in operation for more than 15 years. These efforts, as shown, encompassed a wide range of measures, extending the government's interventionist capacity and aims. The results of this intervention were, however, mixed.

The most promising development was the diversification of the Zimbabwean economy. A manufacturing industry developed from a 5.8 percent share of the value of Gross Domestic Product in 1960 to a 16.9 percent share in 1960. Manufacturing was still surpassed, however, by the share (in terms of value) of agriculture (18.8 percent) mining (6.7 percent), construction (7.3 percent), electricity and water (3.3 percent), and commercial and service industries like hotels and restaurants (47.9 percent) accounted for the remaining shares of the GDP value.[159]

Yet the economy continued to be vulnerable. One vulnerability was its reliance on exports of a few primary products to the world market. The mining industry was virtually excluded from modernizing efforts and its contribution to the national income declined from about ten percent in the early 1950s to approximately five percent in the early 1960s. Part of this decline can be attributed to the inability to increase output, which was hampered by obsolete

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[159]Nelson, pp. 250-251.

equipment and the limited amount of foreign capital available. Thoroughly geared to the world market prices, Zimbabwean gold miners saw the price of gold remain stable in relation to production costs. Lacking profits from gold sales, the government encouraged the increased exploitation of low value minerals like asbestos, copper, coal and chrome, but these minerals could neither be mined nor exported in bulk. The result was that the mining industry came to be dominated by a few large foreign-owned companies, smallworking miners were eliminated, and there was an increasing interest in the bulk production and export of low-grade and low-value minerals. This mining inclination was facilitated by improving rail access to South African and Mozambican ports.[160]

The manufacturing industry itself was also vulnerable. The Zimbabwean market remained small and was only slightly and temporarily enlarged by the creation of the CAF. Domestic consumers consisted of a small number of whites with sophisticated buying habits and substantial buying power, and a large number of blacks with limited buying power, and demands for low-quality consumer goods. For a period after the Second World War domestic manufacturing opportunities were created by the post-war difficulties of foreign and especially European manufacturers. As the export capabilities of the European manufacturers increased while the buying power of

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[160] Ibid., pp. 309-310 and Arrighi, "Political Economy of Rhodesia," p. 354.

the blacks did not (i.e. there failed to develop a black middle class),[161] the Zimbabwean manufacturers faced challenge from imports of high quality goods. The result was that the Zimbabwean manufacturing industry by 1960 was geared to the production of a limited range of low quality consumer goods.[162]

The ability to import high-quality consumer goods and industrial equipment depended on the ability of agricultural and mining exports to earn foreign exchange. Both were subject, however, to fluctuations in the world market. Although some agricultural diversification did occur, tobacco remained the main crop and the chief earner of foreign exchange. Efforts to increase the productive capacities of black farmers were perhaps the most dismal failure. While capital investments in black agriculture increased, efforts were plagued by shallow reasoning, administrative overextension, local black opposition, population pressure and resulting soil depletion. The contribution of black agriculture to the GDP indeed declined: in 1954 it contributed an 8.7 percent share, declining by 1958 to 6.7 percent, and by 1964 even further to 6.4 percent.[163]

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[161]Black buying power declined in the 1945-1965 period. See Arrighi, "Labor Supplies" pp. 215-217.

[162]Nelson, pp. 312-315.

[163]Weinrich, p. 23.

The government itself was also vulnerable, for it had failed to create, enfranchise and attract the support of a black middle class. Political support was still confined to whites but, among them, a rural-based opposition was generated by the government's reform efforts. A rural-based black opposition also existed in response to the government's reforms.

3.4.1. Foreign Pressure

The dissolution of the CAF brought renewed foreign economic and especially political pressure on the Zimbabwean government. The breakup of the CAF, as stated before, was due to the conflicting political forces it contained, and its dissolution would have economic and political consequences for Zimbabwe in particular. With regard to the political consequences, the breakup of the CAF implied --for the first time in Zimbabwean history since the early settlement--the existence of Zimbabwe as an independent or autonomous political unit. The achievement of such a status, according to British policy, would require some race-related political changes within Zimbabwe. With regard to economic consequences, the dissolution of the CAF would deprive the Zimbabwean economy in general of economic benefits and, in particular, create economic difficulties for the Zimbabwean government. It was the government's response to these pressures that led to the Rhodesian Front's electoral victory in 1962.

The Zimbabwean government's policy towards blacks was challenged by the British government in two major respects. First, the British government stated that the post-CAF territorial constitution of Zimbabwe should contain a commitment to improvements in the political and socio-economic conditions of blacks. This was not a demand for a black-dominated government, which would require the total reconstitution of the government of Zimbabwe, nor was there a demand that such a black-dominated government should precede the granting of independence. The British government simply wished to extract a public commitment from the existing government to increase the opportunities for black political participation and improve the material conditions of blacks. Second, the British government demanded that the constitutional expression of such a commitment should, like the constitution itself, be supported by the majority of Zimbabweans (i.e. not only the voters and especially not only the voting blacks).[164]

The Zimbabwean government's response to these pressures constituted a break with past race-related policy.[165]

[164] James Barber, pp. 20-90 and Bowman, pp. 37-43.

[165] James Barber, p. 89 states:

> For the first time black and white had negotiated together about the future of their country. For the first time there was a clear acceptance that Africans would sit in the Legislative Assembly. For the first time the franchise was entrenched in the Constitution. For the first time there was a legal acknowledgement that all races should enjoy individual equal rights.

At the constitutional conference to develop the new constitution, the UFP (representing the Zimbabwean government) expressed its broad agreement with British policy that blacks should play a more important role in Zimbabwean affairs. The proposed constitution consequently contained a declaration of rights, as well as a constitutional council to review future legislation for violation of these rights. As far as the franchise is concerned, it introduced an A-roll of voters with high qualifications who elected 50 members of the parliament, and a B-roll of voters with lower qualifications who would elect 15 members. In exchange, the British government would cease to exercise its reserve powers.[166]

There was some white criticism of the proposed 1961 constitution from all sides of the political spectrum. The Dominion Party led by Winston Field argued that it was a "sell-out" to black interests. Ian Smith resigned from the UFP because of the introduction of a "racist" franchise and opposed the UFP as an independent member of parliament. Others, like Garfield Todd, argued that restrictions on black political activity were still too high.[167] Yet in a referendum on the constitution 41,949 voted affirmatively and only 21,846 against its implementation. White electoral opposition was clearly weak, leading some observers to remark

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[166]Palley, pp. 413-628 contains a full discussion of the 1961-constitution.

[167]James Barber, pp. 89-103.

that the UFP would face no white opposition in the next elections.[168]

Despite its apparent success with the white electorate, the new constitution met with strong black opposition. At the constitutional conference blacks were represented by the National Democratic Party of Joshua Nkomo, who initially endorsed the new constitution and, to express its disapproval, boycotted the constitutional referendum. This set the seal of failure on the government's "middle class"-policy, for blacks were also to oppose and boycott later elections.

Anticipating no significant white opposition, the government made a more determined attempt to attract the black support the British government demanded for the acceptance of the 1961 constitution and the achievement of independence. Foreign economic pressure was now coupled with political pressure. The CAF was being dismantled - it was officially dissolved in December 1962 - and this would again restrict the market for Zimbabwean goods and, in particular, deprive the Zimbabwean government of the disproportionate share of public revenues it received from the CAF. Public debt in Zimbabwe indeed rose significantly during the 1960-1965 period, amounting to US $416 million in 1965.[169] The dire economic consequences anticipated from the breakup

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[168] Ibid., p. 148.

[169] Nelson, pp. 260-261.

of the CAF coincided with government reports of the steadily diminishing capacities of black farmers.

To satisfy British demands for black support and to counter the present and expected economic difficulties, the UFP set out to demonstrate its commitment to black socio-economic and political advancement. It endorsed the abolition of racial discrimination, refashioned its administrative machinery for black affairs, and campaigned for the direct representation of blacks in the Legislative Assembly. Appearing at a United Nations conference in October 1961, Whitehead even claimed that the 1961 constitution and government action would result in black majority rule within 15 years. Finally, at its Congress in November 1962 the UFP announced its intention to abolish the Land Apportionment Act of 1931. In future the only reserved land, it proposed, would be black reserves and national land. Reserve land for whites, in other words, would be abolished.[170]

The UFP (the Zimbabwean government) entered the 1962 elections with a commitment to the 1961 constitution and an intent to abolish the Land Apportionment Act of 1931. Of these two commitments, the latter was by far the most radical. As observers point out, the race-related changes of the 1961 constitution contained several loopholes, leading to the conclusion that black advancement was still not guaranteed but

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[170]The campaign to attract black support was known as the "Build-A-Nation-Campaign." See James Barber, pp. 112-146.

would proceed at the discretion of whites.[171] The repeal of the Land Apportionment Act, however, would transform Zimbabwean society. This transformation could have included the following: white farmers would have no guaranteed access to the best farmland, white farmers would have no guaranteed access to black labor supplies, black farmers could become economic competitors, and white urban wage-workers would face economic competition from blacks from the reserves and urban blacks released from the restrictions of racial job restrictions. The latter would include competition for public employment. Thus urban but especially rural Zimbabwe would be transformed.

Given these prospects, the white opposition underwent a rapid recuperation. In March 1962 the Rhodesian Front was created and by December 1962 developed a potent nation-wide, mass-based party organization.[172] Scholars agree that the RF's political support base consisted almost entirely of rural whites and urban wage-workers before 1962 and, even after 1962 rural dwellers dominated the party organization.[173] By contrast the UFP lacked a strong party organization to extend its support base beyond senior bureaucrats and

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[171]Bowman, p. 40 and Palley, pp. 564-628.

[172]Bowman, pp. 92-97.

[173]On the RF's base of political support, see Ibid., pp. 97-105; Nelson, pp. 168-170; and Arrighi, "Political Economy of Rhodesia," pp. 364-367.

self-employed manufacturers.[174] In the 1962 elections the UFP, with its radical reform program and narrow political base base, was defeated by the RF which, equally, had a racially restricted support base but a reactionary political program.

As the preceding discussion shows, the UFP-government (the "Establishment" or executive-bureaucratic alliance) encountered increasing foreign economic and political pressure during the 1960-1962 period. Its response to these pressures, coupled with the apparent demise of the rural-based opposition, led to the radicalization of its reform program. Although legitimate doubt can be cast on the sincerity or genuineness of some political reforms, the proposed repeal of the Land Apportionment Act and its implications resurrected the rural-based white opposition. Faced with a black boycott and diminishing white support, the government's reform program and its mode of governing was defeated.

3.4.2. 1962-1965: Rhodesian Front Government

The RF after 1962 changed the mode of governing in Zimbabwe, suspended the reform program, and sought to win independence from Britain, even by means of a unilateral declaration of independence--all on the basis of a parliamentary majority that initially consisted of only six seats.

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[174] Bowman, pp. 33-37 and James Barber, pp. 154-168.

With regard to the mode of governing, the RF introduced party government into white Zimbabwean politics. At the lowest level of its party organization members belonged to party branches headed by committees with non-parliamentary leaders. These branches were the focal points of RF-activity, for they financed their own activities, acted as a sounding board for local grievances and kept their own membership lists. Most importantly, local branch leaders had access to national party committees. At the national level this populist, non-parliamentary impetus was somewhat balanced. There was a national congress of ten parliamentary members and nominated branch delegates who met annually and had the power to effect organizational changes and to develop party principles (which served as the guidelines for government policy). The congress appointed a national executive, again only partly composed of members of parliament (ten). Five office-holders and 50 representatives from A-roll constituencies accounted for the remainder of the executive. There were also other national committees, like the National Standing Committee (a practical version of the executive), a Party Finance Committee, a secretariat and several other subcommittees.[175]

With this party-organization as the backbone of the RF's parliamentary majority, the RF moved to impose legislative control over the Zimbabwean public service. The

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[175]Bowman, pp. 92-97.

legislature appointed select committees to investigate the public service, whose reports were largely critical of "corrupt" senior civil servants.[176] To ensure RF-control, the party placed its own supporters on the Public Service Board, which oversaw public service appointments and promotions. The RF also moved to sever the public service's ties to organized interest groups. This not only included economic interest groups, like mining interests,[177] but also rural groups like the Rhodesia Farmers Union. The RFU henceforth existed solely as a commodity co-ordinating body.[178] The RF clearly was opposed to a bureaucracy with independent sources of political power.

The other source of reform, an independent executive, was also brought under party-discipline. The leader of the RF was made directly responsible to the party-executive and indirectly to the party-congress, where non-members of parliament held majorities. These restrictions on the political initiative of the prime minister were evident in the ouster of Winston Field and in the later criticism of Smith. Thus

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[176]See the Legislative Estimates Committee (Sub-Committee on the Public Service), Evidence and Proceedings, September to October 1964 (Salisbury: Government Printer, 1964) and the Legislative Assembly, The Third Report of the Estimates Committee (Salisbury: Government Printer, 1964).

[177]See the First and Second Reports of the Select Committee on the Mining Industry (Salisbury: Government Printer, 1963 and 1964).

political decision-making came to be located, not so much in the parliamentary caucus, but in the "closed confines of the Rhodesian Front."[179] Finally, the RF extended its reach into local, rural politics by introducing partisan political activity to the local and municipal levels.[180]

With regard to public policy, the RF was a staunch defender of the preservation of the Land Apportionment Act of 1931. Yet it abandoned its campaign opposition to the 1961 constitution. In its negotiations with the British government on independence it indeed claimed independence on the basis of the 1961 constitution but, like its predecessor, was rebuffed because it lacked the support of the majority of Zimbabweans. Unlike the UFP who sought to secure that support by a "middle class"-strategy, the RF then sought the support of traditional black leaders whom they regarded as the representatives of all blacks - part of a pastoral and conservationist view of rural society once more in vogue. When the support of these leaders was rejected, the RF prepared for UDI. Despite opposition from manufacturing and industrial interests on the grounds that UDI would have

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[178]Murray, pp. 365-367 and Bowman, pp. 67-69 and 105-109.

[179]Bowman, p. 109. See also pp. 67-69 and 105-109.

[180]Murray, pp. 361-367.

severe adverse economic effects[181] and even a lack of unanimity within the cabinet,[182] UDI was officially announced in November 1965.

Except for the continued commitment to achieving independence (though by radical means), the RF thus fundamentally altered the mode of governing and the public policy directions in Zimbabwe. These reversals were not accompanied by attempts to broaden the RF-support base beyond whites. For political support it relied on a highly disciplined party-organization open to populist influences; when it dealt with the blacks, it was through the traditional leaders in rural areas.

4. Summary and Conclusion

As the preceding discussion illustrates, the composition of the population in Zimbabwe is largely the result of the dynamics of South African society. South Africa housed the Zulu Empire, from which a breakaway faction (the Matabele) arrived in Zimbabwe and conquered the original black population (the Mashona). Later the discovery of gold and the

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[181] Bowman notes that these reports were not requested by the government and were "virtually forced upon it by concerned business groups." (p. 181). Only the report of the group representing office workers was supportive of UDI. The reports of the Rhodesia Tobacco Association, the Rhodesia Institute of Directors, the Associated Chamber of Commerce of Rhodesia and the Association of Rhodesian Industries all expected UDI to have adverse economic consequences. See Bowman, p. 79. See also the Economic Aspects of a Declaration of Independence (Salisbury: Government Printing Office, 1965) by the Office of Prime Minister Smith.

[182] Bowman, p. 89.

resulting gold boom in South Africa inspired hopes of similar wealth in Zimbabwe, leading to the arrival of whites and their conquest of both the Mashona and Matabele. Despite their links to South Africa, Zimbabwean whites consistently opposed the establishment of close political ties with South Africa, preferring to maintain close links with the British imperial presence in southern Africa. Thus they first chose qualified self-government with links to Britain, as opposed to incorporation with South Africa, and later chose to establish political and economic links with northern territories in the Central African Federation.

Politics in pre-1965 Zimbabwe was almost exclusively the preserve of whites. Yet the whites did not form a monolithic mass, nor was there a vigorous tradition of popular control over public affairs. Politics and public policy-making in particular was characterized by the dominance of the executive (especially the chief executive or prime minister) and the public bureaucracy, and the weakness of political parties and the legislature. The public bureaucracy indeed developed into a powerful political actor with an interventionist posture even before the Second World War. With the prime minister, it made and executed public policy in Zimbabwe and this public policy reflected the influence of white farmers and mining interests, as well as Zimbabwe's cooperation with British aims in southern Africa. The political leverage of white farmers and mining interests was largely a reflection

of Zimbabwean society prior to the Second World War, while the imperial leverage was a result of Zimbabwean whites' agreement with British aims in southern Africa.

Apart from the Zimbabwean government's obviously narrow support base, it was also economically vulnerable. The gold boom had failed to materialize, as did economic benefits of gold's replacement, namely agriculture. With its reliance on the export of a few primary products (gold, tobacco and maize) and the absence of secondary industries, the pre-1945 Zimbabwean economy resembled that of a colonial economy of the export-type.

During and after the Second World War Zimbabwe experienced strong pressure from the world market economy and political pressure from the British government to implement racial reform. The political pressure was quickly diluted and disappeared, but economic pressure was sustained. Given its powerful bureaucracy and its interventionist posture, the Zimbabwean government introduced and maintained economic modernization policies during the post-war era, particularly with regard to agriculture and the development of manufacturing industries in Zimbabwe. Although the government maintained its commitment to modernization, the results of its policies, by 1960, were mixed. Some economic diversification did occur, but each of the economic sectors were still vulnerable. With regard to agriculture, the productive capacities of black farmers were steadily diminishing,

reflecting political opposition to the government's reforms as well as questionable economic reasoning in effecting the desired capitalist breakthrough in black agriculture. While white agriculture did increase its output in volume, the value of this output was largely determined by world market conditions, but as world market prices for tobacco rose, white agriculture became thoroughly geared to the export market. With regard to manufacturing, its contribution to the GDP increased, but it concentrated on the production of a limited range of low quality goods (for the black market) and still faced competition from high quality imports.

The Zimbabwean government's reforms generated considerable political opposition from both blacks and whites. This opposition emanated primarily from the rural areas where reforms threatened black rural custom, structures and authority and threatened white farmers' supply of black labor. For the government, the loss of white support was more important in an immediate political sense and it attempted to adjust by adopting an inter-racial electoral strategy. This, however, met with black disinterest and opposition- with the result that the government's support base remained narrow.

The breakup of the CAF brought renewed pressure from foreign sources. In contrast with the foreign pressure of the Second World War and its aftermath (which was primarily economic), the foreign pressure of the 1960-1962 period was primarily political. The form of this pressure came in

British demands for political reforms in the development of a post-CAF constitution for Zimbabwe, as well as demands for political reforms for the achievement of independence. Under these pressures the Zimbabwean government's reform program radicalized, moving from some formal increases in black political participation to the proposed repeal of the Land Apportionment Act and the abolition of guaranteed white access to farmland.

Faced with the prospect of a rural economic and political transformation in Zimbabwe, the rural based opposition grew rapidly. As a proportion of the electorate, white farmers alone could not defeat the government, but opponents of the government developed a potent party-organization that could incorporate other opponents like urban wage workers. This party organization not only defeated the UFP, it transformed white politics in Zimbabwe by fundamentally altering the mode of government, the direction of public policies, and the way by which independence could be achieved.

As the preceding discussion indicates, the historical development of white politics, including the events leading up to the declaration of UDI, was not simply animated by a fear of the black threat or racism. The historical development indeed shows that the Zimbabwean government as an executive-bureaucratic alliance first attempted economic reforms and only then attempted political reforms. These

reforms were not prompted by domestic pressure, but by foreign pressure, and were to be defeated by a rural based opposition who felt threatened by those reforms. Black political activity did exist; its nature and possible threat to the government is the subject of the next chapter.

CHAPTER III

BLACK ZIMBABWE 1888 - 1962: THE CONDITIONS OF POLITICAL ACTION

This chapter examines black political action in Zimbabwe between 1888 and 1962. This period is divided into three periods, namely the 1888-1900 period which witnessed black resistance to the imposition of white rule; the 1900-1945 period; and the post-1945 period which culminated in the emergence of the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU) and the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) before UDI. In each of these periods discussion is focused on (a) the organizational attributes of black political action, especially the emergence of an elite that seeks to ally itself with or encourage mass political action; and (b) the general conditions under which political action took place, particularly the conditions that prevailed when ZAPU and ZANU emerged.

Before turning to the discussion, one point needs to be clarified. The question why black Zimbabweans after 1888 felt themselves unfairly or unjustly treated, either as individuals or collectively, plays a minor part in the following discussion. Since successive Zimbabwean regimes after 1888 were expressly and implicitly committed to racial, political and other forms of inequality, they inevitably created

reinforcing layers of hardship, deprivation and subservience for black Zimbabweans. Much of the existing literature on Zimbabwe deals with these questions, often stressing the point that the blacks' experience of land shortage, racial discrimination, wage gaps, and socio-economic cleavages between blacks and whites eventually led to political anger and violence.[1] On the basis of the above, blacks' perception of their subservient position and political anger is thus presumed. The focus of this chapter, rather, is on the nature of black collective action and is therefore unconcerned with socio-economic, cultural and political structures except insofar as they affect the likelihood and nature of black collective action.

1.1. 1888-1900: White Arrival and Black Response

At the time of the white arrival, the number of blacks in Zimbabwe was conservatively estimated at 500,000,[2] most of whom were incorporated in the Mashona and Matabele political orders. Although the Matabele king Lobengula had by this time signed the Rudd Concession, which was interpreted to open Matabeleland to whites, Rhodes' party entered Mashonaland, where the supposed mineral wealth of Zimbabwe lay.

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[1] See, for example, Reginald Austin, Racism and Apartheid in Southern Africa: Rhodesia (Paris: UNESCO Press, 1965); Eshamel Mlambo, Rhodesia: The Struggle for a Birthright (London: C. Hurst, 1972); and Montague Yudelman, Africans on the Land (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964).

[2] Nelson, p. 40.

The Mashona political order of the 1890s had long outlived its glorious days. The Mashona were now a predominantly agricultural people who were required to pay tribute to the Matabele king but since the late 1880s the Mashona acquired firearms and a number of chiefs of the north-eastern areas entered into alliances with the neighbouring Portuguese in order to resist Matabele power. However, the Mashona lacked a central political authority; they lived in small chiefdoms scattered mainly in the hilly northern and eastern areas and this political-geographical independence of groups resulted in intra-Mashona rivalries. While there was a degree of unity on account of linguistic and religious similarities, the lack of political cohesion made the Mashona vulnerable to attacks by the Matabele and the whites (such as the Portuguese warlords or prazeros and South Africans). Indeed, the location of Mashona settlements, in high, rugged areas, suggests a desire to offset the vulnerability created by the absence of political unity.[3]

By contrast, the Matabele order was smaller but highly centralized. Geographically all the major centers of the Matabele were situated within approximately 60 miles from Bulawayo, which was the seat of the royal house. The Matabele king ruled as an absolute monarch, advised by a council

[3]Robin H. Palmer, "War and Land", p. 86.

of elders, and dependent on military figures (commanders and chiefs) to carry out his wishes. Less important or menial duties were performed by former captives who swore allegiance to the king. In effect the Matabele order was a rigid political and social hierarchy. The king's distributive power over cattle and other goods was the key to his absolutism, and warriors of the military regiments would establish their claims to cattle and other rewards by their warmaking skills. Thus cattle was a measure of social and political power, wealth and prestige, and warmaking the major means of acquiring cattle, as was reflected in the size of the Matabele army in 1890 (16,000 men),[4] the size of the cattle herd (250,000) and the location of Matabele settlements on the disease-free highveld of Zimbabwe.[5]

Prior to 1888, European contact with both the Mashona and Matabele was limited. The Matabele allowed few intrusions by traders and missionaries in their own society and also limited the contact of these individuals with the Mashona as a device to keep them isolated.[6] The arrival of Rhodes'

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[4]Lewis H. Gann and Thomas H. Henrikson, The Struggle for Zimbabwe (New York: Praeger, 1981), p. 4.

[5]Palmer, "War and Land", p. 87.

[6]Restrictions on missionary activity by the Matabele, such as their banishment from Mashonaland and the exile of Matabele (from Bulawayo) who took an interest in missionary activity, is often taken as the cause of the missionaries' ambiguous advice to Lobengula in his dealings with whites. See Nelson, pp. 16-17.

pioneer Column in Salisbury met with little resistance from the Mashona. This apparent acceptance of white rule has been explained in two ways. The first of these is that, while the 200 men of the Pioneer Column were entitled to land (farms of 3,175 acres), few actually claimed farms as they preferred to search for minerals. By October 1892 only 300 farms in the area were occupied and even these did not result in the displacement of the Mashona who lived on them. Since the Mashona's "immediate tenure was very largely undisturbed", they thus accepted the whites.[7] The second explanation is that the Mashona were disturbed by land seizures, but that their decentralized political structures and their geographic dispersal prevented a quick and unified response.[8] Moreover, white interest in Mashonaland waned as the promise of the mineral wealth remained unfulfilled and as white farmers encountered cultivating difficulties with the shallow and sandy soil of the area. White interest thus shifted to Matabeleland.

1.1. The Matabele Uprising of 1893

During 1892 relations between the BSAC and the Matabele deteriorated, not because the whites intruded on Matabele land but because Matabele raiding parties disrupted mining operations in Mashonaland. An incident at Fort Victoria in

[7]Palmer, "War and Land", pp. 90-91.

[8]Loney, p. 39.

July 1893 prompted the BSAC to send a delegation to Lobengula, but they were shot and the BSAC wanted to punish the Matabele. The whites of Fort Victoria, however, refused to take up arms for the BSAC and their cooperation could only be gained by the Victoria agreement of August 1893, which entitled those who fought for the BSAC to a farm in Matabeleland and a share of the cattle captured. With the additional help of 500 British volunteer troops, the BSAC invaded Matabeleland when Lobengula declared war and, within a month, scored an easy victory over Lobengula's forces.[9] This easy victory is usually attributed to the BSAC's superior military technology and the "abominably bad" Matabele generalship.[10] As compared to the 670 men of the BSAC, all of whom were armed and most (400) mounted, the Matabele army of 16,000 was largely unmounted and armed with spears. Instead of opting for a war of attrition against the advancing BSAC columns, the Matabele generals chose to fight set battles and were decisively defeated.[11]

The war of 1893 had calamitous consequences for the Matabele. The most immediate of these was the crisis in political authority as Lobengula died in retreat and the Matabele could not agree on his successor. Eventually the void

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[9]Nelson, p. 20.

[10]Frederick Selous as quoted by Gann and Henrikson, p. 5.

[11]Ibid., pp. 2-6

was filled by the Matabele high priest Umlugulu but, since his power did not include the right to allocate cattle, his position was more tenuous. The political, social and economic order was also altered by the loss of four-fifths of the cattle herd by way of war booty and an outbreak of cattle disease.[12] Furthermore, the shaken Matabele order was still subject to punitive actions by the BSAC's military police. In 1894 the BSAC replaced rule by its military police with a regular system of administration by way of the Southern Rhodesia Native Department[13] which, in the first years of its existence, was kept busy by the changes wrought by the arrival of the whites. In Matabeleland the Native Commissioners "were kept busy registering, branding and distributing cattle", while the Mashonaland commissioners were preoccupied with the collection of the newly-instituted hut tax.[14]

In addition, the Native Commissioners were kept busy with the resettlement of blacks in reserves. As argued before, the creation of reserves (or land apportionment) was a defensive measure, designed to guarantee blacks a minimum of land against white encroachments. In the area around Bulawayo

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[12]Terence O. Ranger, Revolt in Southern Rhodesia 1896-97, pp. 105-116.

[13]Palley, pp. 138-141.

[14]Ibid., Ranger, p. 116.

more than 900 farm grants had been given by 1894, and a Land Commission was appointed to settle matters. The result was the creation of the Gwai and Shangani reserves. In Mashonaland the whites also claimed land around major centers, like Salisbury, Umtali, Fort Victoria and Melsetter, but as yet no reserves were created. Much of the initial effect of land alienation was cushioned by the fact that, although many whites claimed land, few farms were immediately pegged out or occupied. Most blacks in Mashona and Matabeleland were thus not immediately displaced, nor were they forced into the reserves; white farmers needed the labor of blacks in close proximity and the mining operations also required labor and the food produced by black farmers.[15]

Yet the manner in which the reserves were allocated boded ill for their long-term consequences. One problem was the ignorance of desirable population-soil ratios. The Native Commissioners could not accurately assess the size of the black population, did not conduct thorough examinations of the ecological conditions of land allocated to blacks, and knew little about black methods of cultivation or how they were suited to the soil in the reserves. Another problem was the introduction of wage labor to meet the demands of miners and farmers. Although this was also to have far-reaching consequences, its immediate impact was also

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[15]Palmer, "War and Land", pp 91-92.

cushioned as black participation in the labor market was of a "discretionary" nature, i.e. it was not essential to the subsistence needs of the black population.[16] Indeed, blacks initially played an important role not as laborers but as producers of agricultural goods sold on the small, local cash markets created by white settlements.[17]

The Mashona and Matabele orders thus changed under the impact of the white arrival. Most changes took place in the Matabele order, especially those that were due to the 1893 war; by comparison, Mashona life was largely undisturbed and they were inhibited by their political and geographic structures from rising up against the whites. When the Matabeles launched a second attack on the white settlers, however, they were joined by the Mashona.

1.2. The Chimurenga[18] of 1896-1897

In March 1896 the Matabele army started a march toward Bulawayo and, after killing most of the whites in Matabeleland on the way, besieged the town by mid-April. By the end of June the Mashona joined the uprising. The whites responded by scoring a number of victories over the Matabele, whereupon

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[16]Arrighi, "Labour Supplies", pp. 191-193.

[17]There is some disagreement over blacks' familiarity with market opportunities, but there is general agreement that blacks were initially successful participants in the cash market. See Ibid., pp. 183-198; Kosmin, pp. 268-288; and Phimister, pp. 255-267.

[18]Chimurenga means uprising.

they concluded a peace treaty with senior Matabele chiefs. Mashona resistance continued, though they were forced to retreat to the caves in the eastern mountain regions and their resistance also eventually disintegrated.[19]

The causes and organizational form of the uprisings of 1896-1897 are a subject of considerable scholarly dispute. With regard to its causes, Ranger, after reviewing the pressures unleashed by the white arrival, argues that the causes of the uprising "can hardly seem much of a mystery."[20] Both Mashona and Matabele suffered land alienation, their self-esteem collapsed, they were disarmed and forced to work, and their cattle were seized.[21] While Ranger's broad correlation between pressures caused by the white arrival and the uprisings has remained essentially unchallenged, the crucial correlation between land seizures and resistance has been questioned. According to Palmer:

> no direct correlation can be drawn between the extent of land alienated and the outbreak of resistance in 1896, since some paramounts who had suffered great loss of land did not join the rising, while others who had lost no land came out in revolt. In Melsetter, surprisingly, there was no rising; in Fort Victoria Chiefs Zimuto and Chikwanda, whose lands had been alienated, did not rise;

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[19]The most extensive accounts of the risings can be found in Ranger, Revolt in Southern Rhodesia 1896-1897, pp. 127-310.

[20]Ibid., p. 132.

[21]Ibid., p. 141.

> while at Enkeldoorn Chief Chirumanzu, who had lost land, stayed out, and Chief Mutekedza, who had not, became a leading "rebel"[22]

Instead of land grievances, Palmer suggests that more potent pressures to resist were supplied by the hut tax, forced labor, indiscriminate floggings of employees by employers, the general ill-treatment of the Matabele as a conquered people, and the brutality of the military police. Moreover, the opportunity for the uprising was provided by the lessening of repressive forces; most of the military police left Zimbabwe towards the end of 1895 to participate in the Jameson Raid aimed at toppling the Kruger regime in the Transvaal.[23]

With regard to the organization of the uprising, Ranger argues that the leadership element was provided by religious figures, particularly the Mwari cult and spirit mediums, and since religious influences cut across tribal lines the religious figures created unity and a combination of forces between the Mashona and Matabele. As mass, supra-tribal action, the risings are thus the precursors of modern nationalism in Zimbabwe.[24] Ranger's interpretation has been

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[22]Palmer "War and Land", p. 92. See also David N. Beach, "'Chimurenga' The Shona Rising of 1896-1897", The Journal of African History 20 (1970): 395-420.

[23]The military police had a black component who "paid off a number of old scores." Palmer, "War and Land", pp. 92-93.

[24]Ranger, Revolt in Southern Rhodesia 1896-1897, pp. 345-386.

challenged by other scholars. A study by Beach on collaboration showed that not all blacks resisted; in fact, blacks who cooperated with the whites played a crucial role in the defeat of the risings, as well as in the early development of Zimbabwe.[25] More recently a study by Cobbing argues that there is no evidence of supra-tribal organization, nor evidence that the Mwari cult had planned and coordinated the risings. Rather, the scale, organization and leadership of the risings were subject to local factors.[26]

While there thus is agreement that the pressures generated by the white arrival were the causes of the uprisings, there is little agreement as to who participated in them (and why), how widespread they were or by whom they were led. Ranger's argument that all blacks were involved seems strained, while the view that local factors influenced the actions of blacks and their leaders seem more persuasive. A clear picture of the conditions conducive to collective actions thus does not emerge. It is nevertheless clear that the scattered Mashona communities of Mashonaland were more immune to BSAC's counteractions; as compared to the Matabele, their resistance could only be crushed by lengthy, difficult

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[25]Beach, passim.

[26]Ibid., and Julian Cobbing, "The Absent Priesthood: Another Look at the Rhodesian Risings of 1896-1897", The Journal of African History 18 (1977), especially pp. 82-84.

and brutal counteractions.[27]

As in the case of the 1893 war, the uprisings of 1896-1897 had several consequences for blacks. Angered by the role of BSAC officials in the Jameson Raid, the British government took a more active interest in Zimbabwe, appointed a permanent resident, reformed the public service, strengthened the Native Department, and kept the BSAC officials under close rein. Of particular importance, the British government believed the uprisings to be connected to land grievances and therefore wished to have adequate reserves created, and to have blacks not living in them protected against local whites. With regard to blacks living on white land, a High Commissioner's Proclamation No. 19 of 1896 required that blacks enter into agreements with white farmers, fixing the rents owed by the tenant farmers, and limiting the number of tenants on a single farm. These agreements were approved by the Chief Native Commissioner, who was to arbitrate disputes. After a two-year period, white farmers could thus demand rent from blacks living on their property. In Matabeleland a large number of blacks lived on white farms, and by 1907 approximately 40,000 were required to enter into formal agreements with their landlords and to pay a hut tax. In Mashonaland a much smaller number of blacks lived on white

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[27]The BSAC forces eventually dynamited the caves. The leading Mashona spirit mediums were executed for their role in the uprisings.

farms and only about 750 were affected by the proclamation. When agreements were made, they tended to be informal or verbal. Although there was a possibility that landlords could violate these agreements, there was a strong incentive not to do so, for the Mashona tenant farmers could retaliate by moving to the larger and more accessible (because they were scattered) reserves.[28]

With regard to the reserves, their creation was now more difficult than before. There was still a desire to guarantee blacks a certain amount of land, but the amount of land available was lessened as a result of white influx, there now was a strategic consideration of not concentrating blacks in impregnable areas, nor could the reserves be in areas where minerals had been found. Native Commissioners were also uncertain as to where blacks' traditional homes were, as the uprisings and previous land alienation displaced blacks. Bureaucratic factors added to the already complex picture, for while white land assignment was the responsibility of the Survey Department, black land assignments were handled by the Native Department. In short, the reserves were essentially an ad hoc arrangement made by local officials under the direction of the British government, who regarded them as a provisional measure subject to future changes. Yet, for reasons earlier discussed, the British

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[28]Palmer, "War and Land", pp. 96-97.

government later accepted land apportionment in a somewhat revised form as permanent. In Matabeleland, most of the traditional areas of the Bulawayo region were now white farms, while the reserves, constituting about 17 percent of the Matabeleland area, were located in the arid regions to the north and northwest of Bulawayo. In Mashonaland, the reserves were larger, constituting 37 percent of the area, but the quality of the land was in most cases also questionable.[29]

The risings and their aftermath thus accentuated the changes in the black orders: The Native Department administered black affairs under a somewhat reformed system; the head tax, previously imposed only in Mashonaland, was extended to Matabeleland; the reserves, previously confined to Matabeleland, became a reality in Mashonaland; and blacks living outside the reserves on white land were now regarded as tenant farmers and required to pay rent. Together, these factors strengthened the disruptions of the old black orders.

2. 1900-1945: White Rule and Black Political Action

After 1897 neither the Mashona nor the Matabele made any collective, armed attempts at resisting white rule.[30]

[29] Ibid., pp. 97-102.

[30] There were acts of local defiance. In Mashonaland, for example, Chief Mapondera refused to levy taxes and harrassed local officials. His resistance, like that of another Mashona leader, Chief Kunzwi-Nyandoro, eventually declined. Mtshali, pp. 77-78. Loney states that there were repeated rumors of impending black revolt till after the First World War. Loney, p. 91.

Blacks were forced to accept the political reality of white rule and, since they operated under progressively different societal conditions, black political action changed in form.

With the increasing white land acquisition and the weakening of tribal society, a movement developed among the Matabele to create a national homeland, to be governed by a restored Matabele king. This Matabele National Home Movement[31] was, for the most part, led by one of the pretenders to the throne, Nyamanda, and focused most of its appeals on the British monarchy, especially after the British Privy Council began its hearings on the question of unalienated land in Zimbabwe. Nyamanda's claims were supported by the Fingo community, a South African group which had settled in Zimbabwe in the 1890s and whose attempts at buying land were frustrated. The Fingoes enlisted the services of a black South African lawyer and also gained the support of the Ethiopian religious movement of southern African. South Africa's African National Congress also supported the land claims of black Zimbabweans and expressed their concerns in their petitions to British authorities.[32] South Africans, however, were thereafter barred from any political activity

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[31]Also known as the Matabele Home Society.

[32]There was considerable migration, particularly among the southern Matabele, to and from South Africa. In South Africa Matabele activity for a while centered on the Ndebele Rhodesia Society and the Rhodesia Native National Congress. Nelson, pp. 24-25.

in Zimbabwe. Nyamanda then pressed for concerted but non-violent action from Matabeles, but after the Privy Council ruled that all unalienated land belonged to the Crown and the coming of responsible government, the activities of the Matabele Home Movement declined.[33]

The political maneuvering surrounding the introduction of responsible government in Zimbabwe gave rise to several organizations seeking to advance black interests. In 1911 a black named Chirimuhuta founded a Southern Rhodesian Native Association to protest arbitrary behavior against blacks, and in 1919 Jerry Sobantu organized an African Voters League to unite black voters. In 1923 a Rhodesia Bantu Voters Association was created to offer white political parties electoral support in exchange for legislation favoring black interests. This RBVA drew its support mainly from the Matabele, as did welfare associations like the Gwelo Native Welfare Association and the Southern Rhodesia Native Welfare Association. In Mashonaland a Rhodesia Native Association was created in 1920, focusing its activities on the rural areas. There was also an attempt to create an African National Congress of Southern Rhodesia in 1919, but this was unsuccessful; an African National Congress of Southern Rhodesia (initially called the Bantu Congress) was

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[33]Ibid., pp. 25-26 and Mtshali, pp. 80-82.

finally created in 1930 by Aaron Jacha.[34]

The African National Congress (ANC) and the other organizations mentioned above were the first black organizations that tried to enter electoral politics in Zimbabwe. As such they were disinterested in the mass of black Zimbabweans who could not vote; they

> tended to be run by and appeal to the new African elite who were greatly concerned to gain from the whites social recognition as "advanced natives" in contrast to the "uneducated masses." The aims and attitudes of these early associations clearly imply that they were resigned to white rule and had committed themselves to many aspects of a new, European-modelled way of life.[35]

While some black leaders, like Martha Ngano of the Rhodesia Bantu Voters Association, made efforts to overcome the self-conscious elitism, organizations remained focused on the emerging urban elite. In addition, their activities were primarily focused on the Matabele in general and the Bulawayo area in particular.[36]

In the urban areas black workers found a voice in the Rhodesian Industrial and Commercial Workers Union (RICO). Like many black organizations, RICO was founded by South

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[34]The dates of the creation of the ANC vary, but most agree that it was towards the late 1920s as opposition to the Land Apportionment Act.

[35]J. van Velsen, "Trends in African Nationalism in Southern Rhodesia", Kroniek van Afrika 4 (June 1964): 141.

[36]Ibid. See also Terence O. Ranger, The African Voice in Southern Rhodesia, 1898-1930 (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1970), pp. 64-137.

African activists and by 1929 had branches in Bulawayo and Salisbury. RICO's attempt to create an economically-based, supra-tribal organization was disrupted by government repression, mainly by having its leaders imprisoned or South African activists deported, and by 1939 this crippled the organization. RICO was nevertheless significant in that it was the first black organization to seek mass support. While it did not engage in strikes, RICO abandoned the moral-Christian appeals of the previous organizations and attacked their elite, established churches and the missionaries for collaboration with the white power structure. In this regard RICO and other union activity (like the railway union of black employees) became an important training ground for future activists.[37]

Black political activity in the rural areas often focused on religious organizations. Although the established churches (Anglican, Methodist and Roman Catholic) did sometimes voice black grievances,[38] blacks were frustrated by their sympathy with white political interests and therefore sought refuge in religious cults (like the Mwari cult) or joined independent African churches, all of which had a strong

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[37]Ranger, The African Voice in Southern Rhodesia, 1898-1930, pp. 138-193.

[38]Missionary activity resorted under the authority of the Southern Rhodesia Missionary Conference, created in 1906 by 15 church bodies. It controlled the Southern Rhodesia Missionary Conference of Christian Natives, established in 1928.

millenarian appeal. The Mwari cult, for example, advocated food-hoarding as preparation for a cataclysmic intra-white battle. The first significant independent church to develop was the Kitawala cult, led by Romo Nyirenda, who developed a black version of the Watch Tower Bible and Tract Society (the Jehovah's Witnesses). When Nyirenda was executed in Zimbabwe in 1926, the "halo of martyrdom increased the cult's attractiveness to many Africans."[39] While it rarely engaged in overt political activity,[40] the Kitawala cult spread during the 1930s and they (like many other millenarian movements such as the Zionist Church and the Vapostori Movement) were particularly influential in Mashonaland.[41]

There were thus several types of black political activity between 1900 and 1945. Of these organizations, two observations can be made. First, only one organization (RICO) managed to generate a secular, mass appeal; the others were more narrowly based on tribal, regional or self-conscious

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[39]Richard Gibson, African Liberation Movements (London: Oxford University Press, 1972), p. 152.

[40]One exception was its role during a strike at the Shamva mine in 1928. See Ranger, The African Voice in Southern Rhodesia 1898-1930, pp. 147-153.

[41]For an account of the Mwari cult and the independent African churches, see M.L. Daneel, The God of the Matopo Hills: An Essay on the Mwari Cult in Rhodesia (The Hague: Mouton, 1972) and M. L. Daneel, Independent Churches in Rhodesia (The Hague: Mouton, 1970).

class goals. Second, by 1945 most of the secular organizations were dormant, in contrast to the millenarian movements, which flourished in the 1930s. The limited nature of the secular organizations, especially when compared to the vibrant South African organizations which often acted as patrons of the Zimbabwean organizations, raises the question concerning the conditions under which they operated.

By 1945 the changes set in motion by the white arrival had fundamentally altered black life. First, the process of land alienation and taxation continued. With regard to land alienation, the initial rather haphazard creation of the reserves was legally entrenched by the 1920 British order-in-council, assigning blacks to live on about 25 percent of the total land. Blacks could purchase land outside the reserves (i.e. purchase unassigned Crown land) but most were too poor to do so. Later, after the findings of the Morris Carter Land Commission, a Land Apportionment Act was passed which limited the land available to blacks outside the reserves by creating the African Purchase Areas of about 8 percent of the total land area.[42] This land division remained in effect until 1969.

As stated before, the ecological quality of the land assigned to blacks was in most cases questionable, although

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[42]Kay, Rhodesia: A Human Geography, pp. 37-58.

the reserves of Mashonaland were larger and more scattered than the small, consolidated reserves of Matabeleland. Government policy in no way intended for these reserves to be a basis for agricultural or any other development; they were regarded as a refuge for blacks against white encroachments, but even this refuge was regarded as temporary. Government policy was characterized by a doctrine of assimilation and progress: blacks would become detribalized, assimilate into the white work force, and therefore enter into the spiral of socio-economic progress.[43] For this reason there was initially no attempt to force blacks into the reserves, although the government took a dim view of blacks who lived outside of the reserves and did not work. For these blacks, taxes were introduced as a work incentive. The result of land alienation and taxation was a demographic crisis. After an initial period of black farming prosperity, the combined effect of taxation and the limited productive capacities of remote and generally infertile land forced many blacks into wage labor on white farms and in urban areas. For those unwilling to enter wage labor the reserves became the only and, in view of the population increase, the increasingly impoverished refuge of blacks. The government's policy of "proletarianizing"[44] the blacks was thus achieved

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[43]Mason, pp. 255-294 and 313-315.

[44]Black's delayed entry into wage labor (or "delayed proletarianization") is best treated by Arrighi, "Labour Supplies" pp. 183-222.

at the cost of introducing a cycle of over-population and under-production in the reserves. There were still labor shortages, forcing the government and employers to rely on foreign migrant labor and labor regulation by the Rhodesian Native Labour Bureau. Matabeleland was most exposed to the pressures of wage labor, since its economic order was thoroughly disrupted by the risings of 1896-1897 and because Bulawayo and its surrounding area developed faster as an industrial and commercial center than Salisbury. This produced relatively high wages as an attraction, which in turn led to considerable labor migration among the southern Matabele. By comparison Mashonaland with its larger and more fertile soil and the reserves' access to railways and other market opportunities preserved, at least for a while, the productive capacities of black farmers. Hence their entry into wage labor came later than the Matabele.[45]

Second, the crisis in political authority continued. As stated before, the death of Lobengula created a void in Matabele political order and they were later incorporated in the administration of the BSAC's Native Department. In 1898 a Native Regulations Act was passed, which outlined the reforms in the administration of blacks. According to this system, direct administration by white commissioners

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[45]Palmer, "The Agricultural History of Rhodesia", pp. 228-230.

was made necessary by the "decaying force" of tribalism:[46] tribal customs would become progressively weaker as blacks entered wage labor and as tribal organization was weakened by the loss of land and cattle. Therefore direct rule by commissioners, who blended central bureaucratic rule with local hierarchies and who exercised power in a paternal way, was necessary. By the early 1920s the overwhelming majority of blacks (90 percent) fell under the authority of these commissioners.[47]

In the 1920s, however, the view that tribal life and organizations was "beyond recall"[48] was reversed. Following testimony of the native commissioners before the Morris Carter Land Commission, government policy switched to a view which regarded the reserves as the permanent homes of blacks, approved of tribal customs and tried to preserve it, and restored the "authority" of the tribal chiefs.[49] Thus the initial policy of assimilation was replaced by a pastoral view of black rural society. Black society as it existed before the arrival of the whites was indeed still beyond recall, but government policy simply "restored" it in the

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[46]Mason, pp. 313-315.

[47]The commissioners were never a law unto themselves, but they did exercise considerable bureaucratic autonomy. Holleman, pp. 19-30.

[48]Gray, pp. 31-38.

[49]Ibid., pp. 150-168.

form that it was understood and desired by whites.[50] The result was that approximately 50,000 blacks were moved to the reserves during the 1930s.[51]

Third, tribal leadership emerged from its hiatus at a time when an educated elite had emerged in the urban areas. In the rural areas, black education was the responsibility of missionaries who, under the Native Education Ordinance of 1907, offered a maximum of four years primary education. From a figure of 4,000 in 1907, black educational enrollment increased to 40,000 in 1918, to 100,000 in 1929, and to 164,000 in 1945.[52] Since there were no secondary black educational facilities in Zimbabwe, many students who wished to pursue further studies were sent to South Africa. This combination of a Zimbabwean missionary school education and a South African secondary and tertiary education remained a prominent feature of the emerging elite's background till well into the 1970s.

How did these changes affect black political activity? Perhaps most important, there was an elite group but one that did not seek to ally itself with or encourage mass

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[50]This point is often made by D.G. Clarke. See also Murray, pp. 279-280.

[51]The division of Zimbabwe into one sector capable of industrialization and one a pastoral non-productive sector is known as the two-stream policy. Gray, pp. 151-152.

[52]Nelson, pp. 138-139.

political action by blacks. Traditional elites tried to restore themselves, but this attempt failed as the Mashona and Matabele tribal leaders weakened under the impact of direct white rule in which they, however involuntarily, were incorporated. While the decline of the tribal leadership created a vacuum, it was not filled by the emerging urban elite, who were consciously elitist and exhibited little desire to act as spokesmen for the mass of rural blacks. Yet, even if there were an elite seeking to ally itself with rural blacks, the conditions under which blacks lived were hardly conducive to mass political action. First, collective action was discouraged by the number of regulations governing black life. Black tenant farmers worked under contract which, if broken, could lead to expulsion. To enter urban areas, blacks were required to obtain passes and when they did so and entered urban (or rural) employment, they fell under the authority of the Master Servant Act of 1901 which provided for a number of penalties (including imprisonment) for blacks who did not perform satisfactorily. Clearly, blacks lived under the easy reach of employer and landlord punishment, as well as within the reach of the native commissioners and the collection of officials (chiefs, headmen and messengers) they commanded. Thirdly, black politics was still influenced by a loss of morale brought on by the brutality of the repression of the 1896-1897 uprisings. This

loss of morale was particularly evident among the Mashona.[53]

3. 1945-1962: The Challenge to White Rule

After 1945 many of the organizations of the pre-war era continued their existence. The Matabeleland Home Movement, for example, still existed as a defender of traditional values, and the millenarian movements in Mashonaland expanded.[54] The Second World War did not have the "immediate galvanizing effect that it had in many other parts of Africa"[55] in Zimbabwe; yet it did contain the roots of subsequent activity when the government policy started to stress industrialization and the modernization of black agriculture.

In the urban areas government policy was to create a stable and skilled black labor force and, to this end, adopted the Native (Urban Areas) Accomodation and Registration Act of 1946. This act gave blacks some voice in urban townships by creating elected black advisory boards, and many urban leaders concentrated their efforts on getting elected to them. One group successful at this electoral activity was the union leaders of RICO, now renamed the Reformed Industrial and Commercial Workers Union and led by Charles Mzingeli Moyo, and the Rhodesia Railways African

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[53]Ranger, The African Voice in Southern Rhodesia, 1898-1930, pp. 1-2.

[54]Nelson, p. 32.

[55]Gibson, p. 154.

Employees' Association, created in 1944 and led by Joshua Nkomo. While RICO and the Railways Association flirted with the notion of multi-racial, class-based politics during the war years, they became more militant and pro-black after the war. In October 1945 a strike occurred among the 2,400 railway workers in the Bulawayo area, which was the center of the Railways Association's activities, and over the next two weeks gained momentum among all black railways employees. In April 1948 a second major strike occurred, with Bulawayo again as focal point, but which now included employees from mining, municipal and other sectors. Alarmed by these strikes, the government appointed a commission of inquiry into urban blacks' grievances and then incorporated some of the commission's proposals into its urban policy.[56]

The post-war strikes and electioneering for the advisory boards rejuvenated black organizations like RICO, the ANC and the British African Voice Association (the latter created in 1947 and centered on the Bulawayo area), but in the years leading to the creation of the Central African Federation (CAF) their support and organizational activity again declined.[57] The Voice Association was banned

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[56]Gray, pp. 291-302.

[57]The black organizations of Malawi (then Nyasaland) and Zambia (then Northern Rhodesia) opposed the creation of the CAF and, with the support of RICO, the British African Voice Association and the ANC of Zimbabwe, founded an All-African Convention. After the creation of the CAF in 1953 the All-African Convention disintegrated. Gibson, p. 154.

in 1952, although its leader Benjamin Burumbo remained a highly effective and symbolic spokesman, while the ANC under the leadership of Thompson Samkango and later Stanlake Samkango remained an elitist organization whose activities consisted mainly of appeals to the government for favorable legislation for blacks.[58] By 1955 the ANC in fact dwindled to one branch in Bulawayo under the leadership of Joshua Nkomo, and it was further weakened in 1956 when Dunduza Chisiza, a leader of the ANC of Malawi (then Nyasaland) who had encouraged and advised the Zimbabwean ANC, was expelled from Zimbabwe.[59]

Yet, prior to his expulsion, Chisiza's work with the younger ANC members resulted in the creation of a City Youth League in Salisbury, led by George Nyandoro and James Chikerema. The Youth League's young and militant membership presented a challenge to the moderate remnants of the ANC who were sympathetic to the government's attempt to foster a black middle class.[60] Moreover, the Youth League attracted

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[58]Thompson Samkange was also a leading figure in the Southern Rhodesia Missionary Conference.

[59]Gibson, pp. 154-155.

[60]The Youth League's opposition to parliamentary-style politics was reflected in their publications, Mukayi Africa (Wake-Up Africa) and Chapupu (Witness) Bowman, p. 50.

considerable political support and all of its candidates were elected to the advisory boards in elections in Salisbury, and it was successful in organizing a bus boycott. To pool their resources the ANC and the City Youth League thus amalgamated in September 1957 to form a new (or reconstituted) ANC under the leadership of Nkomo as president. Nyandoro and Chikerema were included in the top leadership positions.[61]

The new ANC presented a breakthrough in black organizational activity. As previously indicated, most black organizations (with the exception of some leaders of RICO) were elitist and made little attempt to associate with the mass or rural or uneducated blacks. To a degree, the new ANC still epitomized this approach by participating in the elections for the black members of the federal parliament of the CAF, but the elite clustered around the ANC also encouraged mass black action as a means to pressure the government within Zimbabwe. In acting as spokesmen for blacks as a whole, the ANC had an automatic constituency in the urban areas, as they inherited the constituencies of moribund organizations, but they also acquired a rural constituency. In the rural areas the government's measures to increase black agricultural production emphasized soil

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[61]Loney, p. 101.

conservation measures, destocking and the granting of individual farm rights, encountered black opposition. Destocking, for example, amounted to the self-destruction of black status and wealth, individual tenure undermined the security of communal tenure, and black chiefs' power was undermined by eliminating their power to allocate land. Thus the measures aimed at increasing black agricultural production could only be implemented in a coercive manner, which in turn hardened blacks' opposition to them.[62]

The ANC's appeal to blacks as a whole was facilitated by the fact that most urban blacks remained tied to the structure and security of rural tenure. Urban conditions and government policy discouraged the migration of families to urban areas and thus few black families resided in towns. The remainder of the urban population consisted of young male migrants who came to the towns to supplement their rural income. Upon accomplishing their target objectives, these males rejoined their families in the rural areas and hence had an interest in the security of rural tenure. By including rural issues in their platform the ANC therefore appealed to the vast majority of blacks, both urban and rural. The ANC nevertheless was not a strident organization; instead it "deliberately projected a moderate image...because

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[62]For a full discussion, see chapter 2.

they did not wish to alarm the whites. The ANC's statement of principles was almost deferential in tone."[63]

The promise of an urban elite that seeks to ally itself with rural discontent was shortlived, not because the ANC bungled its opportunities, but because of events elsewhere in the CAF. During the first half of 1959, a wave of violence swept through Malawi as its ANC demanded majority rule. This violence led to the declaration of a state of emergency in the CAF and the banning of the respective ANCs, including the one in Zimbabwe. In February nearly 500 ANC members in Zimbabwe were arrested or detained, including Nyandoro and Chikerema. These arrests and detentions were made possible by a new Preventitive Detention Act, which empowered the government to detain any person who had - even as a spectator - been involved in the violence of 1959, and the Unlawful Organizations Act. In the rural areas, organizational black activity under the Native Affairs Amendment Act could now only take place with the permission of the local commissioner.[64]

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[63]Ibid., p. 51. For support of this view, see the statement of principles, policy and program and the presidential address of the first annual congress in Christopher Nyangoni and Gideon Nyandoro (eds), Zimbabwe Independence Movements: Select Documents (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1979), pp. 3-20.

[64]For the Zimbabwean government's view of the ANC at this time, see the General Report of the Review Tribunal on the Preventitive Detention Act (Temporary Provisions), (Salisbury: Government Printer, 1959), also known as the Beadle Report.

The result was a devastation of organizational black activity in Zimbabwe. The leadership of the ANC was decimated and, even if they were intact, their access to the rural areas was severely circumscribed.[65] Furthermore, the restrictions and the international-legal ramifications of the breakup of the CAF led many of the remaining black leaders to believe that they could only be successful if they could enlist the aid of the British government and international organizations and opinion. Their focus of actions shifted, in other words, from the rural areas to an international context.[66]

In January 1960 the few remaining leaders met to form a new organization, the National Democratic Party (NDP).[67] The NDP was an urban-oriented party aiming mainly at the creation of universal franchise ("one man, one vote") in Zimbabwe through the intervention of the British government. Initially the urban focus of the ANC seemed to be effective, for in July and October 1960 a series of riots occurred in Salisbury, Bulawayo and Gwelo, which could only be quelled by the intervention of the Zimbabwean army. However, as in

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[65]For the effects of this legislation, see Phillip Mason, Year of Decision (London: Oxford University Press, 1960), pp. 218-223 and Bowman, p. 51, who states that the nationalists never recovered from this stunning blow.

[66]John Day, International Nationalism (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1967), pp. 14-16.

[67]Among these leaders were Nkomo (who was abroad at the time of the banning of the ANC and who did not return to Zimbabwe until October 1960), Enos Nkala (a Matabele laborer),

the case of the violence of the previous year, the urban unrest resulted in the government's adoption of repressive measures: the Vagrancy Act empowered the government to arrest any unemployed blacks,[68] the Emergency Powers Act empowered the government to rule by decree in six-month emergency periods and, according to the sweeping measures of the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act the government could restrict public meetings, censor black and other publications, arrest blacks without a warrant, and overrule the judicial system in matters affecting the public security.[69] With its earlier measures, the government now had a vast array of repressive measures that could and were used against blacks' organizational activity.[70]

Herbert Chitepo (a lawyer), Ndabaningi Sithole (a minister, teacher and author) and Leopold Takawira (a Mashona teacher). Bowman, p. 52.

[68]This law was aimed at the increasing number of blacks who had been rendered landless by the reforms of the 1950s, sought refuge in the urban areas or roamed the countryside, and who became enthusiastic supporters of the ANC and NDP.

[69]Barber, pp. 54-56.

[70]Urban collective action was also inhibited by the realities of urban geography in Zimbabwe. Blacks lived in townships that housed few consumer and other facilities necessary for day-to-day living. When urban unrest occurred, it was relatively easy for the government to eventually isolate most blacks in the townships and prevent their access to, for example, food and employment. Prolonged periods of urban collective action was thus difficult if not impossible to sustain. See Francis Nehwati "The Social and Communal Background to 'Zhii': The African Riots in Bulawayo, Southern Rhodesia in 1960", African Affairs 69 (July 1970): 250-254.

The NDP's remaining tactical options now focused on international action and, in particular, the possible intervention of the British under the authority that they claimed as guardians of black affairs in Zimbabwe. Thus Nkomo led the NDP-delegation to the constitutional conference which was to devise a post-CAF constitution for Zimbabwe. The resulting 1961 constitution was initially endorsed by the NDP delegation. According to its provisions, a multi-racial constitutional council was created to monitor violations of the declaration of rights included in the constitution and blacks acquired 15 seats in an expanded legislative assembly. In exchange, Britain would suspend its reserve clauses concerning black affairs.[71] When these provisions were made public, the other members of the NDP urged a "total rejection" of the constitution and, during the remaining months of 1961, the NDP continued to attack the constitutional arrangements and urged black voters not to participate in the referendum on it or indeed in any other electoral activity. In December 1961 the government then banned the NDP. Almost immediately (on December 17, 1961) the black leaders regrouped and formed the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union.[72]

Thus the post-war era and particularly the late 1950s witnessed the emergence of a black Zimbabwean elite and

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[71]See chapter 2.

[72]Gibson, p. 157.

organizations that initially sought to ally itself with and encourage rural (and other) political action. The elite in its successive organizations, however, came under increasing government scrutiny, resulting in the banning of organizations and the arrest and detentions of the leader- and membership. The government also restricted the access of the elite to the rural and urban areas. The result was the narrowing of the tactical scope of the elite and its organizations. On the domestic scene, the elite made one attempt to participate in electoral-constitutional type politics, but this attempt was aborted when other members of the elite objected. This left only one option, namely to try to persuade the British government or other international organizations to intervene in Zimbabwe on behalf of the blacks.

The emergence of ZAPU by the beginning of 1962 (and its rival ZANU shortly afterwards) marked the beginning of a struggle that would include the unilateral declaration of independence by the Smith regime, the UDI-period, and a period marked by the beginning of guerrilla warfare. Since guerrilla warfare as a collective black action was announced in 1965 and only seriously began in the 1970s (as will be discussed in the following chapters), this raises the question of the conditions under which ZAPU and ZANU operated at the time of their founding.

3.1. The Conditions of Black Political Activity

Studies of the black population structure of Zimbabwe have convincingly shown that the structure is derivative of land apportionment.[73] Thus the black population can be divided into blacks living on the Tribal Trust Lands (TTLs or native reserves), the black farmers of the African Purchase Areas (APAs), the black tenant farmers and laborers who live on white farms, and urban blacks. The focus of the remaining part of this chapter is on the conditions under which these groups lived and what those conditions implied for the struggle of ZAPU and ZANU.

3.1.1. The Tribal Trust Lands

Much has already been said about the creation of the reserves, their subsequent entrenchment and then diminishing productive capacities. By 1961 approximately 34 percent of the total land area was designated as reserves, and approximately 60 percent of the total black population of 3,550,000 were listed as the permanent (de jure) residents.[74]

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[73]The standard reference of the distribution and density of the black population is Kay, Rhodesia: A Human Geography. See also Cecrge Kay, "Towards a Population Policy for Zimbabwe-Rhodesia" African Affairs 79 (January 1980): 95-114 and George Kay, The Distribution of African Population in Southern Rhodesia: Some Preliminary Notes (Lusaka: Rhodes-Livingston Institute, 1964).

[74]The only reliable census for Zimbabwe was the one in 1961/62. It sets the number of black farmers in the reserves at 600,000.

There is considerable variation among the reserves, such as different size, local customs, ecological capacity, and proximity to towns, railways and market opportunities. There are also differences in local organizational features, with the main divisions falling along Mashona and Matabele lines. Mashona reserves are divided into chiefdoms, wards and villages (or kraals), with the population of kraals ranging from twelve to 200. These kraals tend to be far apart. Matabele reserves are also subdivided into chiefdoms, headmen in charge of a smaller unit, and kraalheads, but they tend to live in larger, more concentrated settlements.[75] Differences, however, are overshadowed by similarities. Reserves all have agricultural subsistence economies, a high and skewed population density, socio-cultural attributes that stress conformity and cohesion, and all administratively incorporated with the white governmental machinery.

The local agricultural economy consists of small plots, cultivated by blacks by non-mechanized, labor-intensive techniques, and/or blacks tending to their small herds of cattle. The proceeds of cultivation and herding are consumed locally. With the dwindling of the ecological capacities of the land, many blacks were forced into wage labor, and thus a large portion of the adult male population is perpetually absent from the reserves. This skews the population: 45-50 percent

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[75]Palmer, "War and Land", pp. 86-87.

of the adult males are absent at any one time, leaving a high proportion of children, old people and women. These absences have not relieved the population pressure. Between 1941 and 1961 the black population of Zimbabwe rose from 1,400,000 to 3,550,000;[76] in terms of population density, blacks increased from 10 per square mile in 1941 to 15 per square mile in 1951 and finally to 25 per square mile in 1961.[77] Thus, by 1959 approximately 30 percent of the blacks who were entitled to land were in effect landless.[78] The unavailability of land exacerbates cultural strains and rural vagrancy, but these are mediated by the conformity and cohesion of tribal life.[79]

With regard to the political-administrative position of the reserves, the government's policy moved from one stating that traditional-tribal life was "beyond recall" to one upholding tribal life as the Native Affairs Department understood it. Accordingly, the authority of the tribal leadership was upheld, but they were incorporated in the government's system of black (or native) administration.

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[76]Nelson, p. 61.

[77]Weinrich, pp. 18-22.

[78]Yudelman, p. 123.

[79]See Michael Gelfand, African Crucible: An Ethno-Religious Study With Special Reference to the Shona-Speaking People (Cape Town: Juta, 1968) and Hilda Kuper, A.J.B. Hughes and J. van Velsen, The Shona and the Ndebele of Southern Rhodesia (London: International African Institute, 1955).

This administration was organized on a territorial basis, with native commissioners as heads of districts, assistant native commissioners as heads of subdistricts, and chiefs, headmen and kraalheads as paid employees and heads of smaller localities. Prior to the Second World War the general goals of the black administration were to maintain law and order, collect taxes, and uphold the "traditional way of life."[80] After the Second World War the effort to increase black agricultural output in the reserves strained the administrative capacities of the rural officials, and therefore the Native Department was reorganized and expanded. Commissioners now were assisted by officials of the Department of Agriculture, but this failed to solve the problem as the extension officers of the Department of Agriculture and the commissioners clashed over how and at what speed the reforms should be implemented, and as black opposition to the reforms mounted.

To overcome these problems the government launched an investigation and then passed the African Councils Act of 1957. This act was intended to solve the problem by increasing the responsibility of tribal leaders and thus the number of chiefs were reduced and councils were created, partly elected and partly appointed, to assist the chiefs in their duties. These black councils would insulate local black politics from the "political ferment" of national black politics, provide

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[80]Murray, pp. 279-300; Holleman, pp. 19-30 and Gray, pp. 3-194.

an avenue of expression and provide a political-administrative training ground for blacks.[81] Although some blacks did use the black councils as an avenue of expression, they also failed to solve the problem as the overburdened commissioners had difficulty in adjusting to indirect rule after the long experience of direct rule and as black opposition to the agricultural reforms was sustained. In response the government launched further investigations, one on the effects of the Native Animal Land Husbandry Act and the other on the bureaucratic problems resulting from it.[82] The reports of these investigations deepened the trend toward black local self-government, now named "community development." Under this approach the number of black councils was increased, councils were held responsible for many of the local efforts to increase black production (like soil conservation measures), and were held responsible for the maintenance of the local roads and bridges, and for primary education. To finance these activities, the chiefs were to have limited powers of taxation. When the Rhodesian Front came to power it enthusiastically embraced the idea of community development,

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[81]Earlier chiefs were assisted by native boards.

[82]See the Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Alleged Discontent in the Mangwende Reserve (Salisbury: Government Printer, 1961) and the Report of the Commission of Inquiry into and Report on Administrative and Judicial Functions in the Native Affairs and District Court Departments (Salisbury: Government Printer, 1961), the Robinson Commission.

although it abandoned the notion that it would be the vehicle to increase black agricultural production.[83] Bureaucratically the Native Department was renamed the Department of Internal Affairs and some internal reforms took place.[84]

By 1962 the position of blacks in the reserves was thus as follows: First, the tribal leadership was in a difficult position. On the one hand their authority was undermined by the loss of their power to allocate land, the progressive weakening of tribal organization, and the fact that they were the paid employees, agents and servants of the white government. Some chiefs, for example, owed their very position to government support when it started to reduce the number of chiefs and some had to be dismissed and others retained. On the other hand the position of the tribal leadership was exaggerated by the prolonged absences of young males from the reserves[85] and by the government's policy of community development, as well as its view that the tribal leaders represented black Zimbabweans as a whole. This view led to the creation of the National Council of Chiefs in 1962.[86] Second, the

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[83]For the Rhodesian Front's approach to rural black administration, see Barber, pp. 221-247.

[84]Holleman, pp. 255-291

[85]See Weinrich, p. 22 and passim for a discussion of the rural black elite.

[86]The point is not that tribal or any other traditional leaders were either pro- or anti-government as a whole; it is simply that, given the structural position of these leaders, they had little scope for independent political action.

local councils in time became the means for the government to implement goals, not an avenue for local self-expression and independence. It became the government's main link with the local population and a way to remain abreast of local black political developments.[87] Third, after 1959 black political activity beyond the above channels or activity that undermined the authority of the local leadership and officials was severely circumscribed by the Native Affairs Amendment Act. Any meeting of more than twelve blacks, for example, required the consent of the local commissioner.[88]

Thus the blacks of the reserves lived under the impact of at least three crises. There was a demographic crisis as black population increases combined with the limited amount of land available led to severe over-population. There was also an ecological crisis as overpopulation further decreased the productive capacities of the soil and as the reforms of the 1950s undermined blacks' security in rural tenure. Finally, there was a political crisis as the traditional leadership of the rural areas was first undermined and then reconstituted by the government in its desired form (i.e. as paid public servants who had no independent political power).

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[87]Holleman notes that the government's information of rural conditions was often slanted by the bureaucratic self-interest of the local commissioners. Holleman, pp. 34-38.

[88]These restrictions were actually requested by the tribal leadership. See Loney, p. 188.

Although these crisis conditions existed, the blacks of the reserves had little independent political power to engage in collective action in order to remove those problems. Since some of the reserves were in remote areas they were to some degree out of the reach of the white government, but most of the blacks lived under conditions where the government had knowledge of local black political developments and had a vast array of means to repress it. There were local leaders and organizational forms, but these could hardly be expected to strike an independent course of political action.

3.1.2. The African Purchase Areas

Blacks could initially buy land outside of the reserves and, when few blacks managed to do so, the Land Apportionment Act reserved certain areas for black purchase. By 1961 these purchase areas consisted of 86 widely scattered areas, amounting to approximately eight percent of the total land area. Like the reserves, the purchase areas were overpopulated with an average of 21 persons per square mile.[89]

The first blacks who bought land in the purchase areas were mainly foreign-born blacks like the Fingoes, who could not claim traditional land, and Zimbabwean blacks from educational, commercial and other elite groups. As more blacks were displaced by the land apportionment measures, these

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[89]Kay, Rhodesia: A Human Geography, pp. 37-58.

original inhabitants were joined by successful farmers of the reserves. By 1956, when the application list for black purchase was closed because of a shortage of land, the number of black farmers in the purchase areas amounted to 8,500.[90] Since the acquisition of farmland required a period of tenure, government certification of farming skills and, most importantly, capital, the population of the purchase areas is also skewed. The main factor is age, with 85 percent of the male cultivators of the areas older than 45 years.[91] Although the quality of the soil, access to railways and roads, and market opportunities presented difficulties similar to those of the reserves, the purchase area farmers usually produced a surplus. By 1965 approximately 32 percent of their production was consumed locally and the remaining 68 percent sold. These cash sales amounted to one-third of all marketed black agricultural produce.[92]

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[90]Most of the post-1945 arrivals were "master farmers", i.e. plotholders with enough capital and at least three years of contact with agricultural extension officers. The notion that successful black farmers could come to own their own land is comparable to the freeholding peasantry (as opposed to copyholding peasants) in British history. William R. Duggan, "The Native Land Husbandry Act of 1951 and The Rural African Middle Class of Southern Rhodesia", African Affairs 79 (April 1980): 227-239. See also Oliver B. Pollak, "Black Farmers and White Politics in Rhodesia", African Affairs 74 (July 1975): 263-277.

[91]Purchase area farmers employ a small number of permanent black laborers or rely on female and seasonal labor. Pollak, p. 268.

[92]Government policy favored the purchase area farmers over those of the reserves, with the former able to gain easier access to extension services, credit and market opportunities. Nelson, p. 294.

How did these conditions affect the political activity of the purchase area farmers? First, the black farmers lived on 200-acre plots with their families, other dependents and employees. Since many of these blacks are originally from the reserves and since purchase area farms are isolated from one another, purchase area residents tend to preserve their social and political ties with the blacks of the reserves. Second, although these ties are preserved, the blacks of the purchase areas are an elite; blacks either bought land with their savings from high status occupations, or worked their way up through the reserves and then bought land. These similarities as an elite are accentuated by the common concerns the farmers face after they have bought land. Third, it should be remembered that the purchase area farmers are, in both number and the land area that they command, only a small fraction of the black population. Compared to the blacks of the reserves, the blacks of the purchase area thus are a small and socio-culturally diverse elite who have similar socio-economic backgrounds and concerns.

The elite of the purchase area has a long history of political activity. In the 1930s several farmers created organizations to advance their interests and these eventually merged into the African Farmers Union.[93] Like many

[93]The African Farmers Union operated under different names; this title will be used here.

black organizations of the pre-war era, the AFU was consciously elitist; the organization excluded the farmers of the reserves and scrupulously avoided identification with the poorer inhabitants of the reserves. Even the tribal leadership of the reserves was barred from the AFU conferences. Since it usually sought government aid, the AFU was cautious and deferential in its dealings with the government which, until the Second World War, was indifferent to its pleas for aid. After 1945, however, the goals of the government and the AFU coincided and, under the leadership of Aaron Jacha, the AFU entered a phase of active collaboration with the government. This collaboration included an attempt to merge the AFU with the white farming association (the Rhodesia National Farmers Union).[94]

During the 1950s the AFU and its constituents were relatively isolated from the dislocations brought about by the government's efforts to reform black agriculture; indeed they were often held as the model of what the farmers of the reserves should be. The issue that brought matters to the fore was the presence of squatters in the purchase areas. When the purchase areas were created in 1930, approximately 150,000 blacks were already living in the areas assigned as purchase areas and by 1960 about 110,000 of these remained.

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[94]Jacha was one of the leading figures in the old ANC, but left it in the 1950s when it became more militant. Pollak, p. 272.

In 1960 the government's land commission recommended that these squatters remain in the purchase areas, as it was too expensive to resettle them elsewhere, and that the land they occupied should be called Special Native Areas.[95] The purchase areas, in other words, should be reduced. The AFU, however, thought that the squatters should either be expelled from the purchase areas (like they were expelled from white farms) or the land that they occupied should be replaced by land from the category of unreserved land. Eventually the purchase areas were not enlarged and the category of special native areas was created, but the dispute forced the AFU to oppose the government after a long period of cooperation. The experience also radicalized the AFU-leadership, as Jacha was replaced by William Kona, who supported the ANC and later the NDP, and who opened up avenues of grass-roots participation within the AFU by creating strong regional branches.[96]

When ZAPU and ZANU emerged, the purchase area farmers thus were engaged in organizational politics and had, to a degree, disassociated themselves from the government. At least some of the purchase area farmers indeed openly supported the predecessors of ZAPU and ZANU. Though the record of the farmers' organizational forum hardly shows a concern with the

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[95] The Select Committee on the Resettlement of Natives (Salisbury: Government Printer, 1960), the Quinton Report.

[96] Pollak, pp. 269-274.

lot of farmers in the reserves, the farmers nevertheless tended to preserve their social and other ties with the blacks of the reserves.

3.1.3. Blacks on White Farms

White agriculture after 1945 changed under the government's pressure to increase production. Two of these changes affected the position of blacks who lived on white farms (either as tenant farmers who performed certain duties as a permanent or semi-permanent employee). First, foreign- and domestic-owned estate farming increased with most of these concentrated in the southwestern and eastern provinces (Matabeleland North and South, Manicaland and Victoria) where cotton, citrus, tobacco, tea and sugar is grown. In central and western provinces (the low Midlands and Matabeleland) some cattle ranches were similar to the estate-type farming.[97] Second, the rise of corporate farming, government aid and the stress on improved production techniques did lead to some mechanization, but simultaneously white agriculture increased its dependency on unskilled labor. In fact, between 1946 and 1961 the number of black farmworkers rose from 142,000 to 272,000. These black farmworkers were unevenly distributed

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[97] Michael Bratton "Structural Transformation in Zimbabwe: Comparative Notes from the Neo-Colonization of Kenya", The Journal of Modern African Studies 15 (December 1977): 602-603. See also Arrighi, "The Political Economy of Rhodesia", pp. 352-359.

with most in Mashonaland North (35.2 percent of the total) and Mashonaland South (25.3 percent), Manicaland (15.5 percent), and Victoria (10.3 percent), and significantly less in Matabeleland North and South (7.7 percent) and the Midlands (6.0 percent).[98] The number of farmworkers included a high proportion (50 percent) of foreign-born workers.[99]

Given this number of black farmworkers (272,000 or 23 percent of the black population) and their distribution (heavily concentrated in the eastern areas), under what socio-economic and political conditions did these farmworkers live? First, more than 60 percent of the black farmworkers are permanent or semi-permanent employees, with the remainder either casual workers or foreign-born contract workers.[100] Second, except for the central and western areas, there was a high number of workers per farm with about 60 per farm in Mashonaland North, 36 in Mashonaland South, 45 in Manicaland, and 66 in Victoria.[101] Third, although these workers earned wages, they actually had several sources of income with in-kind payments, employer contributions to pension funds and other aids, and support from friends and relatives in urban employment.[102] There was no agricultural minimum wage;

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[98]D.G. Clark, Agricultural and Plantation Workers in Rhodesia (Gwelo, Zimbabwe: Mambo Press, 1977), pp. 24-26.

[99]Ibid., pp. 31-32.

[100]Nelson, p. 290.

[101]Clarke, p. 26.

[102]Ibid., pp. 44-51.

wages and other working conditions were determined by agreements made under the Master Servant Act and the African Labour Regulations Act. This gave the employer total control over workers as the loss of employment could mean the loss of tenure on white farms, basic subsistence and welfare assistance.[103] Fourth, employer control extended beyond the workplace. In the case of single farms, there was a strong paternalist tradition whereby white farmers frequently and personally intruded in the private lives of their workers. On the estates, the division of farm labor brought more impersonal bureaucratic control. Blacks here lived in compounds and were supervised by bossboys and policemen. Managers tended to be more aloof, with the result that the black bossboys and policemen played a crucial role in the mediation of worker discontent.[104]

The preceding shows that black farmworkers on estates and single farms fell under the all-encompassing control of their white employers and their assistants. When worker discontent arose, employers had a variety of means to contain it; these included hearing complaints, using the services of the local commissioner, using the bossboys and policemen, and displaying a sense of fair play expressed in the local language. Although there were labor strikes on white farms,

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[103] Ibid.

[104] Ibid., pp. 146-149.

this was not the dominant form of workers' discontent. Rather, workers tended to express their discontent surreptitiously in the form of insolence, absenteeism, arson, theft, go-slow work and malicious damage to property.[105]

There was one significant attempt to unionize black farmworkers with the creation of the Agricultural and Plantation Workers Union (APWU) in Matabeleland. The activities of APWU were inhibited by the resistance of employers and financial trouble, as farmworkers did not or could not pay union dues. The result was that the APWU became dependent on foreign support. In addition, the activists of the APWU found it difficult to organize the farmworkers because they were dispersed in scattered areas. When the Emergency Powers Act then forbade rural travel by union organizers, the APWU was effectively crippled.[106]

When ZAPU and ZANU emerged, the black farmworkers thus had no history of involvement in organizational black politics. These farmworkers lived on estates and single farms under the total control of employers and their assistants. Support of ZAPU and ZANU would thus entail a great risk for black farmworkers.

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[105]Ibid., pp. 177-178.

[106]The National African Federation of Unions and the African Trades Union Congress later offered black farmworkers some national political representation. Ibid., pp. 188-193.

3.1.4. Blacks in Urban Areas

By 1962 approximately 18 percent of all blacks resided in urban areas,[107] where they were employed in the public service, industry and commerce, and domestic service. These workers lived either in the townships or in rooms on whites' property;[108] few blacks owned their own property in urban areas as they were, until 1960, forbidden to do so. Moreover, few blacks were born in the urban areas or are permanent residents; most are temporary residents from rural areas who attempt to supplement their income by wage employment. The urban black population is therefore skewed in terms of age and sex; most are young (under 45 years of age) and male, although the proportion of women (approximately 35 percent in 1964) was increasing.[109]

As previously discussed, most black organizational activity after the Second World War took place in an urban setting and it was noted that urban collective action by blacks was difficult to organize and sustain. Activists and organizers were subject to surveillance and arrest, organizations were banned, publications censored, and the

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[107] According to the 1962 census.

[108] For a comprehensive discussion, see D. G. Clarke, Domestic Workers in Rhodesia: The Economics of Masters and Servants (Gwelo, Zimbabwe: Mambo Press, 1974).

[109] Rogers and Frantz, p. 15.

membership arrested or detained. When collective action did take place it could be repressed. Many blacks lived in black townships on the edge of white urban areas and thus could be isolated from employment, shops and access to other townships. Although the geophysical features of blacks' urban environment thus inhibited collective action, it is often said that the urban setting provided blacks with opportunities to develop organizations which minimized or superseded tribal affiliations, as it brought together blacks from different tribal backgrounds and gave them common socio-economic concerns.[110]

Although the influence of tribal factors will be discussed more fully in the following chapter, it is worth noting at this point that urbanization, at least as far as Zimbabwe is concerned, did not necessarily erase the influence of tribal and rural factors. Indeed, it is possible to argue that urbanization entrenched such influences. First, most blacks in the urban areas were temporary residents who maintained a strong interest in the security of rural tenure and hence the position and fate of rural society. In fact, an absence from the rural areas may have increased an awareness of the security of rural tenure Second, most migrants' immediate concerns were not political but directed towards welfare needs and the organizations that focused on them.

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[110]See, for example, Newhati.

These welfare associations were organized and run by ethnic groups. Third, blacks who migrated tended to migrate to the urban area closest to their area of permanent residence and thus urban areas' political activites were often dominated by the group living in the area. In Salisbury, for example, the Mashonas were heavily represented in political and other organizations, whereas Bulawayo was dominated by the neighboring Matabele.[111] It is consequently not suprising that "tribalism" is often mentioned as a centripetal force in black organizational politics.[112]

4. Conclusion

When ZAPU and ZANU emerged before UDI they claimed that they and not the tribal leadership, as the government claimed, represented black Zimbabweans as a whole. That the government claimed the support of the tribal leadership was not surprising, as their effort to create a multi-racial political constituency with a middle class character had failed. Yet, even presuming that ZAPU and ZANU did represent black Zimbabweans, it was clear that collective action

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[111] Nelson, p. 87.

[112] There are no systematic studies of the influence of tribal and other traditional loyalties in black politics in Zimbabwe. One does find fleeting references to it, such as in the leadership struggles of the AFU (Pollak, p. 272), the elections and actions of the advisory boards in urban areas, and in the actions of the Matabele Home Movement and the Mashonaland Cultural Society (Newhati, pp. 259-260).

by blacks would be difficult.

Approximately 60 percent of the black population lived in the reserves, engaged in subsistence agriculture and maintained a strong sense of socio-cultural cohesion. But the local leadership and organizations (down to kraals of twelve people) rarely displayed a willingness to oppose the government or to act in a politically independent manner and, even if they had done so, they were within the reach of the government's repressive means. The position of black agricultural workers (23 percent of the total black population) was even worse, as they fell under the all-encompassing control of their employers and their assistants. Urban blacks (about 18 percent of the total black population) had participated in some collective action, but the geo-physical features of the urban environment discouraged future action and, moreover, past action had resulted in the government's strengthening of its repressive power. Finally, there were the purchase area farmers who seemed to have the greatest scope for independent political action, but their numbers and the land area that they inhabited were small.[113] Given these conditions, it was clear that ZAPU and ZANU's efforts at mobilization would be difficult. Furthermore, their efforts

[113]There are some minorities in Zimbabwe. See Floyd Dotson and Lillian O. Dotson, The Indian Minority of Zambia, Rhodesia and Malawi (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1969).

would be subject to government repression, which already had severely weakened the black organizations by arrests, detentions and the banning of organizations. These challenges from without could be complemented by any internal weaknesses (such as tribal squabbles and financial weaknesses) that ZAPU and ZANU developed.

CHAPTER IV

THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER: INTERNATIONAL NATIONALISM, GUERRILLA WAR AND THE RESPONSE OF THE REGIME

This chapter consists of an examination of black collective action in Zimbabwe and the Smith regime's response to that action between 1962 and 1979. With regard to black action, the examination focuses on four questions, namely (a) What was the nature, extent and effectiveness of their actions; (b) Whether some blacks participated more in the guerrilla war than others, for example, the blacks of the reserves, purchase area farmers, farmworkers or urban dwellers; (c) What organizational forms were generated by the guerrilla war; and (d) What was the character of the black elite that sought to ally itself with and/or encourage black collective action. The natural counterpart to these questions is the response of the Smith regime; here the focus is on what actions the regime took with regard to public security and its effectiveness. To facilitate discussion of these questions, the period between 1962 and 1979 is subdivided into two periods, that period between 1962 and 1970, and that between 1970 and 1979.

1. 1962-1970: International Nationalism

During the first half of 1962, most of ZAPU's activities were directed at the generation of international support, especially that of the British government, which ZAPU believed to be the formal sovereign in Zimbabwe and which appeared to be the only government capable of influencing the white regime. This emphasis on foreign-diplomatic activity led the ZAPU leadership, and Joshua Nkomo in particular, to be absent from Zimbabwe for most of the first half of 1962. Within Zimbabwe there were some violent incidents, including petrol bomb attacks, a strike in Salisbury, attacks on cattle dips and other property, the burning of a forest in the eastern part of Zimbabwe, and disruptions of railroads.[1] These incidents, however, were "irregular and infrequent."[2]

When Nkomo returned to Zimbabwe in July, ZAPU could claim some success at securing international support from the United Nations and the Afro-Asian nations, but its attempt to influence the British government was thus far unsuccessful.[3] Within Zimbabwe ZAPU's position became precarious when the

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[1]Anthony R. Wilkenson, "From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe" in Basil Davidson, Joe Slovo and Anthony R. Wilkenson, Southern Africa: The New Politics of Revolution (New York: Penguin Books, 1976), p. 227.

[2]Barber, p. 141.

[3]See Day, International Nationalism, pp. 25-43.

Whitehead (or United Federal Party) regime launched an investigation of ZAPU and its report blamed ZAPU for most of the violence of 1962.[4] Even if it was not responsible for this violence, ZAPU indeed did plan on some violent action in the future, because it sent supporters abroad to acquire military training and made preparations to smuggle arms into Zimbabwe. These men would form the nucleus of the military wing of ZAPU. During September 1962 a "Zimbabwe Liberation Army" started to advertise its existence by distributing leaflets, but as yet the ZAPU leadership denied any connection with it. Despite these denials, ZAPU was banned in September 1962.[5]

With the banning of ZAPU the UFP regime amended its Unlawful Organizations Act so that it, among others, prohibited the leadership of an organization declared illegal to reconstitute itself under another name, and amended the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act to widen its scope and to increase the severity of punitive measures. This included a mandatory death sentence for setting fire to a residential building, vehicles and aircraft, regardless of whether it was occupied.

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[4]See the Report on the Zimbabwe African Peoples' Union (Salisbury: Government Printer, 1962).

[5]Gibson, p. 161.

On the grounds of these provisions, this law became known as the "hanging bill." In addition, the regime detained many of ZAPU's leaders.[6] Because of the prohibition on the reconstitution of an illegal organization, ZAPU decided to remain as such and Nkomo, who was in Zambia at the time of the arrest of ZAPU's leaders, prepared to locate it in Tanzania as the seat of a Zimbabwean "government-in-exile." The location and designation of ZAPU, however, was rejected by the Tanzanian president (Julius Nyerere) and other African leaders. Rebuffed, ZAPU found a home in Lusaka, Zambia, where Nkomo was joined by the remnants of the ZAPU membership and by former ANC members who were released by the Rhodesian Front regime when it came to power in December 1962.[7]

With ZAPU now based in Zambia, its leadership became divided over leadership and tactics, much of which was focused on Nkomo's personality and leadership style. While the move to Zambia had reasonable grounds, i.e. government actions made effective action within Zimbabwe impossible, Nkomo was

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[6]Including Takawira, Mugabe and Moyo.

[7]The release of the detained nationalist leadership was part of an initial conciliatory approach by the Rhodesian Front. See Barber, pp. 196-220.

accused of avoiding altogether a struggle within Zimbabwe, directed by ZAPU as an underground movement. Instead, so the criticisms went, Nkomo preferred to concentrate on foreign-diplomatic actions, which not only brought dubious success (it "converted those already converted") but deprived ZAPU of a strong leadership element when it was still struggling to establish itself.[8] Nkomo reacted to these charges by calling a mass rally in Salisbury in August 1963, where he publicly castigated the discontented ZAPU leaders, like Robert Mugabe, Leopold Takawira, Mouton Malianga, Ndabaningi Sithole, Nathan Shamuyarira and Enos Nkala. In response, Mugabe, Takawira, Malianga, Sithole and Herbert Chitepo formed the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) on August 9,1963, with Sithole as president. This development led Nkomo to form the Peoples Caretaker Council (PCC) to operate within Zimbabwe: outside of the country, the PCC operated under the name of ZAPU.[9]

Between August 1963 and August 1964 there was widespread violence in Zimbabwe and by the end of 1964, 4,435 contraventions of the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act had been recorded. This was the "worst year on record for violence and

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[8]Day (pp. 112-119) accounts Nkomo's travels and cites critics who argue that Nkomo travelled because he feared he would be arrested within Zimbabwe.

[9]Ibid., p. 22.

the breakdown of law and order":[10] schools were burnt, property in rural and urban areas destroyed, and people were intimidated, stoned and killed. Most of these incidents involved or were directed against blacks, particularly on the part of ZAPU and ZANU supporters who battled each other.[11] In response, the Smith regime prohibited ZAPU and ZANU from holding meetings, and later started to detain their leadership, including Nkomo, Mugabe, Sithole and other members.[12] Finally the PCC (or ZAPU) and ZANU were declared illegal in August 1964. The PCC then suspended itself as an internal wing of ZAPU and the remaining leaders gathered in ZAPU's headquarters in Zambia, where James Chikerema became acting president assisted by Nyandoro, Moyo and Silumdika.[13] With Sithole and Mugabe absent, the remnants of ZANU also fled to Zambia, where Herbert Chitepo assumed the leadership.

Although there was a striking difference between the rhetoric of ZAPU and ZANU, with the latter usually more

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[10]The Director of African Affairs in Salisbury as quoted by Barber, p. 210.

[11]David Martin and Phyllis Johnson, The Struggle for Zimbabwe (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1981), pp. 70-71. and Wilkenson, pp. 228-231.

[12]A total of 1,791 were detained between January 1964 and June 1965. Bowman, p. 60.

[13]The dissolution of internal party arrangements occurred at the Cold Comfort experimental farm, and later became controversial.

militant,[14] their actions or strategies were quite similar. Both mainly engaged in foreign-diplomatic activity to secure international support, and attempted to secure British support and possibly intervention to prevent a possible UDI or to prevent the British transfer of the CAF's armed forces to the Smith regime.[15] Yet ZAPU and ZANU did prepare for a guerrilla struggle within Zimbabwe: ZAPU sent recruits to the Soviet Union, China and North Korea, while ZANU recruits were sent to Ghana.[16] Except for one ZANU attack by the "Crocodile Commando" in July 1964 in the Melsetter area,[17] however, there were no noteworthy guerrilla incidents within Zimbabwe.

ZAPU and ZANU's emphasis on foreign-diplomatic activity and their infighting before UDI is often singled out for criticism. Given government repression, it is argued, the best tactic would have been to regroup, preserve unity, and develop an underground structure as preparation for guerrilla struggle. Was the emphasis on foreign-diplomatic activity then inappropriate? It should be remembered that the

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[14]Gibson, p. 175. For a sample of these differences, see Christopher Nyangoni and Gideon Nyandoro, pp. 64-113.

[15]Day (p. 22-103) characterizes this activity as "international nationalism."

[16]Ibid., pp. 104-111.

[17]For an account of this incident, see Davis M'Gabe, "The Beginnings of Guerrilla Warfare" in W. Cartey and M. Kilson (eds) The Africa Reader: Independent Africa (New York) Vintage Books, 1970).

constitutional status of Zimbabwe prior to UDI was genuinely ambiguous. On the one hand, Britain claimed to exercise "reserve powers" over a territory described in contradictory terms as a "self-governing colony", while on the other hand, the Smith regime claimed that the 1961 constitution amounted to a state of independence. Thus ZAPU and ZANU were in a tactical dilemma. If Zimbabwe were a colony, a foreign-diplomatic offensive was entirely appropriate, since similar actions by other nationalist groups in Britain's African colonies had resulted in independence. However, if Zimbabwe were independent and sovereignty exercised by the Smith regime or the white minority, ZAPU and ZANU had to develop power through, for example, the development of a guerrilla army, that could threaten the Smith regime from within Zimbabwe. In this respect the Smith regime would react differently than the metropolitan power; they would resist claims for political equality and are formidable adversaries in doing so. For them the question would be not whether to resist black nationalist demands, but how to do so.[18] Stated differently, the termination of foreign or colonial rule can be achieved without necessarily establishing a position of physical, coercive or military superiority, while the downfall of an independent, domestic regime is unlikely if it

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[18]Kenneth W. Grundy, "Black Soldiers in a White Military: Political Change in South Africa", The Journal of Strategic Studies 4 (September 1981): 296.

cannot be defeated in physical-military terms.[19] With ZAPU and ZANU's leadership experience in foreign-diplomatic activity and their restrictions within Zimbabwe, it is not surprising that they chose the colonial version of the Zimbabwean dispute.[20] Their misjudgment, rather, was in being "mesmerized" by potential British rule and intervention even after Britain clearly indicated that it would not intervene[21] and in underestimating the adverse effects of prolonged absences by the leadership.[22]

Why did ZAPU and ZANU spend so much time in battling each other rather than the Smith regime? Internal schisms and rival movements characterize many southern African liberation movements; their nature and causes tend to be interpreted differently. First, it is argued that internal schisms are a by-product of regime repression. Since repression eventually forces groups into exile, they have difficulty in waging an authentic guerrilla struggle and then suffer morale problems and exaggerate their claims of

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[19]On this crucial strategic distinction, see Rejai, p. 19; Robert Taber, The War of the Flea (Bungay, Suffolk: The Chaucer Press, 1970), pp. 90-91; and Andrew Mack, " Sharpening the Contradictions: Guerrilla Strategy in Imperialist Wars", Race and Class 17 (Autumn 1975): 161-177.

[20]Day, pp. 120-125.

[21]Gibson, p. 156.

[22]Day, pp. 125-128.

"success." These and other indignities and anxieties of exile naturally engender epithets and charges of treason, collusion with "agents of imperialism", "revisionism", and "adventurism."[23] Second, it is argued that liberation movements - in exile or operating from within - are bureaucratic or political institutions in which demand for status, roles and positions exceeds supply. This leads to intense competition for positions, whereby candidates attempt to beat competitors by questioning their loyalty, commitment, honesty and character, and invoke linguistic, tribal, regional, racial and class considerations to demonstrate a greater following.[24] Third, some have argued that tribalism is not simply a matter of revolutionary job competition, but that rivalry among tribal and other ethno-linguistic groups find expression in organizations. This leads to struggles among the leadership and the membership at large, defections and eventually the creation of rival movements. Particular groups then tend to overrepresent a particular social group.[25]

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[23]John A. Marcum, "The Exile Condition and Revolutionary Effectiveness: Southern African Liberation Movements" in Christian P. Potholm and Richard Dale (eds.), Southern Africa in Perspective (New York: The Free Press, 1972), p. 274.

[24]See the study of Mozambican liberation movements by Walter C. Opello, "Pluralism and Elite Conflict in an Independence Movement: FRELIMO in the 1960s", Journal of Southern African Studies 2 (October 1975): 66-82.

[25]J. Bowyer Bell, "The Future of Guerrilla Revolution in Southern Africa", Africa Today 19 (Winter 1972): 12-13. Bell specifically includes the Zimbabwean movements in this statement.

To see the initial split between ZAPU and ZANU as an irrevocable division of Mashona and Matabele political loyalties, with the former located in ZANU and the latter in ZAPU, seems strained. Although almost half of ZAPU's executives left to join ZANU there was no exodus among the local branch leaders of the membership. Not only did ZAPU retain most of its membership, it continued to attract support in urban areas that had large concentrations of Mashona and Matabele. Even the dissatisfaction with Nkomo cannot easily be explained in tribal terms, as Nkomo is a member of the Kalanga, a branch of the Mashona confederation but one which lives in the western part of Zimbabwe and has close ties with the Matabele. Nkomo himself also apparently did not engage in tribal exclusivism.[26] Yet, even if the original split was not primarily due to tribal exclusivism, it was clear that the organizations' exile condition, their close proximity in Lusaka, the relative paucity of organizational positions and regime repression provided a fertile ground for internecine warfare. By 1965 ZAPU and ZANU seemed the bitterest of enemies, whose differences could not be resolved by the reconciliation attempts of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). The OAU then recognized and supported both

[26]Scholars agree that the initial split was not primarily over tribal matters. See Bowman, p. 55; Wilkenson, p. 228; Nelson, p. 179; and Gibson, pp. 161-162.

organizations.[27]

When UDI was announced in 1965, ZAPU and ZANU were in a difficult position. As the previous chapter showed, blacks in the various areas of Zimbabwe were unlikely to engage in any spontaneous or locally organized action. In addition, the successive regimes had armed themselves with a battery of repressive means and used them to pre-empt any collective action - urban or rural - by blacks. While ZAPU and ZANU regrouped, they were now based abroad, led by substitute leadership, engaged in internecine warfare, and emphasized foreign-diplomatic action more than preparation for guerrilla struggle. UDI and events in its aftermath presented a stunning defeat for this strategy. Britain remained unwilling to intervene and even the independent African nations, who were converted to the nationalist cause, could not be persuaded to sever diplomatic relations with Britain as a retaliatory measure. As far as the United Nations was concerned it did react, but it was only after more than a year that the Security Council determined that the Zimbabwean situation was, as argued by ZAPU and ZANU in terms of Article 39 of the UN Charter, a threat to international peace and security. The Security Council, however, still refused to authorize the use of collective international force in

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[27]The OAU's African Liberation Committee did favor ZAPU in its financial allocations. Martin and Johnson, p. 71.

terms of Article 42. Sanctions were instituted, but these were broken by many nations.[28]

Thus ZAPU and ZANU were faced with a situation that necessitated action aimed at the overthrow of the Smith regime as the defacto sovereign power in Zimbabwe. At the same time the OAU adopted a policy whereby it would favor only those liberation groups that waged effective political-military struggles within their respective territories.[29] ZAPU and ZANU now had to attempt guerrilla struggle within Zimbabwe. Between 1966 and 1970 ZAPU and ZANU clashed with the regime's security forces on seven major occasions, with six of these incidents directed by ZAPU. Only the first incident (or incursion) was directed by ZANU, which led to a clash with regime security forces near Sinoia in April 1966. ZANU infiltrated other groups and these survived undetected for a longer time, but they too were eventually discovered and arrested and killed. These actions by ZANU's Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) were

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[28]Negotiations and sanctions will be discussed in the following chapter.

[29]This decision followed on the failure of an ALC committee (composed of Malawi, Tanzania, Zambia, Uganda, Kenya and Ethiopia) to unite ZAPU and ZANU. This committee was hampered by its own internal difficulties. Zambia, for example, supported ZAPU, while ZANU was supported by Tanzania. Leonard T. Kapungu, "The OAU's Support for the Liberation of Southern Africa" in Yassin El-Ayouty (ed.), The Organization of African Unity After Ten Years: Comparative Perspectives (New York: Praeger, 1975), pp. 138-139. On the OAU and ALC's views on Zimbabwe, see Zdenek Cervenka, The Unfinished Quest for Unity (London: Julian Friedmann Publishers, 1977), pp. 45-63 and 122-127.

denounced by ZAPU, whose Zimbabwe Liberation Army (ZLA) had not yet made any incursions. In July 1967 ZAPU forces, accompanied by members of the South African ANC, infiltrated Matabeleland North and made their way to the Wankie Game Reserve in the south of the province. By August and September they were detected by the regime's security forces, attacked and eventually captured and killed. During 1968 ZAPU again made infiltrations, one entering Zimbabwe from west of Lake Kariba into Matabeleland North, and three to the east of the lake. These were also detected by the regime's security forces and captured and/or killed. During 1969 there were no reported clashes within Zimbabwe, leading observers to conclude that neither ZAPU nor ZANU could wage an effective guerrilla campaign within the country.[30]

This apparent demise of ZAPU and ZANU as effective guerrilla forces can be explained in reference to their mobilization efforts, their organizational forms, internal problems, and the nature of counter guerrilla warfare by the Smith regime.

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[30]Wilkenson, pp. 232-244; J. Bowyer Bell, "The Frustration of Insurgency: The Rhodesian Example in the Sixties," Military Affairs 35 (February 1971): 1-5; Gibson, pp. 164 178; Kees Maxey, The Fight for Zimbabwe (London: Rex Collings, 1975); and Michael Morris, Armed Conflict in Southern Africa (Cape Town, South Africa: Jeremy Spence, 1974), pp. 28-42.

1.1. Mobilization

There is no evidence to suggest that ZAPU and ZANU intended to infiltrate trained recruits as agents for local political mobilization during the period between 1965 and 1970. Initial infiltrations from Zambia were not covert or intended for local political targets, nor were attacks of the "hit and run" variety. Attacks consisted of conventionally-styled positional warfare, rationalized by the organizations as "facing the government squarely" or a "policy of confrontation."[31] This led to heavy losses and demoralization.

There were several reasons for ZAPU and ZANU's taste for confrontation. One (and perhaps the most important) reason was the OAU's stipulation that it would recognize and support only the effective liberation organizations. Consequently the

> polarized liberation movements, in order to gain the support of the OAU, had to seem to be fighting. So armed men were sent into the territories at precisely the time an OAU organ was about to meet...(and) leaders of the liberation movements would go to the OAU and claim to be waging an armed struggle...In other words, revolutionary effectiveness was sacrificed for propagandistic reasons.[32]

The influence of international (as opposed to local) factors is also evident in the targets of the infiltrating groups.

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[31] Inez S. Reid,"African Nationalism in South Africa and Zimbabwe" in Potholm and Dale, p. 44.

[32] Kapungu, pp. 138-139.

Both ZAPU and ZANU avoided the Tonga reserves adjacent to Lake Kariba and preferred to risk a long and difficult route to the more distant reserves in the vicinity of Bulawayo and the farmworkers in the vicinity of Salisbury. These targets may be partly explained by the lure of urban areas, but more obviously by the fact that ZAPU and ZANU were conscious of their ethnic stereotypes and tried to overcome them for international consumption. Thus ZANU (or ZANLA), which was said to be dominated by Mashona, entered Matabeleland, while ZAPU with its Matabele stereotype, entered Mashonaland.[33] While these may have been laudable attempts to create supra-tribal organizations, it demonstrates the importance of international factors in the respective organizations' strategic thinking. Another reason for the taste for confrontation was that the exile in Zambia had produced a psychological attitude of impatience, reinforced by the misguided belief that the Smith regime, like the colonial regimes in former struggles in Africa, would quickly succumb to the pressure of violence.[34] Finally, it is said that ZAPU, which directed most of the armed clashes, was mainly trained in the Soviet Union, whose training de-emphasized guerrilla warfare in rural areas, whereas ZANU (or ZANLA) received most of its

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[33]Wilkenson, p. 241.

[34]Martin and Johnson, p. 11.

training from Chinese instructors, who were familiar with the tenets of guerrilla warfare and the need for political mobilization.[35]

Mobilization efforts in the areas adjacent to Zambia would be difficult. Geographically Lake Kariba constitutes a large part of the Zambia-Zimbabwe border and crossing it by boat would expose the guerrillas to detection from the air. This left only two options for entry into target areas: one to the west of the lake into the Matabeleland North province, and the other east of the lake into Mashonaland North. As Tables I and II show, the northern areas of Mashona- and Matabeleland North are largely depopulated, because the land is designated as national land (game reserves) or as unassigned land. The more densely populated reserves lie directly east of Lake Kariba or further south. Thus guerrillas had to spend much of the initial part of their infiltration in steep (especially in Mashonaland North), waterless, and otherwise inhospitable terrain without the assistance of the local population - and hence deprived of the means and ends of guerrilla warfare.

Clearly Zambia was of limited value as a base for infiltration, although it was the only neighborhing state willing to host ZAPU and ZANU. When infiltration did take place, the actions seemed premised more on international than local factors, with ZANU and ZAPU preferring dramatic

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[35]Ibid., pp. 10-11.

confrontations to score points with an international audience. Even if mobilization were seriously attempted, it would be difficult, as the area adjacent to Zambia is geophysically inhospitable and largely devoid of population.

1.2. Organizational Forms

By late 1970 most of the strategic assessments of the progress of ZAPU and ZANU reflected a gloomy pessimism. The diagnosis, in most cases, was that the respective organizations needed to place greater emphasis on mobilization efforts within Zimbabwe and, in order to do so, they needed to become political parties.[36]

ZAPU originally intended to be a political party that operated within Zimbabwe and, before it was banned, it formed a military wing, known first as the Zimbabwe Liberation Army (ZLA) and later as the Zimbabwe Peoples Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA), that was covertly directed by a member of the ZAPU executive. When ZAPU was banned it operated for a time within Zimbabwe under the name of the Peoples Caretaker Council (PCC) and, when it was threatened with banning, its leadership met at the Cold Comfort experimental farm, dissolved existing internal organizational arrangements and discussed arrangements if banning were indeed to occur. When the PCC was then banned, the remnants of ZAPU gathered

[36]See, for example, Kenneth W. Grundy, Confrontation and Accomodation in Southern Africa (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973), pp. 180-183.

in Lusaka under the arrangements made at the Cold Comfort meeting. Chikerema was the acting president in Nkomo's absence and headed a national executive, with each of the members of the executive at the head of functional areas, such as youth affairs, education, military affairs, and so forth. Authority over ZIPRA was exercised by a high command, headed by a military commander (or head of staff). The actual planning and waging of the guerrilla struggle was placed under the authority of a War Council, representing military and civilian-political leaders.[37]

The Cold Comfort meeting was not a constitutional conference; it simply made practical arrangements which, in the absence of Nkomo and under the conditions of exile, had deteriorated to disarray and mismanagement. These internal problems were publicly aired in three documents. The first document, "Observations on Our Struggle" was presented by Moyo (ZAPU's national treasurer and second in command in the military department) and criticised the indiscipline and self-indulgence of ZIPRA members, the dictatorial leadership style of Chikerema, and the Zambian intelligence forces' penetration of ZAPU. To correct these problems, Moyo proposed that military-style discipline should

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[37]Gibson, pp. 169-170.

be imposed, the War Council should be strengthened by including more ZIPRA forces and particularly the members of the high command, recruitment efforts should be increased, and ZAPU should review its strategy of confrontation. In the second document, "Reply to Observation on Our Struggle" Chikerema defended his leadership style by noting that the Cold Comfort meeting did not create formal structures but resigned itself to Nkomo's judgment on such matters. Since Nkomo then appointed Chikerema, his position could not be questioned. While Chikerema did admit that ZIPRA lacks leadership, sound administration and cohesion, he accused Moyo of trying to manipulate the positions within it so as to establish his own influence. Therefore Moyo was relieved of his command, as were his supporters on the executive committee (Nyandoro and Silundika). Chikerema's actions led to a third document, "On the Coup Crisis Precipitated by J. Chikerema", wherein Moyo and Silundika disassociated themselves from Nyandoro and called for the collective exercise of authority within ZAPU.[38]

As these documents indicate, there were several causes of the internal problems of ZAPU, which together reveal its internal dynamics. First, the rivals on the ZAPU executive were supported by tribal groups, with the Zezuru

[38]This section is based on Ibid., pp. 169-173.

(a branch of the Mashona) conspicuous supporters of Chikerema and the Matabele supporting Moyo and Silundika. Indeed, ZAPU could only maintain a facade of unity by housing the rival factions in separate military camps and political offices.[39] Second, it was clear that the internal rivalries were fueled by the highly informal organizational form of ZAPU. Nkomo's leadership style derived from his personal authority, but Chikerema's imitation of it was clearly unsuccessful. Third, it became evident that the rivals on the executive were maneuvering to gain control over the 400-man ZIPRA contingent,[40] but their very rivalry made them incapable of doing so.

ZANU's organizational form was originally set by a party congress, attended by 22 members, at Gwelo in May 1964. It created a central committee, with members responsible for functional areas, and appointed Chitepo as president. When ZANU was banned in September 1964, the central committee instructed Chitepo to organize a military wing, known as ZANLA, which was headed by a military high command and a commander. The daily operations of the struggle fell under the authority of a Revolutionary Council, composed of 16 members and headed by Chitepo.[41]

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[39]Martin and Johnson, pp. 29-30.

[40]Ibid., p. 30.

[41]Gibson, pp. 180-181.

Like ZAPU, ZANU experienced internal problems in Lusaka and accusations were made of the self-indulgence of leaders, a lack of resolve, tribalism, and personality clashes. The discussion of these problems at ZAPU's first annual review conference nevertheless resulted in the reaffirmation of Chitepo as leader, but led to an internal reorganization as the Revolutionary Council was replaced by a Supreme Council, known as DARE (short for Dare re Chimurenga). The civilian-political leaders also attempted to assert their leadership over ZANLA by having a member of the central committee, the secretary of defense, chair the DARE meetings.[42] The reorganization did not solve all of ZANU's internal problems, as Chitepo continued to be the target of criticism, the "politicians" on DARE were accused of a preoccupation with foreign-diplomatic action and preference for dramatic guerrilla confrontations, and tribalism. With regard to the latter, two-thirds of DARE were indeed Mashona, as well as many of the other top positions within ZANU. There was not, however, a single branch of the Mashona that dominated ZANU.[43]

By 1970 ZAPU and ZANU were thus in a period of organizational transformation as they struggled to adjust to the exile environment in Zambia, tried to transform

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[42]Ibid., pp. 181-183.

[43]Gann and Henrikson, p. 106 (fn. 36).

themselves into entities capable of waging effective guerrilla warfare (i.e. they had to develop a military component or had to become armies rather than parties), and as the leadership underwent a transition with the positions of the former prominent leaders now filled by less known figures. In view of these transitions, it was inevitable that internal problems and rivalries would be exacerbated. Most prominent among these was the tension between the guerrillas and the civilian-political leaders (the "politicians"), with the latter being accused of avoiding a genuine guerrilla struggle within Zimbabwe. Even within the ranks of the political leadership there were rivalries, caused by a variety of factors including personality, tactics, leadership style and the use of tribal support in bids for power. Yet neither ZAPU nor ZANU were, as stereotyped, exclusive Matabele or Mashona organizations. Tribal attachments were used rather than dominated.

1.3. Leadership

The leadership of ZAPU and ZANU were primarily drawn from the ranks of urban and professional blacks; teachers, in particular, were heavily represented.[44] Most of the leadership had by 1970 acquired experience of foreign travel. The various branches of the Mashona are predominant, as could

[44]Mugabe, Sithole, Silundika and Takawira were among the teachers. Chitepo was a lawyer.

be expected from a black population which is about 71 percent Mashona and about 16 percent Matabele.[45] Most of the leadership was spawned by the black organizational activity of the 1950s. Moyo, Nkomo, Takawira, Mugabe and Sithole all had experience in the ANC and the NDP, while Moyo and Nkomo were also formerly active in black trade union politics. Many indeed spent most of their adult lives as organizational activists.[46]

Since most of these leaders were former office-holders of black organizations, it left each with some experience of organizational politics, but also with a personal following and personal-political ambitions. While most of the top leadership was in detention between 1962 and 1970 (and thereafter), the secondary leadership who moved into their vacated organizational positions moved in an organizational environment where new offices and roles were created. This encouraged the cultivation of personal followings, rivalries and other power-seeking behavior and, although this equipped many with in-fighting skills, the attempt to wage guerrilla war required and generated a new leadership component. By 1970 many of the ZAPU and ZANU recruits had returned from training abroad, but they had not yet moved into important decision-making positions. It was nevertheless clear that the political

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[45]Nelson, p. 74.

[46]Nyandoro and Chikerema were orginally active in the Youth League in Salisbury. See the previous chapter.

leadership was rethinking its strategy of foreign-diplomatic actions combined with some dramatic military confrontations.

In early 1970 ZAPU's Chikerema stated that they were now preparing for a protracted guerrilla struggle that required political mobilization and covert rural organizations. Chikerema gave no indication as to how ZAPU would accomplish this, given that ZAPU was internally divided and Zambia had severe limitations as a base for infiltration. There was no mention of ZAPU's earlier cooperation with the South African ANC or,[47] more importantly, that ZAPU would attempt to make contact with the Frente de Libertacao de Mozambique (FRELIMO) of Mozambique. Since 1968 FRELIMO had been successful at establishing its presence in the northwestern province of Mozambique, Tete, which was adjacent to the northeastern areas of Zimbabwe. A working relationship with FRELIMO could allow ZIRPA forces to enter Mashonaland North and South.[48] ZANU's leadership made no public mention of a change in strategy; indeed the most startling strategic statement came from Sithole, on trial for advocating the murder of Ian Smith, who said: "I wish to disassociate my name in word, thought or deed from any subversive activities, from any terrorist activities, and from any form of violence."[49]

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[47]Gibson, pp. 168-169.

[48]FRELIMO in fact saw ZAPU as its natural ally but the internal problems of ZAPU prevented it from making any lasting contact with FRELIMO. Martin and Johnson, pp. 15-16.

[49]Ibid., p. 148.

Nevertheless ZANU continued to send recruits to their training camp at Itumbi in Zambia, where they were trained by Tanzanian and Chinese instructors.[50] ZANU had not made any noteworthy incursions into Zimbabwe since 1966, but it established a working relationship with FRELIMO, which permitted a small contingent of ZANLA forces to join FRELIMO operations as observers and trainees.[51]

Thus the leadership that was in effective control of ZAPU and ZANU in Zambia was only a fraction of the leadership spawned by black organizational activity of the 1950s. The competitiveness of this elite was encouraged by the transitional organizational environment in which they found themselves. Guerrilla war also required new leadership skills and, although training was underway, a new style of leadership had not yet emerged. ZANU's leaders did have one important success, namely their contact with FRELIMO; if FRELIMO then could establish its control in Mozambique, this would widen the tactical possibilities for ZANU.

1.4. Counter Guerrilla Warfare

When UDI was declared the Zimbabwean defense establishment was divided into three components, namely the regular

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[50]With little mobilization and recruitment within Zambabwe, ZAPU and ZANU found recruits within the large exile and refugee communities of Zimbabweans in Zambia. Gann and Henrikson, p. 97.

[51]Martin and Johnson, pp. 17-18.

(or standing) force, the territorial (or citizen) force, and the British South Africa Police.

The regular force consisted of the Rhodesia Army and the Rhodesia Air Force. The Rhodesia Army numbered approximately 3,500 men and was organized into two battalions, the all-white Royal Rhodesia Regiment and the Rhodesian African Rifles of about 1,000 black troops under the command of white officers. These were both infantry battalions, and resorted under the authority of a military headquarters. The Rhodesia Air Force by 1969 consisted of approximately 1,000 men, organized into seven squadrons, with about 80 aircraft.[52] The territorial force consisted of approximately 10,000 white men, organized into eight infantry battalions and support units. These men were called up for nine months of national service, after which they were assigned to certain units, attended parades, or could be activated. The British South Africa Police consisted of approximately 6,400 men in permanent employ. The BSAP was a quasi-military force; its members were trained in light infantry tactics and carried light arms. A considerable proportion of the BSAP was black, either as policemen or as messengers. In addition to the permanent employees of the BSAP, there was a reserve police force, which expanded during the 1960s; its largely white membership rose

[52] The development of the air force occurred under the CAF and, when it was dissolved, the air force was transferred to the Zimbabwean defense establishment.

to about 28,500 in 1970. In equipment, training and doctrine, the Zimbabwean military establishment was deeply influenced by the British military tradition.[53]

A rough division of labor existed among the above military components. The regular army and the air force were responsible for security in the border areas, while the BSAP was responsible for ordinary crime control and other matters affecting the public security in internal areas. Both of these responsibilities were aided by a well-organized intelligence system, which included a network of urban and rural black informers.[54]

When the first infiltration of guerrillas occurred, the Zimbabwean military establishment's only exposure to guerrilla warfare was service as a volunteer unit in the Malayan Emergency.[55] During the ensuing period (1966 and after) the security forces nevertheless countered the guerrilla threat

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[53]International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 1969-1970 (London, 1970), p. 53 and Richard Booth, The Armed Forces of African States, Adelphi Papers, No. 67 (May 1970). For the historical development of the Zimbabwean armed forces, see Lewis H. Gann, "From Ox Wagon to Armored Car", Military Review 48 (April 1968): 63-72.

[54]Besides the intelligence network, small parties of security forces masquerading as guerrillas were also allowed to roam the countryside. See Roy Christie, For the President's Eyes Only (Johannesburg: Hugh Keartland Publishers, 1971), pp. 10-30 and Martin and Johnson, p. 9.

[55]This unit included Peter Walls, later the supreme commander of the regime's security forces.

in a way that was touted as a model for counter-guerrilla warfare elsewhere. Acting on the information of its intelligence network and air surveillance, tracker units would be dispatched by helicopter to identify the position of guerrillas, and then other units (or the tracker unit) would ambush, capture and/or kill the guerrillas. Three units distinguished themselves in these actions, namely the Grey's Scouts, a highly mobile infantry unit; the Selous Scouts, essentially a tracker unit composed of blacks and whites and trained to roam the countryside for long periods of time; and the Special Air Services, an airborne commando unit with intelligence and light infantry duties.[56]

In assessing the effectiveness of the counter guerrilla operations it is important to remember that the initial guerrilla attacks were small and rather clumsy. Moreover, the regime's security forces were supported by South African men and equipment after ZAPU announced that it had formed a military alliance with South Africa's ANC. The South African para-military contingent was responsible for security in the border area west of Lake Kariba, and was assisted by South African helicopters and spotter planes. Estimates of the size of the contingent vary, but even a conservative estimate

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[56]See particularly Bell, "The Frustration of Insurgency: The Rhodesian Example in the Sixties"; Russel W. Howe, "War in Southern Africa", Foreign Affairs 48 (October 1969): 150-165; and Cann and Henrikson, pp. 64-66. For a contrasting view, see Fire Force Exposed (London: Anti-Apartheid Movement, 1979).

of 1,000 men gave South Africa a substantial role in the Zimbabwean operations.[57] The cost of the para-military contingent was borne by South Africa.[58] An assessment of the regime's security operations also has to account for its cost. There was a gradual rise in defense expenditures, from approximately Rh $20 million in 1964 to approximately Rh $40 million in 1973. In 1967 the defense expenditures amounted to about 6.5 percent of the annual budget, rising to about 9 percent in 1973.[59] With regard to manpower, the size of the regular force and the BSAP did not noticeably increase, but the police reserve and especially the territorial force and its commitments expanded. National service was forced to increase to a twelve-month period of active duty (up from nine months), after which the trainees were subject to one-month or longer short tours of duty.[60] These

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[57]While guerrillas claimed that there were 8,000 South African troops by 1972, other accounts estimate the number at 5,000 in the same year, rising to between 7,000 and 10,000 by 1973. Stockholm Institute for Peace Research (SIPRI), Southern Africa: The Escalation of a Conflict (New York: Praeger, 1976), p. 109. Nelson estimates the number at 1,000 by early 1970 (p. 347).

[58]Wilkenson, pp. 328-329.

[59]See Ibid., p. 306; Nelson, p. 336 and Kenneth W. Grundy, "The Social Costs of Armed Struggle in Southern Africa" Armed Forces and Society 7 (Spring 1981): 456. Hereafter cited as "Social Costs". These figures are drawn from the Central Statistical Office in Salisbury. It is likely that they do not reveal disguised military expenditures or South African budget support.

[60]Grundy, "Social Costs", pp. 447-448.

commitments were a drain on the Zimbabwean economy, but the war itself did not seem to increase emigration as there was a net overall gain in immigration during the 1965-1970 period.[61]

In view of the self-destructive behaviour of ZAPU and ZANU of this period, the size of the South African contingent, and the costs (although still modest) of the security operations, the regime's "success" at countering the guerrilla threat was clearly a qualified one. Yet the regime viewed the decline of guerrilla activities during 1969 and 1970 as an unqualified success. Instead of a simple boost in morale, they lasped into overconfidence.[62]

1.5. Summary

By the end of 1970 there thus was little evidence that ZAPU or ZANU was engaging in a serious and sustained attempt at mobilizing rural blacks in its cause. There was some infiltration, but these efforts were rather clumsy and aimed more at scoring foreign-diplomatic victories than on local mobilization. With no visible increases in local or rural black activity it is thus clear that rural blacks would not become more active at the mere existence of ZAPU and ZANU. The blacks of the reserves, the purchase area farmers and

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[61] See Wilkenson, p. 307 and William G. Kuepper, G. Lynne Lackey and E. Nelson Swinerton, pp. 5-6.

[62] Gann and Herikson, p. 67 and Martin and Johnson, p. 96.

and the farmworkers seemed to change little from the position in 1965. With regard to organizational form, both ZAPU and ZANU were in a transitional period complicated by the conditions of exile and elite competitiveness. ZAPU and ZANU were neither fully armies or political parties; they were more informal organizations characterized by the tension between their military and civilian-political components. The leadership (or elite) of ZAPU and ZANU was, despite the similarity of their socio-economic backgrounds and their past experiences, characterized by highly competitive behavior by substitute leaders. There was no single reason for this competitiveness; it appears to be a combination of, among other things, the pressures of the exile environment, personality factors, organizational setting, and personal ambitions nurtured by a long involvement in organizational black politics.

Given these features, the counter guerrilla actions clearly scored a victory by default, but the Smith regime did not view it as such. Rather, they overlooked the cost of their operations and overlooked the possibility of renewed guerrilla actions. In short, the regime became complacent because they thought that they had scored a military victory.

2. 1971-1979: Guerrilla Warfare

In the period between 1971 and 1972 security forces reported no armed clashes with the guerrillas, but several signs pointed to the increase of guerrilla activity. In the areas bordering on Zambia, ZIPRA concentrated on the use of landmines against civilian and military vehicles. In retaliation, the Smith regime demanded guarantees from Zambia that guerrilla infiltration cease and, when this was not forthcoming, closed the border with Zambia.[63] In the northeastern areas bordering on Mozambique there were reports of armed clashes and infiltration, and the Smith regime expressed alarm at the failure of the Portuguese forces to contain FRELIMO in Tete.[64] By the end of 1972 (December) the Smith regime indeed admitted that guerrilla actions were increasing, and said that the situation was "far more serious than it appears on the surface."[65]

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[63]Despite Zambia's refusal to prevent guerrilla infiltration, Smith reopened the border, but the Zambian government regarded the closure as permanent. For a full account, see The Rhodesia-Zambia Border Closure, January-February 1973 (London: International Defense and Aid Fund, May 1973).

[64]Wilkenson, pp. 273-274.

[65]Ibid., p. 258 and Maxey, p. 108. According to BSAP statistics (Wilkenson, p. 231) there was a rise in the contraventions in the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act from 130 in 1970 to 396 in 1972 and finally to 636 in 1972. These figures do not necessarily reveal a rise in rural political activity, as they include urban unrest associated with the arrival of the Pearce Commission and the creation of the African National Council by Bishop Muzorewa.

Between 1971 and 1972 there were no signs, however, that ZAPU and ZANU would reconcile their differences. The continued internecine warfare led to a threat by President Kaunda of Zambia in late 1971 that, unless they settled their differences, he would expel them from Zambia. In response some of the leaders of ZAPU and ZANU formed the Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe (FROLIZI), but FROLIZI was actively supported by only James Chikerema, leading to charges that FROLIZI was a Zezuru clique. FROLIZI nevertheless did manage to establish a training camp and infiltrated a few guerrilla groups.[66] As a political force of unity, however, it collapsed.[67]

With ZAPU and ZANU unreconciled, the period between 1970 and 1972 witnessed the rebirth of overt organizational black activity within Zimbabwe.[68] During 1970 the British and Zimbabwean governments announced the conclusion of a settlement and in 1971 a British commission, led by Lord Pearce, arrived in Zimbabwe to test blacks' acceptance of it.[69] To organize black opposition to the proposals an African National Council (ANC) was created by the Reverend

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[66]A second attempt at a unified front came when ZAPU and ZANU announced the formation of a joint military command (JMC).

[67]See Tony Kirk, "Politics and Violence in Rhodesia" African Affairs 74 (January 1975): 3-38.

[68]Up to this point blacks found electoral expression in the multi-racial Centre Party, who returned seven members of parliament.

[69]Negotiations will be discussed in next chapter.

Canaan Banana and Bishop Abel Muzorewa. The ANC quickly demonstrated its urban viability by organizing meetings, providing blacks with information, and by advertising its opposition to the proposals. The subsequent British rejection of the settlement proposals further enhanced the stature of the ANC and Muzorewa in particular.[70]

When ZANU then claimed responsibility for an attack on a white farm in the northeastern districts in December 1972, it was against a background marked by the emergence of the ANC within Zimbabwe and the deteriorating position of the Portuguese forces in Mozambique. These and other domestic and international events influenced ZAPU and ZANU's subsequent mobilization efforts, their organizational form, the behaviour of their elite, and the nature of the regime's counter guerrilla operations.

2.1. Mobilization

In the two years after the attack of December 1972, ZANLA used the Tete province of Mozambique to infiltrate the northeastern areas of Zimbabwe. This border area consists of a 150 mile long and 40 mile wide set of black reserves, as well as the small Chesa purchase area, and its rugged geophysical features facilitate guerrilla operations. By

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[70] On the creation of the ANC, see Eshmael Mlambo (ed.) No Future Without Us: The Story of the African National Council (London: The African National Council, 1973).

mid-1973 ZANLA had in fact firmly established its political influence over the area.[71]

ZANLA initially acquired its freedom of movement in the northeastern areas by making covert contact with the religious and political authorities of local areas. Thus ZANLA made contact with the relevant spirit mediums and, in honour of their role in these and past actions, named their operational sectors after them,[72] and made contact with sympathetic chiefs, ward- and kraalheads.[73] With the support of the inhabitants of the reserves and the purchase areas, ZANLA then launched a variety of actions. They robbed stores;[74] ambushed security forces (often after these hit landmines); abducted and/or killed civilians; and, acting on the information supplied by farmworkers, attacked white farmers and their property.[75] These actions were undertaken

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[71]Maxey, pp. 98-131; Wilkenson, p. 284; and Martin and Johnson, pp. 73-91.

[72]On the nature and importance of the spirit mediums in the guerrilla struggle, see Terence O. Ranger "The Death of Chaminuka: Spirit Mediums, Nationalism and the Guerrilla War in Zimbabwe", African Affairs 81 (July 1982): 349-369.

[73]An early supporter in the northeastern areas was Chief Chiweshe of the Chiweshe reserve. Unsympathetic tribal leaders frequently became targets for attack. Gann and Henrikson, pp. 90-92.

[74]There is some evidence that social banditry was interspersed with the guerrilla warfare, and that guerrillas' indiscipline led to criminal actions. Wilkenson, p. 269.

[75]Ibid., pp. 268-270.

by full-time and part-time (or locally recruited) guerrillas, both of whom were assisted by women and mujibas (landless, unemployed or otherwise available young men) who acted as local scouts and contacts. Full-time recurits were heavily drawn from local villages and particularly from the migrant and refugee communities in Zambia and Mozambique. Judging from the number of abductions and press-gangings, it was clear that ZANLA experienced some recruitment problems at this time.[76]

Although ZANLA had acquired freedom of movement within the reserves and the purchase areas of the northeastern districts, they did not attempt to create "liberated areas", as characterized by geo-political control and the creation of alternative political institutions. The reason was that the security forces could still detect and pursue ZANLA forces.[77] Yet ZANLA established a political network and, as long as it was supported by the local population and remained highly mobile, they could continue their actions in the area.

In the western areas ZIPRA continued its mine offensive, supplemented by a number of infiltrations, ambushes and other attacks. While the scale of their operation was

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[76]Gann and Henrikson, pp. 97-99 and Martin and Johnson, pp. 73-91.

[77]Martyn Gregory, "Zimbabwe 1980: Politicisation through Armed Struggle and Electoral Mobilization" Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 19 (March 1981): 69.

smaller than that of ZANLA, ZIPRA forces were more disciplined, better equipped and trained, and were capable of executing well-planned and -led operations.[78] Given these qualities, the Smith regime expected an increase in ZIPRA activities, especially in the southeastern areas of Matabeleland.[79]

The Portuguese coup of April 1974 created new possibilities for ZANLA. It had established a working relationship with FRELIMO and, with the active support of FRELIMO as the future government of Mozambique or even with the absence of Portuguese forces, ZANLA could locate its bases within the sanctuary of Mozambique and infiltrate Zimbabwe along the long eastern border. Due to problems within ZANLA and ZIPRA, however, it was only two years after the Portuguese coup (in 1976) that they could make full use of these tactical possibilities.

The Portuguese coup led to a "spirit of detente" in southern Africa as Zambia responded to South Africa's request for a relaxation of tensions in the area. This led to a summit meeting of southern African leaders at Victoria Falls in December 1974 to settle, among other things, the Zimbabwean question. As an indication of its good faith

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[78]This was also the view of the Smith regime. See Paul Moorcraft, A Short Thousand Years: The End of Rhodesia's Rebellion (Salisbury: Galaxie, 1979), p. 164.

[79]Martin and Johnson, p. 112.

in the detente effort, the Smith regime released the detained nationalist leaders, allowing Nkomo, Sithole, Chikerema and Muzorewa to attend the meeting. These leaders signed a "unity agreement" to provide for a common bargaining position during the negotiations; the respective organizations (ZAPU and ZANU) would still exist, but the ANC, now called the United African National Council or UANC, would be the umbrella organization for the nationalists.[80] A temporary ceasefire was instituted as a prelude to negotiations. Despite these developments, the effort at negotiations was shortlived and by January 1975 the ceasefire and the unity collapsed. The Smith regime stopped the release of detained leaders (or members of banned organizations) and guerrilla attacks continued.

In Zambia, however, ZANU was wracked by internal political and military problems. In March 1975 Chitepo, its president, was killed by a car bomb, and the Zambian authorities suspected the other leaders of ZANU to be responsible and therefore arrested most of the DARE and ZANLA high command. In addition, several senior military commanders led by Thomas Nhari attempted a coup within ZANU and the violence that accompanied it led the Zambian authorities to make a sweeping series of arrests of ZANU (and ZANLA) members. In March 1975 Zambia in fact banned ZANU and the other nationalist groups and closed their offices. The remaining guerrillas

[80]For the text, see Nyangoni and Nyandoro, pp. 295-296.

were restricted to their bases and training camps. Tanzanian authorities responded similarly in May 1975. In Tanzania there was also dissatisfaction among ZANLA forces concerning the political leadership. Guerrillas at the Mgagao training camp produced a Mgagao Declaration charging that the present political leadership (Sithole of ZANU itself and Chikerema, Nkomo and Muzorewa of the UANC as umbrella organization) were wholly incapable of leading the guerrilla struggle. Of the leadership, only Robert Mugabe was singled out for praise. In Mozambique, where the transition to a FRELIMO government was under way and where the ramificaitons of Chitepo's murder was also felt, ZANLA guerrillas were effectively restricted to their bases and training camps. Mugabe and a senior ZANLA commander Tekere was under vitural house arrest in Quelimane. The result of these problems within ZANU was predictable, while the number of recruits arriving in Mozambique increased, organizational activity declined to about three active guerrilla groups within Zimbabwe.[81]

While the hosts of the nationalist organizations were agreed that the struggle against the Smith regime should continue, their attitude by 1975 was that guerrilla actions as hitherto characterized could no longer be supported. Consequently they agreed that all the guerrillas should be concentrated in Mozambique under some form of unity. Thus ZIPRA

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[81]Martin and Johnson, p. 215.

and ZANLA were to merge into a united Zimbabwe Peoples Army (ZIPA), and be led by a military committee of 18 members with Rex Nhongo (the senior ZANLA commander) as chief of staff. It was unclear as to under what political authority ZIPA would function. Mugabe was the appointed leader of the guerrillas ZANLA, but ZANU's leadership still formally belonged to Sithole and, moreover, Mugabe's movements within Mozambique were restricted. ZAPU was led by Nkomo, but he advocated a negotiated ending to the conflict and was involved in the UANC of Muzorewa. As such he did not command the confidence of the guerrillas of ZIPA.[82]

By the end of 1975 there were between 5,000 and 10,000 guerrillas of ZANLA gathered in Mozambican camps, as well as a much smaller ZIPRA contingent,[83] and in January 1976 infiltration began again. Unlike their earlier efforts, the guerrillas now had few recruitment problems and could infiltrate Zimbabwe at more points, including the Manicaland, Victoria and Matabeleland South provinces. By the end of 1976 approximately 1700 guerrillas had crossed the border into

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[82]The ANC formed a council to direct guerrilla activities, the Zimbabwe Liberation Council or ZLC, composed of Muzorewa, Sithole, Chikerema and Nkomo.

[83]A figure of at least 6,000 ZANLA guerrillas and 1,000 ZIPRA guerrillas is usually cited. See Patrick O'Meara, "Rhodesia: From White Rule to Independent Zimbabwe" in Gwendolen M. Carter and Patrick O'Meara (eds), Southern Africa in Crisis (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1977), pp. 36-37; Gann and Henrikson, p. 103; and Robert I. Rotberg, Suffer the Future (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1980), p. 262.

Zimbabwe[84] and the Smith regime admitted that the "war zone" had doubled.[85] In the following years (1976 to 1979) guerrilla actions increased dramatically. By July, ZANLA guerrillas within Zimbabwe increased to approximately 3,000 and their actions resulted in the deaths of 197 security forces. In the western areas ZIPRA activity also increased.[86] By March 1978 ZANLA's forces within Zimbabwe rose to 13,000 and even higher (to about 15,000) by July 1979.[87]

While the availability of Mozambique as a host state increased with effectiveness of ZANLA and ZIPRA actions increased, there were still problems within the organizations. One of these was that political and military cooperation was tenuous. In October 1974 the leaders of ZAPU and ZANU formed the Patriotic Front (PF) to facilitate their negotiations at the Geneva conference organized by the British government, but this cooperation did not encourage military cooperation. During the preceding years ZANLA and ZIPRA had acquired different zones of influence, received different training and

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[84]Gann and Henrikson, p. 80.

[85]O'Meara, pp. 33-34. During 1976, 191 security forces and 45 civilians were killed. In retaliation, Zimbabwe closed its border with Mozambique in March 1976. Martin and Johnson, p. 263.

[86]Rotberg, Suffer the Future, pp. 262-263.

[87]The extent of ZANLA's infiltration, presented in a paper at the Lancaster House conference, was confirmed by its acceptance by the Zimbabwean and British governments. See Martin and Johnson, pp. xx-xxi.

were different in organization, discipline and tactical doctrine. ZIPA could not resolve these differences and violent clashes between them continued.[88] As before, these clashes led to detentions by the Mozambican government. ZANLA also had to contend with the effects of raids by the security forces' raids on their bases and training camps. By 1979 it was clear that ZIPA was in practice dominated by ZANLA. Many of the ZIPRA guerrillas left Mozambique and returned to Zambia and by the end of 1979 ZANLA was responsible for most of the attacks in the northeast, while ZIPRA was responsible for most of the guerrilla action in the western areas adjacent to Zambia.[89]

Guerrilla infiltration thus occurred in two waves: the first occurred in the 1972/1973 period, was directed by ZANLA, and was geographically focused on the northeastern areas' reserves and small purchase areas; the second wave occurred in the 1976-1979 period, was again mainly directed by ZANLA (although ZIPRA actions also increased) and spread from the northeastern areas westward towards the central and southeastern areas of Zimbabwe. Infiltration was thus

[88]To counter training differences, ZANLA and ZIPRA would in the future receive training at the same camp (Nachingwea) in Tanzania.

[89]There is wide agreement on this point. See Gregory, pp. 73-74; Gann and Henrikson, pp. 54-55; Martin and Johnson, pp. 235-263; and Colin Legum, Western Crisis Over Southern Africa (New York: Africana Publishing Company, 1979), pp. 219-220. Hereafter cited as Western Crisis.

strongly influenced by the availability of Mozambique as a host state. The guerrillas were supported by the blacks of the reserves and the purchase areas and enjoyed most of their freedom of action in the reserves. Black farmworkers were also crucial, in that they supplied information about suitable targets for attack. It is doubtful whether the reserves were liberated areas in the sense that the term is usually used, nor was there extensive mobilization by incorporating the local population into the political organization of ZAPU or ZANU. Both ZANLA and ZIPRA enjoyed some freedom of action within their separate regions of influence as a result of local political support but, except for recruits drawn from villages, the rural population's role was designed to meet military rather than political purposes.[90]

2.2. Organizational Form

In 1970 ZAPU and ZANU were neither fully political parties nor fully armies, but were rather highly informal organizations struggling to transform into entities capable of waging guerrilla warfare. This transition was complicated by tensions between military and civilian-political leaders and other divisive factors. In the years between 1971 and 1979, ZANU was characterized by the following organizational features.

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[90]Political mobilization increased dramatically after the announcement of upcoming elections. Gregory, pp. 67-91.

First, ZANLA remained a loosely organized military organization without the benefit of a stable command structure or leadership. At the highest organizational level, ZANLA's actions were directed by the DARE and the high command and, at lower levels, there were regional (or geographical) commands, operating under the authority of a provincial and operational commander and a dozen section commanders. This organizational arrangement, combined with attrition by the security forces and the intermittent absences of military commanders, provided an environment suitable for the development of personal followings and cliques.[91]

Second, while ZANLA could nominally absorb more recruits, it was ill-equipped to adequately train, equip and command increasing numbers of recruits. Only a fraction of the new recruits received full training from the Chinese, Tanzanian and Mozambican instructors. Many of these recruits, moreover, came from urban environments and, when they were infiltrated in rural environments without maps, medicine, arms and other aids, their effectiveness was often limited. Besides the resulting morale problems and psychological exhaustion, the guerrillas often felt betrayed by their

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[91]Lower level section commanders were given discretionary powers as to the selection of targets. This may have contributed to the tendency to cultivate personal followings and banditry. Well-known examples of this are Kid Morongorongo, Nhari and Solomon Ngoni. See Anatomy of Fear (Salisbury: Ministry of Information, 1974).

leadership and thus became resentful towards superiors.[92]

Third, while some of the rank-and-file's resentments were vented against their military superiors, most of the bitterest sentiments were reserved for the political leaders. "Politicians" were seen as self-indulgent, deceitful, ambitious and lacking resolve; in contrast, the guerrillas were seen as dedicated "boys in the bush" and "fighters." As indicated before, these tensions played a key role in the Nhari rebellion and the Mgagao Declaration and were heightened by the return of the detained political leadership after 1975. Nkomo, who advocated a negotiated settlement to the dispute, and Sithole, who had denounced the guerrilla struggle at his trial, were particular targets of criticism.[93]

Finally, when Sithole was released and tried to reassert his leadership in ZANU, he was defeated. Sithole tried to replace Tongogara, who was the elected as ZANU's secretary of defense in 1973, held a position on the DARE and has a large personal following. When Sithole lost power after the Mgago Declaration a substitute was not elected. Instead, the leaders of the hosts of ZANU on two occasions asked the commanders of ZANLA to list their preference among the political leadership and, when Mugabe repeatedly held the

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[92]Gann and Henrikson, pp. 87-90.

[93]Martin and Johnson, pp. 159-169 and 196-202.

confidence of the commanders, he became the leader of ZANU. The dominance of ZANLA within ZANU became obvious with the internal reform of the organization in 1977, when it enlarged ZANLA's representation on the central committee. Mugabe was elected president, but eighteen of the remaining 25 members of the central committee were either a military commander or had at some point undergone military training. Clearly, the military component within ZANU was dominant.[94]

Compared to ZANLA's loose form, ZIPRA was smaller, better trained and equipped, and followed a conventional military style as regards organization. These organizational features discouraged internal divisions, indiscipline and morale problems,[95] and left it in a better position to absorb the recruits of the 1976-1979 period.[96] Yet some of ZANLA's problems also occurred in ZIPRA. One of these was the tendency to form cliques and personal followings, which led to armed clashes and subsequent detentions within Zambia. Another problem was the tension between the military and civilian-political leaders, although it was less pronounced than in the case of ZANLA. A major reason for the more

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[94] Ironically, 1977 was heralded as the "year of the party." The reorganization did not lead to the softening of civil-military tensions, although Mugabe continued to be supported by the senior ZANLA commanders, in particular Josiah Tongogara and Rex Nhongo. Legum, Western Crisis, pp. 219-220.

[95] ZIPRA also appears to have had sophisticated weaponry, as evidenced by the shooting down of a Zimbabwean aircraft. See "Please Don't Kill Us" and "We Shot It Down", Newsweek, September 18, 1978, pp. 45-47.

amicable civil-military relations within ZAPU was that Chikerema, who had been the target of much dissatisfaction in the 1966-1970 period, lost power in the 1970s and ZAPU was then led by Moyo and Silundika as political figures and Alfred Mangena as military commander.[97]

When the ceasefire was instituted in December 1979 ZAPU and ZANU thus were both essentially military organizations. As armies rather than parties, there were tensions between the military and civil-political leaders, with the latter accused of a variety of transgressions. In organizational style ZIPRA differed somewhat from ZANLA in that the former was patterned more after a conventional military institution, but both were loosely styled rather than formal organizations.

2.3. Leadership

As previously discussed, the period between 1966 and 1970 was characterized by elite competitiveness. In the absence of the detained top leadership, the leadership fell to substitute figures who competed for positions. By the end of 1979 this competitiveness was even more pronounced. The only unity that the nationalist elite could provide was a facade of unity for negotiating purposes (the UANC and the Patriotic Front) at the Geneva and Lancaster House

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[97]Colin Legum (ed.), Africa Contemporary Record: Annual Survey and Documents 1976-1977 (London: Rex Collings, p. A-13-A-22. Hereafter cited as ACR 1976-1977.

conferences. Indeed, the Smith regime after 1976 seemed to owe much of its existence to the fact that there was disunity among the nationalists.

While there were certain factors at the time of the creation of ZAPU and ZANU that made for disunity, it is said that additional quarrels and the experiences of the following guerrilla struggle reinforced differences. Thus differences in personality (for example, Nkomo the "genial autocrat" versus Mugabe as the "intense intellectual") were reinforced by different operational areas (ZANLA east and ZIPRA west), ideological bifurcation (ZANU radical/Marxist and ZAPU moderate/capitalist), tactics (Nkomo's negotiations versus Mugabe's militancy) and their training (the Chinese, Tanzanian and Mozambican advisors of ZANLA as opposed to ZIPRA's Soviet advisors).[98] The result is a somewhat simplistic view of a nationalist elite divided by irreconcilable differences.

As the previous discussion has shown, all of the factors mentioned above did at one time or another play a role in problems between and within ZAPU and ZANU. Yet at other times the differences seem trivial, resulting more from differences in tone than substance. Nkomo, for example, did want negotiations, but ZAPU and ZANU were agreed that a swift transfer to black majority rule was necessary. This

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[98]See, for example, Gann and Henrikson, p. 44.

leads to the question of whether differences within and between the organizations were deliberately encouraged, by either the Zimbabwean regime or the nationalists themselves.

Nationalists on several occasions charged that the Smith regime was encouraging tribalism.[99] This took the form of subversive actions by informers and other members of the Smith regime's intelligence network. Yet divisions persisted even after the Smith regime accepted black majority rule and the Muzorewa regime was installed. Consequently, it raises the possibility that the divisions were exaggerated by the nationalists themselves.

It is important to note that the nationalist leaders in detention for most of the struggle and the leaders that filled their positions could not take their political following within their organization for granted. Thus the leadership as a whole was forced to constantly struggle to consolidate its positions within the respective organizations. Undoubtedly the top leadership suffered worst from this, because they were placed in the company of competitors without any certainty about their following. Some of these, like Sithole, tried to reassert their authority over ZANU but found that the organization was transformed during their absence.

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[99]Legum, ACR 1976-1977, pp. A 13-A 33.

Mugabe labored to make himself acceptable to the senior ZANLA commanders by espousing a militant Marxist ideology and posture.[100] In the subsequent election, however, Mugabe felt that such an approach would lead to defeat by the voters and hence downplayed his radical aspirations. In other words, the leadership of the different organizations exaggerated and manipulated differences to suit their own ambitions and that of their organizations.[101]

Thus the competitiveness of the nationalist leadership can best be seen as organizational and personal drives for political power. Although this entailed the exaggeration and manipulation of differences, it does not make differences less real. Regional, tribal, personality, tactical and ideological differences remain; it is simply their political expression and use that vary according to considerations of power.

2.4. Counter Guerrilla Warfare

As previously discussed, the bungled initial attempts at guerrilla warfare and the regime's counter actions resulted

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[100] On Mugabe's Marxism and his rise to power, see Xan Smiley, "Zimbabwe, Southern Africa and the Rise of Robert Mugabe," Foreign Affairs 85 (Summer 1980): 1060-1083. Smiley notes that the ZANLA guerrillas initially referred to Mugabe not as their leader but as a "spokesman." (p. 1063).

[101] This interpretation follows that of John Day, "The Divisions of the Rhodesian African Nationalist Movement" The World Today 33 (October 1977): 385-394. Day states:

> The divisions between the various nationalist factions originated in and are sustained by the leaders' contempt for each other's leadership, and by their ambitions to increase their own personal power. (p. 392).

in a qualified victory for the Smith regime during the period between 1966 and 1970. The Smith regime nevertheless saw these as an unqualified victory, with the result that a mere boost in morale reached immodest and complacent proportions. Even if guerrilla actions were to increase, the regime saw no cause for alarm, because it would be given advance warning by its intelligence network.

The intelligence network, however, failed to detect several crucial developments which led to ZANLA's guerrilla actions in the northeastern areas, namely the change in ZANLA's strategy from one of confrontation to a more orthodox guerrilla campaign and ZANLA's development of ties with FRELIMO. Even by late 1973 the Smith regime still believed that the Zambian border areas were the critical regions for guerrilla activity. Regime intelligence was generated mainly by three sources, the Ministry of Internal Affaris whose district or local commissioners were in contact with chiefs and ward and kraal heads, an external intelligence wing (the Central Intelligence Organization of CIO), and the intelligence officers of the defense and police establishments. Of these, the Ministry of Internal Affairs in particular failed to gather accurate information during the 1970s, partly because its informants in the rural areas were co-opted, eliminated or neutralized by the guerrillas and partly because the department lacked adequate funds to conduct intelligence activities. In general the reports of the other intelligence

sources were more accurate, but the Smith regime placed more faith in the Ministry of Internal Affairs' knowledge of rural affairs.[102]

As a result of this intelligence failure, the Smith regime struggled to regain the initiative in the years prior to the Portuguese coup of 1974. The organization of the defense establishment remained essentially unaltered. The counter guerrilla forces consisted of five major army units, namely the white Rhodesia Light Infantry, the Rhodesian African Rifles composed of blacks and led by white officers, the Selous Scouts as a predominantly black tracker unit, the racially mixed Grey Scouts as mounted infantry, and the Special Air Service as an elite commando/paratroop unit. These units were assisted by the air force and the BSAP. All were manned by regular (or permanent) personnel, national servicemen, territorial forces on short tours of duty, and reservists.[103]

Whereas most of these forces up to 1970 were deployed in the western regions, ZANLA's actions in the northeastern areas led to the designation of the area as an "operational zone" in December 1972 under the code name of Operation Hurricane. In this zone counter guerrilla actions took place under the authority of a Joint Operations Command (JOC),

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[102]See Martin and Johnson, pp. 6-8, who note that the intelligence failure was later admitted by officers of the Smith regime.

[103]James K. Bruton, "Counterinsurgency in Rhodesia", Military Review 59 (March 1979): 32-38.

which linked the senior officers of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, army, air force and police.[104] In the Operation Hurricane area and in the other subsequent operational zones forces were not geographically dispersed. Instead the mode of operation consisted of "search" operations by ground and air forces followed by "destroy" operations (named Fire Forces) to engage guerrillas. By 1979, three-quarters of all guerrilla casualties were attributed to these Fire Forces.[105]

In addition to these search and destroy operations, the regime also took several measures to discourage guerrilla actions. First, the regime in 1972 adopted a policy of imposing collective fines[106] on villages whose inhabitants (as individuals or as a group) aided the guerrillas or failed to notify the regime security forces of their presence. Sometimes these fines took the form of cash fines, but usually cattle was seized. Second, in the border areas the regime created "no go" or "free fire" zones in defoliated areas.

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[104]Legum, Western Crisis Over Southern Africa, p. 222.

[105]Army personnel played the major role in the decisions and actions on the operational zones. See Gann and Henrikson, p. 65 and "Tea and Terrorists", Newsweek, May 8, 1978, pp. 52-53. For a more critical account, based on personal experiences, see Barry Cohen, "The War in Rhodesia: A Dissenter's View", African Affairs 76 (October 1977): 483-494.

[106]Made possible by the Emergency Powers (Collective Fines) Act of 1973.

Officially these areas were nomansland, i.e., any person not attached to the security forces could be shot on sight. Other areas were subject to curfew regulations. Third, the regime widened and legalized discretionary powers for the security forces by the Indemnity and Compensation Act. According to this act, the belief that one's actions would strengthen public security or would counter "terrorism" absolved the person from blame. As a complementary measure the regime amended the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act to include punishment for undergoing guerrilla training (varying between the death sentence and twenty years imprisonment), for hosting, aiding or failing to report guerrillas (the death sentence to twenty years), and for committing an act of terrorism (the death sentence to thirty years).[107] Fourth, the regime sought to control public information about the conflict by press censorship (imposed under the Emergency Powers Act) and the restriction of journalists.[108] Finally the regime adopted a policy of population resettlement in the

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[107] Tony Hodges, "Counterinsurgency and the Fate of Rural Blacks", Africa Report 22 (September-October 1977): 15-20 and Bruton, pp. 32-38. Except for the amnesty that accompanied the release of the nationalist leaders in 1974, the death sentence was maintained throughout the conflict and frequently used against guerrillas.

[108] See Pieter Niesewand, In Camera: Secret Justice in Rhodesia (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1973) and Elaine Windrich, "Rhodesian Censorship: The Role of the Media in the Making of a One-Party State", African Affairs 78 (October 1979): 523-534.

northeastern and later other areas. Under this policy blacks were settled in protected villages that were guarded by a Guard Force, a local militia resorting under the authority of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Similarly, the construction of the protected villages was the responsibility of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.[109]

Since the guerrillas suffered from a variety of internal problems during the period between 1973 and 1976, it is difficult to gauge the overall effectiveness of the regime's actions. Some policies, like the collective fines and population resettlement, were clearly counterproductive from a security viewpoint,[110] while other policies like the no go areas, curfew regulations and the death sentence for guerrilla training, support and actions were criticised on security and moral grounds.[111] Yet, judging from the decline of guerrilla

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[109]Protected villages were enclosed by barbed wire, with guardposts and floodlights. Each usually housed about 2,000 inhabitants, living on small plots allocated to families, and with access to medical, educational and other facilities. Conditions and size, however, varied. A.K.H. Weinrich, "Strategic Resettlement in Rhodesia", Journal of Southern African Studies 3 (April 1977): 207-229.

[110]In the Chiweshe reserve, for example, 43,000 blacks were resettled within one month. Many blacks resisted resettlement and when they were coerced to do so became resentful and more sympathetic towards the guerrillas, who indeed foten selected the villages as targets for recruitment. Hodges, p. 18.

[111]Much of this criticism originated from within Zimbabwe, like from the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace and the Roman Catholic Bishops' Conference. See their Rhodesia - The Moral Issue (Gwelo, Zimbabwe: Mambo Press, 1968). Criticism also came from within Parliament. Martin and Johnson, pp. 102-104.

activity to three active groups in the northeast by the end of 1975, it is likely that at least a measure of effectiveness was reached.

As before, however, effectiveness was linked to increasing costs in both money and manpower. In 1973, with only one operational zone (Hurricane), the army, air force and BSAP complained of manpower shortages. These complaints led to the Defense Act of 1972 and the creation of a Directorate of Security Manpower, which widened national service and short tour obligations and made evasion of them more difficult.[112] In addition, the regime planned on increasing the number of blacks in the security forces.[113] In purely financial terms the cost of the operations was also escalating as defense expenditures rose from Rh $65 million in 1974 and to Rh$96 in 1976.[114]

It is against the background of rising costs in counter guerrilla operations that the second wave of guerrilla

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[112]These measures included the extension of national service to one year, doubling the intake of the national servicemen, and more duties for the increased territorial forces. Wilkenson, p. 281

[113]Blacks constituted about 40 percent of the regular army and about 60 percent of the BSAP. Grundy, "Social Costs", p. 449. There also was a contingent of mercenaries serving with the regime's forces. See Legum, ACR 1976-1977, p. A 50-A 51 and David Anable, "The Return of the Mercenaries", Africa Report 20 (November-December 1975): 2-6.

[114]Grundy, "Social Costs", p. 457.

infiltration (1976-1979) occurred. In response to these infiltrations the regime announced the formation of three new operational zones, Operation Trasher in February 1976 to cover the eastern border in the vicinity of Umtali, Operation Repulse in May 1976 to cover the border areas of Victoria province and the rail and road links with South Africa, and Operation Tangent in December 1976 to cover the border areas of the west and northwest. Operations in these areas resembled those of Operation Hurricane. The only new counter guerrilla tactic was the border raids on guerrilla bases and other camps in Mozambique and Zambia.[115]

By 1979 the cost of the counter guerrilla operations reach major proportions. With regard to manpower, the number of security forces' casualties rose from 403 in 1977 to 724 in 1978 and finally to 788 in 1979.[116] The defense establishment expanded to a total of 115,000 men with most of the increases taking place in the territorial force;[117] of these,

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[115]There were more than 200 of these raids by the end of 1977. Martin and Johnson, p. 286.

[116]Grundy, "Social Costs", p. 457.

[117]The number of regular forces rose from 3,500 to about 5,000, while the territorial forces rose from about 10,000 in 1973 to 45,000 in 1976 and to about 58,000 in 1978. Figures taken from the International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 1975-1976 and 1977-1978 (London, 1977 and 1979).

however, only 25,000 could be active at any one time.[118] To offset manpower shortages the regime was forced to widen the obligations for military service, including short tours of duty for men between 51 and 60 years old and planned national service for blacks.[119] Financially the defense expenditures rose from Rh$ 146 million in 1977 to Rh$ 197 million in 1978. Originally this burden was lightened by South African aid,[120] but South African withdrew its contingent after the Victoria Falls conference of 1975.

The preceding shows that the counter guerrilla actions entered the 1971-1979 period at a disadvantage because of an intelligence failure. Subsequently the security forces struggled to regain the initiative and in doing so developed effective search and destroy operations which, combined with the guerrillas' weaknesses, led to a decline in guerrilla actions in 1975. The socio-economic and other operations that accompanied the search and destroy operations, such as collective fines and population resettlement, however, were often crude, ineffective and counterproductive and were accompanied by the steadily increasing cost of the operations. This cost

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[118] Gann and Henrikson, p. 65.

[119] Black conscription was ordered by the Muzorewa regime and would have produced a 25,000 force loyal to Muzorewa. Grundy, "Social Costs", pp. 449-450.

[120] Estimated at about 50 percent of the total budget. Ibid., p. 456.

increased dramatically after the increase in guerrilla activities after January 1976. By the end of 1979 search and destroy operations were still conducted against guerrillas, but the overall cost of the operations had reached a critical level.

2.5. Summary

When the ceasefire was instituted in late 1979 it was thus clear that guerrilla infiltration occurred in two waves (1971-1973 and 1976-1979), that ZANLA and ZIPRA had established spearate areas of influence, and that their actions within those areas were aimed guaranteeing the guerrillas freedom of action within the rural areas rather than incorporating the rural population into the respective organizations. Given the extent and location of the guerrilla actions it is clear that blacks of the reserves, the small purchase areas and farmworkers all supported the guerrillas in one or another form, although the guerrillas enjoyed greatest freedom of movement within the reserves. In organizational form ZANLA and ZIPRA were essentially military organizations; military figures dominated decision-making and were often bitterly hostile towards the civilian-political leaders. The leadership was highly competitive but this competitiveness should not be seen as the irrevocable division of ascriptive and other loyalties; rather, the competitiveness is shaped and encouraged by organizational and personal drives for power.

Finally, on a purely tactical level the regime's counter guerrilla operations were an effective deterrent or at least an inhibition of guerrillas' freedom of movement but, given the limited resources of the regime, escalating costs made their indefinite continuation improbable.

Figure III: Land Apportionment in 1970



Source: George Kay, Rhodesia: A Human Geography (New York: Africana Publishing, 1970).

Figure IV: Population Distribution 1970



Source: George Kay, Rhodesia: A Human Geography (New York: Africana Publishing, 1970).

CHAPTER V

SANCTIONS, NEGOTIATIONS AND THE EFFECTS OF GUERRILLA WARFARE

This chapter discusses the way in which the conflict in Zimbabwe ended. After UDI several parties tried to resolve the conflict and eventually the resolution came by highly unusual means, namely an election monitored by a British peacekeeping force. Why did the conflict end in this way? The reasons, it is submitted, can be found in the changing domestic, regional and international conditions in which the guerrilla warfare took place. These conditions are seen to fall into two eras, the UDI era before 1974 and the era after the Portuguese coup that was characterized by guerrilla warfare.

1. 1965-1973: An End to UDI?

In the era between 1965 and the Portuguese coup the possible ending of the conflict was subject to three interwoven sets of conditions, namely the international environment characterized by British efforts to end UDI as a legal question, the regional environment characterized by South African and, to a lesser extent, Portuguese support of the Smith regime, and the domestic environment marked by limited guerrilla warfare and the entrenchment of the Smith regime.

1.1. The International Environment

When UDI was announced, the parties most immediately involved in Zimbabwe disagreed on the nature of the conflict. For Britain, UDI was a constitutional problem brought on by a rebellious and reactionary white minority's illegal seizure of power. For the black nationalists, UDI and the question of illegality was yet another manifestation of their view that the Smith regime (and the other white regimes preceding it) ruled unjustly. The Smith regime's view contradicted charges of illegality and injustice; their self-conception was that they were the only government capable of exercising responsible government in Zimbabwe.

Britain claimed that the 1961 constitution did not grant independence, which could only come about through further negotiations based on the principles of: (1) unimpeded progress toward majority rule; (2) guarantees against retrogressive amendments of the 1961-constitution; (3) immediate improvements in the political status of the black population; (4) progress toward the abolition of racial discrimination; and (5) British satisfaction that any proposed basis for independence was acceptable to all the people of Zimbabwe.[1]

If the negotiations based on these five principles

[1] Southern Rhodesia - Document Relating to the Negotiations between the United Kingdom and Southern Rhodesian Governments, November 1963 to November 1965, Cmnd. 2807. Hereafter referred to as Cmnd. 2807.

were to fail and UDI be declared, the British government said it

> would be an open act of defiance and rebellion and it would be treasonable to take steps to give effect to it...would bring to an end relationship between her [Zimbabwe] and Britain, would cut her off from the rest of the Commonwealth, from most foreign governments, and from international organizations; would inflict disastrous economic damage upon her; and would leave her isolated and virtually friendless in a largely hostile continent.[2]

Although the British government thus threatened the Smith regime that a UDI would be met by a variety of punitive measures, it made it clear that it was powerless to prevent it. Specifically, the British government denied that it would use force as a preventive or punitive measure.[3]

While the British renunciation of the use of force was justifiably based on practical military[4] and political considerations, it was a poor bargaining ploy[5] that demonstrated the contradictory British position. On the one hand it claimed sovereignty in Zimbabwe but, on the

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[2]Written exchange between Wilson and Smith, October 24, 1964 in Ibid.

[3]Ibid., p. 132. For Wilson's views, see Harold Wilson, The Labour Government 1964-1970: A Personal Record (London: Michael Joseph, 1971). Force would only be used if requested by the British governor in the event of a collapse in the public security of Zimbabwe. Public opinion in Britain was also opposed to the use of force. Robert C. Good, UDI: The International Politics of the Rhodesian Rebellion (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1973), p. 62.

[4]See William Gutteridge, "Rhodesia: The Use of Military Force", The World Today 21(December 1966): 499-503 and P.C. Rao, "The Rhodesian Crisis and the Use of Force", Africa Quarterly 6 (January-March 1967): 285-296.

[5]Loney, pp. 133-136 and Robert Good, pp. 53-65.

other hand declared that it was powerless to exercise that sovereignty. The British assessment of its power lay with the economic and diplomatic isolation and pressure that it could bring to bear on the Smith regime; faced with economic chaos and diplomatic isolation, it was argued, the Smith regime would capitulate.

British reaction to UDI was prompt. Between November 1965 and January it adopted a variety of measures designed to exert pressure on the Smith regime. An order-in-council announced that Zimbabwe now was a crown colony, enabling the British parliament to govern or at least pass laws on Zimbabwe; Zimbabwe was banned from the sterling monetary area; no British investment capital would be made available to Zimbabwean firms; Britain banned all Zimbabwean imports and all trade with it was suspended; Zimbabwean import of oil was prohibited; and all Zimbabwean assets in Britain were frozen. Britain urged other states to do likewise and in November 1965 the United Nations Security Council adopted a voluntary embargo against Zimbabwe.[6] Collectively, Britain stated, these measures would end UDI "within weeks."[7] An end to UDI would, however, not be tantamount to majority rule; it would leave a white government in power but give it a constitutional guarantee that progress toward majority rule would be unimpeded.[8]

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[6]Security Council Resolutions 216 and 217 of 1965.

[7]Wilson, p. 196.

[8]Cmnd. 2807, pp. 125-142.

Britain's handlings of the UDI-question was harshly criticized by the Afro-Asian nations and other members of the United Nations. They argued that Britain should have pressed for a mandatory trade embargo. The question over UDI was not the first appearance of Zimbabwe on the UN agenda. In 1962, the UN Committee of 24 (the decolonization committee) created a special committee[9] to examine Zimbabwe's 1961 constitution, which found that it did not provide blacks with adequate representation. Later this committee ruled that Britain did have the constitutional authority to intervene in Zimbabwe and a General Assembly resolution requested Britain to restore the political rights of blacks in the territory. The Security Council also discussed the Zimbabwean question when it requested Britain not to transfer the military forces of the CAF to the Zimbabwean military forces, but Britain vetoed the resolution. As part of their strategy, black nationalist leaders actively participated in these UN debates, as did representatives of the Zimbabwean government, but Britain usually did not participate in the discussions. Britain's support of the voluntary trade embargo was thus a reversal of its stance but it still did not meet the expectations of other UN members, who proposed a mandatory embargo and/or the declaration of the Smith regime (and the situation

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[9]The Special Committee on the Situation with Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

in Zimbabwe) as a threat to international peace and consequently intervention by the UN or Britain.[10]

Britain used the UN as a secondary vehicle in its relations with Zimbabwe, usually when it wanted to publicly express its disapproval about its ongoing negotiations with the Smith regime. In December 1966, for example, Prime Minister Wilson and Smith met on the HMS Tiger to discuss the UDI question. These negotiations were based on the aforementioned firm principles but resulted in the addition of a sixth principle to the effect that minority (white) rights would be guaranteed. Under the Tiger proposals, a multiracial intermediate government headed by Smith would be formed, during which Britain would test the acceptability of the new proposals. If this arrangement broke down, Britain reserved the right to intervene. The Smith regime rejected these proposals and the Tiger meeting ended in failure.[11] In reaction, the British government did not veto a UN resolution imposing a mandatory embargo on select Zimbabwean goods and a resolution stating that Zimbabwe was a "threat to world peace." Britain thus could intercept oil shipments bound for Zimbabwe through the port of Beira in

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[10]See J. Leo Cefkin, "The Rhodesian Question at the United Nations", International Organization 22 (Summer 1968): 649-669.

[11]For the official correspondence of the Tiger proposals, see Rhodesia: Documents Relating to Proposals for a Settlement, 1966, Cmnd. 3171, 1968 and the Relations Between the Rhodesian Government and the United Kingdom, November 1965-December 1966 (Salisbury: Government Printer, 1966). For a discussion of the issues, see Robert Good, pp. 182-197.

Mozambique.[12] In May 1968 Britain again did not use her veto when the Security Council passed a mandatory comprehensive embargo. On this occasion Britain wished to express disapproval of the Smith regime's execution of five blacks in defiance of a royal pardon.[13] The hangings caused a rift in Britain's bipartisan approach to the UDI question and there was pressure on the Wilson government to abandon its position that independence could be granted with the Smith regime still in power. Some agreed that the British position should preclude independence without majority (i.e. no independence before majority rule or NIBMAR). In search of a quick solution, the British government softened its stance on the requirement that any solution should be subject to the population's approval as tested by the British. According to the meeting that took place on the HMS Fearless, such approval could take place under the oversight of the Smith regime.[14] The Smith regime again rejected the proposals, which led to the adoption of a NIBMAR policy by the British government.[15]

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[12]Security Council Resolutions 221 and 232 of 1966.

[13]Security Council Resolution 253 of 1968.

[14]See Rhodesia: Report on the Discussions Held on Board HMS Fearless, October 1968, Cmnd. 3793.

[15]Robert Good, pp. 201-271.

The failure of the Tiger- and more generous Fearless-proposals, the ineffectiveness of sanctions[16] and the 1968 executions robbed the British government of most of its negotiating options. Instead of negotiating from weakness, the Smith regime seemed to be negotiating from strength, expecting British concessions.[17] The reasons for this strength and confidence derived from certain regional and domestic conditions that, paradoxically,were also a source of potential weakness.

1.2. The Regional Environment

Prior to the Portuguese coup of April 1974, Zimbabwe was ensconced in the so-called "White Bastion" consisting of Zimbabwe and another white minority-ruled state (South Africa and its administration in Namibia), colonial territories (Angola and Mozambique), and small black-ruled states (Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland). Since these states were enmeshed in a network of long-standing social, economic and political ties, it produced a strong incentive to ameliorate tensions and South Africa, as the most powerful state in the

[16]The long-term effects of sanctions will be discussed later in this chapter.

[17]For a sympathetic view of the Smith regime's position, see Kenneth Young, Rhodesia and Independence: A Study in British Colonial Policy (London: Dent and Sons, 1969).

region, tended to set the tone and direction of most political developments.[18]

As previous chapters showed, much of the political development of Zimbabwe was premised on opposition and reaction to South Africa's wealth and its political directions, especially the rise of Afrikaner nationalism.[19] With its foreign policy emphasis of legalism and painstaking conformity to international custom,[20] South African officials were initially displeased by UDI but they stated that they would not apply pressure on the Smith regime through, for example, sanctions. As far as South Africa was concerned, the dispute should be settled between Britain and Zimbabwe

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[18]The best study of the tension-reducing features of the southern African region remains Kenneth W. Grundy, Confrontation and Accommodation, especially p. 1-117.

[19]These include the initial settlement of whites in Zimbabwe in hope of a "second Reef"; imperial opposition to the late 1890s, the intended incorporation of Zimbabwe into South Africa and its effects on land policies, and opposition to Afrikaner nationalism and the National Party regime in South Africa.

[20]See John E. Spence, Republic Under Pressure: A Study of South African Foreign Policy (London: Oxford University Press, 1965); Edwin S. Munger, Notes on the Formation of South African Foreign Policy (Pasadena, California: Castle Press, 1965); Gerrit C. Olivier, Suid-Afrika se Buitelandse Beleid (Pretoria: Academica, 1977); and James Barber, South Africa's Foreign Policy, 1945-1970 (London: Oxford University Press, 1973).

in a friendly and realistic manner.[21] South Africa nevertheless came to regard a white-ruled Zimbabwe as an essential buffer between itself and hostile and possible guerrilla actions from black African states. Thus South Africa's active support of the Smith regime was created by its post-1960 military-security concerns[22] and, in the ensuing years, this support became the single most important factor in the survival of the Smith regime. South African support took many official and private forms. As previously noted, South Africa sent a para-military contingent that played a critical role in the Smith regime's security operations, sent equipment and contributed to Zimbabwe's defense budget.[23] South Africa also maintained an accredited diplomatic office in Zimbabwe and continually made public and private statements of political

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[21]Grundy, pp. 256-257. Grundy cites South African officials who describe the Smith regime as "second-rate political blacks" and "cowboys" who risk provocative and destabilizing actions in a delicate environment. Ibid., p. 256.

[22]Christopher Hill, "UDI and South African Foreign Policy", Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies 7 (July 1969): 96-103.

[23]These contributions were not revealed in official data and its extent thus remains a matter of speculation. Estimates of the para-military contingent is modestly set at 1,000 men (Nelson, p. 347), while others set it at between 5,000 and 10,000 men by 1973 (SIPRI, p. 109). Budget support is estimated at approximately 50 percent of the total budget. Grundy, "Social Costs", 456.

support.[24] Zimbabwean consumers were supplied by South African manufacturers, trade[25] and technical cooperation continued[26] and Zimbabwean firms continued to have access to South African capital.[27] Finally, Zimbabwe's exports made use of South Africa's railways, roads and ports.[28]

In addition to South African support, the Smith regime relied on Portuguese support. One form of support was military cooperation, which allowed the Zimbabwean and Portuguese counter-guerrilla forces to cross the border between Zimbabwe and Mozambique in pursuit of guerrillas.[29] Zimbabwe also relied on the roads and railways of Mozambique to export goods through Beira and Maputo which, in view of the congestion of South African ports, provided a valuable alternative

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[24]There was no known formal military alliance between Zimbabwe and South Africa (and Portugal). When questioned about such a possibility, the South African premier replied: "...good friends do not need a pact. Good friends know what their duty is if a neighbour's house is on fire." Grundy, Confrontation and Accommodation, p. 222.

[25]See Adrian Guelke, "Africa as a Market for South African Goods", The Journal of Modern African Studies 12 (March 1974): 69-98. Imports from South Africa rose from Rh $527 million in 1965 to Rh $121.5 million in 1971 (out of a trade total of Rh $282.4 million). Ibid., p. 76.

[26]John Sprack, Rhodesia: South Africa's Sixth Province (London: International Defence and Aid Fund, 1974), pp. 51-61.

[27]Capital movements were faciliated by South African firms' subsidiaries in Zimbabwe.

[28]Grundy, Confrontation and Accommodation, pp. 49-59.

[29]Wilkenson, pp. 273-274.

outlet. Most importantly, Zimbabwe relied on oil imports from the pipelines in Beira.[30]

By 1973 Zimbabwe's reliance on South Africa in particuticular reached a point at which it was described as a "sixth province" of South Africa.[31] This economic and political dependency revealed the weaknesses of the Smith regime. While there was no public criticism from the South African government, much of the military and industrial equipment sent to Zimbabwean manufacturers found its access to the South African and Zambian market restricted. South African firms did not re-invest their profits within Zimbabwe and the trade agreement between the two countries gave liberal terms of trade to South Africa.[32] Moreover, when the Smith regime closed its Zambian border, the South African premier disavowed complicity with the action and implied that it was provocative and unnecessary.[33] This subtle criticism can best be seen

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[30]When Britain patrolled the Mozambique Channel, oil reached Zimbabwe via South Africa.

[31]Sprack, passim. See also the annual reports of the Security Council Committee Established in Pursuance of Resolution 253 (1968) Concerning the Question of Southern Africa.

[32]Sprack, pp. 39-51.

[33]South African newspapers criticized the closure as "overhasty", "rash" and urged South African policy-makers to recognize that "Rhodesia's interests are not necessarily ours." Kenneth Good,"Settler Colonialism in Rhodesia", pp. 33-34.

against the background of a shift in South Africa's foreign policy. To break out of its own isolation, South Africa launched an "outward-looking" policy to seek a political accommodation with, in particular, hostile black African nations.[34]

Since UDI the nations of Africa had been unremittently hostile to the Smith regime on the grounds that it prevented "national self-determination" or constituted a "flagrant violation of the inalienable rights of the legitimate inhabitants" and practiced racism of "doctrines of human inequality."[35] Consequently African nations were dedicated to the liberation of Zimbabwe and channelled their efforts to that and through the UN (as previously discussed), as well as the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the British Commonwealth.

At the founding of the OAU in 1963 it was agreed that the OAU itself would not be responsible for the liberation of Zimbabwe. The OAU would simply provide aid through a

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[34]See Robert Molteno, Africa and South Africa: The Implications of South Africa's "Outward-Looking" Policy (London: Africa Bureau, 1971).

[35]Moses E. Akpan, "African Goals and Strategies Toward Southern Africa", African Studies Review 14 (September 1971): 244-246. The Smith regime was accused of a variety of excesses and transgressions. Regardless of whether it was guilty of those, it would be naive to conclude that Black African states are united in support of liberation in Southern Africa because they are united in their commitment to human rights. Many of the states that have been very strong in supporting

Special Fund supported by the contributions of African (and other) nations and create a united liberation front by reconciling movements through an African Liberation Committee (ALC).[36] From the beginning the liberation effort was plagued by a variety of problems. First, states did not adequately contribute to the Special Fund, either because they were unwilling to do so or because they objected to the ALC's use of funds.[37] Second, the ALC's membership increased steadily as those states who did contribute to the Special Fund demanded membership in the ALC which turned concerted action into a series of compromises to suit members. Third, events like the Nigerian civil war divided the OAU and some states resigned from the OAU. The consequence of these problems was that African states preferred to bypass the ALC and to deal directly with the liberation movements and to provide aid in non-monetary form, such as accommodating refugees and providing instructors, facilities and equipment. The most likely

Southern African liberation, ranging from Amin's Uganda to Sekou Toure's Guinea, are guilty of gross violations of human rights in their own societies. It would be almost as naive to assert that Black African States are committed to the principle of "majority rule", if by that is meant a system of government that allows the majority of the people periodically to choose their own rulers in free elections. Ali A. Mazrui and David F. Gordon, "Independent African States and the Struggle for Southern Africa" in John Seiler (ed.), Southern Africa Since the Portuguese Coup (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1980), p. 185.

[36]See Cervenka, The Unfinished Quest for Unity: Africa and the OAU, pp. 50-58 on the organization of the ALC.

[37]Kapungu, "The OAU's Support For the Liberation of Southern Africa", pp. 142-143.

contributors were those states that were close to Zimbabwe in a geographic and cultural sense, were ideologically sympathetic to particular groups and whose leaders' personalities suited such initiatives.[38]

The centrifugal forces within the OAU and the large role that individual states consequently played in aid to nationalist groups in Zimbabwe complicated the contribution of African nations to the overthrow of the Smith regime. On the one hand, they provided unflagging moral support at a time when these groups were ineffective but, on the other hand, they failed to unite rival groups whose very rivalry contributed to their ineffectiveness. Indeed, both ZAPU and ZANU were recognized by the OAU and thus both were eligible for aid from the OAU (and other nations).

Besides the OAU and the UN, some African nations used the Commonwealth to press for the overthrow of the Smith regime and majority rule. Since the British government claimed that Zimbabwe was a colonial territory, executive authority in Zimbabwe now was vested in the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations. More importantly, a Commonwealth Sanctions Committee (later renamed the Commonwealth Committee on South Africa) was formed to monitor sanction; it sponsored

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[38]Vincent B. Khapoya, The Politics of Decision: A Comparative Study of African Policy Toward the Liberation Movements, University of Denver, Monograph Series in World Affairs, 12 (1974-1975), pp. 26-29.

most of the resolutions at the UN. Indeed, the Commonwealth Sanctions Committee became the institution which linked African and other Commonwealth members with British initiatives and the opposition expressed to initiatives, such as the Fearless proposals, often led to changes in British policy.[39]

Thus the prevailing conditions in the regional environment between 1965 and the Portuguese coup supported the survival of the Smith regime. Black African nations provided valuable moral and non-monetary support to ZAPU and ZANU, but also failed to unite and hence contributed to the ineffectiveness of these groups. African nations developed an important channel of access to British initiatives through the Commonwealth but, as long as the British initiatives were unsuccessful, the access did not lead to concrete results. Zimbabwe also became progressively dependent on South Africa and, by the end of 1973 the Smith regime's survival seemed vulnerable only in the unlikely event that South Africa renounced its support.

1.3. The Domestic Environment

The Smith regime operated first under an independence or UDI constitution. It replaced the 1961 constitution as the queen was substituted with an "officer administering the

[39]Robert Good, pp. 166-177.

government" (Clifford Dupont) and privy council authority with the Zimbabwean High Court. The Constitutional Council, which monitored civil rights violations, was retained but became an all-white body. This UDI question could be amended by two-thirds legislative vote.[40]

Following the failure of the Tiger proposals, the Smith regime appointed the Whaley Commission to advise it on a new constitution for Zimbabwe.[41] The Whaley report was completed by April 10, 1968 and rejected both on definite white and black rule; instead, it proposed a multi-racial legislature at best half controlled by blacks, i.e. eventual "parity."[42] The proposal for parity met with considerable opposition, particularly from within Rhodesian Front (RF) ranks,[43] and was eventually abandoned. It was replaced by a constitution developed by the RF, approved by the electorate in a referendum in June 1969 and by the legislature in November 1969, and came into effect in April 1970. This constitution enlarged

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[40]The UDI constitution closely resembled the 1961 constitution. See the "Constitution of Rhodesia 1965" in Palley, pp. 751-759.

[41]The existing 1961 and 1965 constitutions were found unsuitable because they failed to provide a suitable basis for negotiations. The Whaley Commission had a multi-racial composition, one black member was Charles Mzingeli Moyo, former leader of RICO. R. Hodder-Williams, "Rhodesia's Search For A Constitution: Or, Whatever Happened To Whaley?" African Affairs 69 (July 1970): 217-224.

[42]See the Report of the Constitutional Committee 1968 (Salisbury: Government Printer, 1968), The Whaley Report.

[43]Hodder-Williams, pp. 225-235.

the legislative assembly to 66 seats of which 50 were filled by whites. The remaining 16 members were black, elected by two rolls: a lower roll returned 8 members while the other 8 were elected by traditional black authorities (chiefs and headmen). A second house was established (a Senate), exercising delaying powers by 10 whites, 10 black chiefs and three members appointed by the president who, under Zimbabwe's new republican status, was the head of state. Thus racially segregated voting rolls were established, and the Constitutional Council abolished.[44]

The RF dominated the legislature and executive of Zimbabwe, winning all white seats in the general elections of May 1965 and April 1970. RF organization, as stated before, developed from a populist philosophy that emphasized party control over the legislature, executive and bureaucracy. Each of the 50 constituencies contained about 1,500 voters, of which about 400 were members of 3-4 local RF branches. Local branches were dominated by non-members of parliament, who elected members to the annual divisional and national RF congresses. The function of the divisional congresses was to filter and coordinate proposals from local branches, which reach the party's executive through formal proposals or

[44]See the Proposals for a New Constitution of Rhodesia (Salisbury: Government Printer, 1969) and the Constitution of Rhodesia (Salisbury Government Printer, 1969).

through divisional leaders who have permanent membership in national party institutions. The function of the national party congress was to elect national party executives once to set subscription fees. The central national party institution was the National Executive, composed of 10 members of parliament and 50 members elected by the divisional and national congresses. The National Committee met quarterly to oversee the operations of the cabinet, and several subcommittees were formed to oversee the operations of the legislature and bureaucracy. Thus the RF was in fact an organizational parallel of the government.[45]

Within the government and the RF organization, two features were evident. First, rural constituencies and interests were overrepresented within the parliament, the RF caucus membership contained a 35 percent farmer component; by law, at least 18 of the white constituencies were required to be rural and many members of the executive were full or parttime farmers. With the RF, there is a similar bias. Rural branches outnumber urban ones by 102 to 63, chairmen of urban branches often were closely linked to the farming community, and about one-third of the National Executive were members of rural branches. Second, the cabinet and

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[45]There are other national party bodies, such as the National Standing Committee (a smaller replica of the National Executive), the Party Finance Committee (responsible for party financial management) and the secretariat. Bowman, pp. 92-97.

executive had little discretionary power. The defeat of the Tiger and Fearless proposals and the Whaley report all indicate that Smith was largely deprived of decision-making initiative. Indeed, Smith represented himself in negotiations as the captive of extremist institutions and opinion at home.[46]

In the period between 1965 and the Portuguese coup, the RF overwhelmed the political parties and forces of moderation. The UFP was eclipsed in the 1965 election. Subsequently a Center Party was formed by remnants of opposition groups and opposed the 1969 constitution; one important supporter, Major General Putterhill (a former commander of the Zimbabwean armed forces) argued that it would increase guerrilla activity-and was attacked by Smith as an "extreme leftist."[47] By 1973 the most powerful pressure group in Zimbabwe was the bureaucracy. Between 1964 and 1969 public service employees increased in number from 40,000 to 78,000. White central government employees amounted to 24,000 by 1973 who, with their spouses, comprised one-third of the white electorate. There were 13,000 tenured positions in the central bureaucracy; of these only 829 were filled

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[46]Ibid., pp. 97-109 and Hodder-Williams, pp. 228-235. The British government also regarded Smith as a moderate. Robert Good, pp. 186-193 and 262-265.

[47]Bowman, p. 139.

by blacks, as compared to about 1,700 in 1965. Blacks were better represented in untenured positions, with 23,000 of the 35,000 positions filled by blacks.[48]

The control established over the governmental machinery and the press[49] provided the Smith regime with wide-ranging means to respond to the guerrillas and to British proposals. Prior to 1974, moreover, there was little indication that the experience of guerrilla warfare had produced serious political divisions within the RF and the white population at large. It was nevertheless clear that there were practical difficulties in defending UDI, two of which require elaboration.

1.3.1. Sanctions

As previously discussed, the Zimbabwean economy was by 1965 diversified, but each economic sector was vulnerable. Agricultural output was dominated by whites who produced for export and, as the world market fluctuated, so did the government's foreign exchange reservoir. With regard to manufacturing, its contribution to the GDP increased, but it was geared to a small and relatively unsophisticated

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[48]Nelson, p. 156.

[49]Ibid., pp. 225-234 and Elaine Windrich, "Rhodesian Censorship: The Role of the Media in the Making of a One-Party State", pp. 523-534.

domestic market; it produced a limited range of low quality goods for the black market. High quality goods and industrial equipment had to be imported. Over the first nine years of UDI, several changes occurred in this economic structure.

First, the effort to counter sanctions brought the economy under full and direct state management. After 1964 exports and imports were managed by the National Export Promotion Council (NEPCO), later called Universal Exports (UNIVEX), who were assisted by four committees, representing commerce, industry, agriculture and mining. Together these organizations limited imports through, for example, quotas, import ceilings and short-term licenses, encouraged production by selected firms, stockpiled goods, and intervened in the internal labor and fiscal affairs of foreign and domestic firms. The government also placed a ban on revelations or any public information about the state of the economy under the Official Secrets Act of 1919 and the Emergency Powers (Espionage) Regulations of 1969. Firms' compliance with regulations was ensured by the Emergency Powers (Control of Corporations) Regulations and the Emergency Powers (Industrial Relations) Regulations of 1965. The Smith regime repudiated all of Zimbabwe's debt to the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (the World Bank) and conducted agreements with South Africa and

Portugal to guarantee regional trade and access to ports, roads and rail facilities. Finally, the regime developed a network of trade commissioners who established covert economic ties with other nations.[50]

Second, sanctions and the effort to counter them resulted in further diversification. The ban on tobacco exports to Britain produced a major slump in the value of agricultural produce; tobacco production dropped from 246 million pounds in 1965 to 145 million pounds in 1972, forcing 50 percent of the white farmers to either go out of business or to change their crop production. The result was the diversification of agricultural production as tobacco exports were surpassed by especially cotton and sugar. Even with tobacco in a slump, the value of agriculture's contribution to the GDP rose from Rh $128 million in 1965, to Rh $218 million in 1972. While agriculture's share of the GDP declined slightly, from 18.4 percent in 1965 to 17.3 percent in 1972,[51] that of manufacturing increased form 19.4 percent in 1965 to 23.2 percent in 1972. Manufacturing's expansion was not primarily due to the expansion of existing firms; rather, it was due to the government's program of

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[50]For a good account, see Leonard T. Kapungu, The United Nations and Economic Sanctions Againsh Rhodesia (Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1973), pp. 103-122. See also Stephen Park, Business as Usual: Transactions Violating Rhodesian Sanctions (Washington, D.C.; Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1973), pp. 1-33.

[51]Nelson, pp. 250-251.

import substitution on the basis of "one product, one manufacturer."[52] Mining output's share of the GDP declined slightly (from 6.9 percent in 1969 to 5.7 percent in 1972), but the value of it increased dramatically from Rh $48.3 million in 1965 to Rh $72.2 million in 1972. One reason for this rise in value was that the mining industry was dominated by multinational firms and they had little difficulty in evading sanctions through parent companies.[53]

Third, Zimbabwe's trading patterns shifted as trade with the former Central African Federation partners (Zambia and Malawi) and Britain was replaced with trade with South Africa. Imports from South Africa rose from Rh $54.9 million in 1965 to Rh $121.0 million in 1973, and exports to South Africa rose from 10.2 percent of total trade to 21.1 percent in 1972.[54] British trade with Zimbabwe dropped sharply as Zimbabwe was replaced by Zambia and Malawi as Britain's central African trading partners.[55]

Most importantly, Zimbabwe was able to sustain

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[52]Ibid., p. 241.

[53]Ibid., p. 238.

[54]Guelke, p. 76.

[55]Michael Williams and Michael Parsonage, "Britain and Rhodesia: The Economic Background to Sanctions", World Today 29 (September 1973): 382-383.

an average growth rate of 6.5 percent between 1965 and 1972,[56] contradicting the predictions that sanctions would cause economic chaos--and political concessions. The growth rate led some observers to conclude that sanctions had a stimulating effect on the Zimbabwean economy, providing proof of the ability of a state-managed economy to sustain growth under conditions of economic isolation by import substitution. Under those conditions the Smith regime obviously would make no political concessions.[57] Other observers argued differently, noting that the diversification of the Zimbabwean economy (not state management) allowed it to withstand sanctions, but that genuine growth was inhibited by restrictions on exports and the scarcity of foreign capital and investment.[58] Since there was a shortage of investment capital, moreover, the state made allocations on a priority basis to the sectors most productive in an immediate sense, like mining and manufacturing, with the result that sectors less profitable (like roads and railways) received inadequate funds and deteriorated.[59] There were

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[56]Nelson, p. 246.

[57]Timothy Curtin and David Murray, Economic Sanctions and Rhodesia (London: Institute of Economic Affairs, 1967) and T.R.C. Curtin, "Rhodesian Economic Development Under Sanctions and 'The Long Haul'", African Affairs 67 (April 1968): 100-110.

[58]R.T. McKinnel, "Assessing the Economic Impact of Sanctions Against Rhodesia", African Affairs 67 (July 1968): 227-232.

[59]Nelson, p. 257.

also indications that sanctions produced negative trends in state financial management. With limited domestic savings, a shortage of foreign capital and a narrow tax base, the government could not meet its financial obligations as Zimbabwe's major investor and was forced to borrow money. Thus the public debt of Zimbabwe increased by 40 percent between 1965 and 1972.[60]

In economic terms sanctions thus had a mixed effect, but overall they tended to accentuate the structural features of the Zimbabwean economy, such as economic diversification, state intervention and dependency on exports (particularly to South Africa). The intended short-term political effects were most disappointing. Although public debt rose and some sectors of the economy, especially its infrastructure, deteriorated these difficulties were insufficient to cause a change in the political directions of the Smith regime.

1.3.2. The Smith Regime and Black Zimbabweans

Under UDI the Smith regime's policy toward the blacks underwent three changes: the political role of the traditional-tribal authorities were upgraded, a new land act was passed, and segregationist practices increased.

With regard to the role of the traditional-tribal

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[60] Ibid., pp. 260-261.

authorities, both the 1965 and 1969 constitutions gave them representation in the national legislature, as they were viewed as the representatives of blacks as a whole. In addition, the local power of those figures were increased. In 1966 the chiefs became "peace officers" with legal discretionary powers over local matters of law and order, including the power of arrest. In 1969 the African Law and Tribal Act extended this legal power as chiefs presided over most local civil and some criminal cases. Chiefs' powers to allocate land were restored by the Tribal Trust Land Act of 1967. The number of black local councils increased steadily to about 153 in 1972 under the aegis of the community development approach of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, who created approximately 265 ad hoc bodies to assist the councils in local projects.[61]

By 1972 government expenditure on community development amounted to 8 percent of the GDP.[62] Most of these funds went to civil administration; only 2 percent went towards black education. The government was chronically short of funds for black educational expansion to meet the needs of the black population, of which 50 percent is under the age of 15. This forced a reduction in the years required

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[61]Holleman, pp. 316-357.

[62]Nelson, p. 258.

for primary education and a cutback in the funding for missionary schools; finally, the government made black education a responsibility of the local councils, which were required to raise their own funds.[63]

In 1969, the Land Apportionment Act was replaced by a Land Tenure Act, which divided the total land area into African areas of about 46.6 percent of the total land[64] and white areas, also of about 46.6 percent of the total land. National Land (wildlife reserves and forests) accounted for the remaining portion. The previous category of Unreserved Land, open to all races, was eliminated.[65] In terms of the amount of land allocated, the Land Tenure Act of 1969 did not bring any fundamental changes in the patterns established by the Land Apportionment Act, but the regime was more determined to remove, by all the means available, blacks living in white areas.[66] Moreover, there were indications that the blacks' lands were viewed as potentially autonomous economic-political units with, for example,

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[63]Lester K. Weiner, "African Education in Rhodesia since UDI", Africa Today 14 (Special Issue 1967): 14-15.

[64]Reserves accounted for about 41.3 percent of the black land areas and the purchase areas for about 3.8 percent. Kay, Rhodesia: A Human Geography, p. 50.

[65]Ibid.

[66]One example of this determination was the removal of the Tangwena branch of the Mashona.

separate legislative assemblies, and developed by an industrial development council. This led some observers to conclude that the Smith regime had embarked on a policy similar to South Africa's separate development/bantustan policy.[67]

Finally, the Smith regime's policy toward urban blacks also invited comparisons with South African race policy. The Municipal Amendment Act of 1967 authorized local town councils to segregate public recreational facilities and other conveniences. Under the Residential Property Owners' (Protection) Bill of 1970, residents could have their residential area declared as "exclusive", i.e. blacks and multi-racial suburbs could be prevented. Under the policy of urban renewal, black small businessmen were evicted from decayed urban areas. Multi-racial hotels found their licenses not renewed and multi-racial urban schools were closed.[68]

Between 1965 and the Portuguese coup the environment within Zimbabwe thus witnessed the demise of moderating forces in the white political spectrum. The RF with its strong rural component dominated public life and the information about it by centralized government control and a well-organized party of the populist mold. As regards race

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[67]Sir Robert Tredgold quoted by Jack Halpern, "Polarization in Rhodesia: State, Church and Peoples", World Today 27 (January 1971): 5.

[68]Bowman, pp. 143-144.

policy, there was little sign of moderating influences, whether in the form of "winning hearts and minds", "removing the causes of the discontent" or any other compromises. The changes that did occur seem rather to have accentuated existing problems, such as racial discrimination, educational opportunities for blacks and land segregation. Sanctions did produce neither political concessions nor political divisions. However, sanctions did have effects, in that they deepened the structural features of the economy. Most importantly, they revealed that, although the Smith regime used all the means at its disposal to maintain itself (i.e. total defense) its means were limited and unevenly dispersed. There was a shortage of foreign exchange, capital and investment, public debt rose and the priority planning it produced deprived certain economic and geographic areas of public funds.

2. 1974-1979: The End of Guerrilla Warfare

The second era of the Zimbabwean conflict was initiated by the Portuguese coup of 1974 and ended in the latter half of 1979 with the Lancaster House conference and a cease-fire. The events set in motion by the Portuguese coup brought dramatic international, regional and domestic changes, which together led to the negotiated ending to the conflict.

2.1. The International Environment

Prior to the Portuguese coup British initiatives led to an agreement with the Smith regime, but the subsequent test of black opinion by the Pearce Commission met with opposition led by the ANC of Bishop Abel Muzorewa and the Reverend Canaan Banana and were defeated. This led the British government to conclude that it could not resolve the differences between the Smith regime and black opposition. A settlement, the British Foreign Secretary told the House of Commons, was now up to the Zimbabwean groups themselves; settlement proposals would be suspended until a "better climate" developed. In the meantime, sanctions would continue as an "atmosphere conducive to discussion", as well as ministerial-level contact.

Even when the Portuguese coup occurred, the British policy continued to be one of avoiding any new initiatives. The Wilson government did announce, however, that sanctions would be increased and that the basis of the previous negotiations--the six principles--were void. The onus in reaching a new settlement would henceforth rest with the Smith regime and Britain would only regard the dispute as resolved if it were convinced of black acceptance.[69] Between 1974 and

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[69]Previously the (Conservative) British government had blamed the nationalist leaders for the breakdown of the 1971 settlement. See Robert Good, pp. 292-327. See also, Rhodesia: Proposals for a Settlement, Cmnd. 4835 and Rhodesia: Proposals for a Settlement of the Commission on Rhodesian Opinion under the Rt. Hon. the Lord Pearce, Cmnd. 4964.

1976, the British policy remained one of "no initiatives" as South African policy toward the Smith regime changed, Zambia exerted greater pressure for a settlement, as the Smith regime released the detained nationalist leaders and negotiated with the ANC and Nkomo, and as guerrilla actions increased. When the Smith regime proposed a bipartisan British panel to devise a settlement, the British government replied that they would only consent to a new constitutional conference if the Smith regime agreed to the principle of majority rule and held elections for it within an 18-month to two-year period. Smith rejected the proposals as "extreme".[70]

With the British policy options apparently exhausted, the United States for the first time took an active interest in the Zimbabwean situation.[71] In view of the

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[70]"Not Rhodesia Again?" The Economist, March 27, 1976: 12-13 and Martin and Johnson, pp. 229-230.

[71]UDI occurred in the period when the United States was engaged in the Vietnam War and a gentleman's agreement existed between the British and American governments to the effect that the U.S. would support British actions in Zimbabwe and in return receive British support for American actions in Vietnam. The U.S. did express its support for United Nations sanctions by Executive Order 1132 and called on firms to comply with the ban on trade with Zimbabwe. The Nixon administration shifted the emphasis of American policy and under Secretary of State Kissinger the National Security Council produced a memorandum (NSSM 39) on policy options in southern Africa. As recommended by NSSM 39, the Nixon administration "partially relaxed" its measures against the Smith regime (although it closed its consulate in Salisbury in March 1970) and planned on backing away from sanctions, especially those related to strategic

termination of Portuguese rule in southern Africa, the presence of Cuban troops in Angola and South Africa's policy changes, the Ford administration announced a change in the previous policy. Speaking in Lusaka in April 1976, Secretary of State Kissinger stated that American policy henceforth supported meaningful and negotiated change in Zimbabwe. Kissinger repudiated any support for the Smith regime, proposed progress toward majority rule on a strict timetable, and pledged to protect minority rights, provide technical and economic assistance to Zimbabwe during a transition period and assistance to refugees. Subsequently Kissinger arranged a series of meetings with the leaders of Zimbabwe, South Africa and Angola, Mozambique, Botswana, Tanzania and Zambia (the frontline states)--which on September 24, 1976 led to the Smith regime's acceptance of black majority rule under a five-point plan.[72]

minerals. The latter goal resulted in the Byrd Amendment to the Military Procurement Act of 1971, allowing the import of Zimbabwean chrome. The Byrd Amendment was criticized by independent African nations and became symbolic of the United States' tacit support of the Smith regime. See Anthony Lake, The "Tar Baby" Option: American Policy Toward Southern Rhodesia (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976); W.A.E. Skurnik, "Recent United States Policy in Africa", Current History 64 (March 1973): 97-135; and Bruce Oudes, "Southern Africa Policy Watershed", Africa Report 19 (November-December 1974): 46-50.

[72]The five points were: the Smith regime's agreement to majority rule within two years; the establishment of a multiracial Council of State (with a white chairman); the creation of a Council of Ministers (with a black majority and chairman); an end to sanctions; and a ceasefire. Elaine Windrich, "Rhodesia: The Road from Luanda to Geneva", World Today 33 (March 1977): 107-109.

The American initiative floundered, however, when the Kissinger proposals were rejected by the frontline states, who called for renewed British participation in the settlement. Britain responded by proposing a constitutional conference attended by all parties concerned. This took place in Geneva in October, 1976, attended by Smith, Nkomo and Mugabe (united in the Patriotic Front), and Sithole and Muzorewa (as representatives of a United African National Council). The Geneva conference failed to produce an agreement and was finally adjourned in December 1976.[73] The failure of the separate initiatives of the United States and Britain led to a coordinated Anglo-American effort at settlement. Their proposal was rejected, however, by the Smith regime and the frontline states.[74]

Having admitted the possibility of a black-ruled Zimbabwe, the Smith regime wished to have "moderate" black leaders (i.e. not Mugabe and the ZANU component of the Patriotic Front) installed as the future leaders of Zimbabwe. The Smith regime thus accused the Anglo-American plan as a device to bring Mugabe to power and, when the initiative failed, announced the convening of an internal constitutional

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[73] Ibid.

[74] For details of this plan, see Legum, Western Crisis, pp. 201-208.

conference. This constitutional conference resulted in an "internal settlement", signed by Muzorewa, Sithole and Chief Jeremiah Chirau (a traditional chief and leader of the Zimbabwe United Peoples' Organization or ZUPO) in March 1978. Under the internal agreement the Zimbabwean cabinet was replaced by an Executive Council, consisting of the black leaders and Smith, and the legislature was enlarged to a 100-seat lower house (with 72 black seats) and a 30-seat upper house (with 20 black seats). Elections were held on two occasions, the first an all-white one which approved the settlement and the second an April 1979 election in which Muzorewa's UANC won the majority. Under the internal settlement and the Muzorewa regime the Land Tenure Act was abolished, a minimum wage policy adopted, educational segregation prohibited and Zimbabwe's name changed (from Rhodesia) to Zimbabwe-Rhodesia.[75]

The internal settlement led to the return of many of the exiled nationalist leaders. It also received support from abroad. In the United States the Carter administration was pressured to recognize the Muzorewa regime and end sanctions.[76] Some British observers assessed the 1979 elections

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[75]See Rotberg. Suffer the Future, pp. 266-268.

[76]"Shift U.S. Policy on Rhodesia?" U.S. News and World Report, October 30, 1978, pp. 31-32; "Let's Make a Deal", Newsweek, October 30, 1978, pp. 41-42.

as "free and fair" and the newly-elected Thatcher government hinted that it would recognize the Muzorewa regime and lift sanctions.[77] At the Commonwealth conference in August 1979, however, the Thatcher government, under pressure from Commonwealth members, suggested that a test should be devised that could electorally assess the claims of the Muzorewa regime and its rivals, and demanded that the Zimbabwean groups participate in a constitutional conference in September 1979 at the Lancaster House in London. Pressured by, respectively, the frontline states and South Africa, the Patriotic Front and the Muzorewa regime participated in the Lancaster House conference and signed a set of agreements that drastically revised the constitution of the internal settlement, introduced a ceasefire and scheduled elections monitored by a Commonwealth Monitoring Force. In the interim period Britain would be responsible for public security.[78]

From 1974 to 1979 British policy thus changed from a stance of "no initiatives" to one that exercised the responsibilities it claimed when it declared Zimbabwe to be a crown colony. Similarly, the Smith regime moved from a rejection of majority rule to its acceptance. Two questions

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[77] R. W. Apple, Jr., "Tory Recognition of Rhodesia A Possibility", New York Times, April 8, 1979, p. 3.

[78] Rotberg, Suffer the Future, pp. 272-275. See also Henry Wiseman and Alastair M. Taylor, From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe: The Politics of Transition (New York: Pergamon, 1981) pp. 3-44.

can therefore be raised: Why did the Smith regime accept majority rule in 1976 and why did the conflict end by an election when ZAPU and ZANU (the Patriotic Front) guerrilla actions were expanding? These questions can best be addressed by noting (a) the role of the regional patrons in the conflict and (b) the role of exhaustion in the policies of the regional patrons and the Smith regime.

2.2. The Regional Environment

As discussed earlier, South Africa became the regional pattern of the Smith regime, while the black African nations close to Zimbabwe became the patrons of ZAPU and ZANU. As regional conditions changed, these regional patrons shifted the tone and direction of the Zimbabwean conflict.

The Portuguese coup of 1974 radically altered the role of Zimbabwe in South Africa's strategic thinking. A FRELIMO government in Mozambique was more than a year away, but South Africa wanted an amicable relationship with Mozambique to guarantee its access to Mozambican ports, the labor supply of southern Mozambique and the electricity of the Cabora Bassa Dam. Contrastingly, Zimbabwe's liability increased. ZANU's cooperation with FRELIMO would (it was accurately feared) lead to guerrilla infiltration into Zimbabwe, Mozambique could close its border with Zimbabwe and hence increase Zimbabwe's reliance on South Africa's already congested railways and ports, and Mozambique could

participate in sanctions. Under these conditions, the Smith regime could only survive if South Africa increased its support--at a time when the rationale for it disappeared. Instead, there now was a strong incentive for South Africa to pressure the Smith regime into a political settlement as a means to stabilize relations between South Africa and black southern African states.[79]

Publicly there was no sign of a South Africa-Zimbabwe rift. South Africa signed a new trade agreement with Zimbabwe, maintained its para-military contingent and completed a railroad linking Rutenga with the Beitbridge-Johannesburg line (in the event that the Umtali-Beira line was closed). Privately, however, South Africa and Zambia devised a "detente scenario" for southern Africa whereby South Africa would pressure Smith into a political settlement and withdraw its para-military contingent. The scenario would include a constitutional conference, in preparation for which Smith would release the detained nationalist leaders, and a ceasefire. Following public disclosure, the Victoria Falls conference did take place, Smith released the detained nationalist leaders, and a ceasefire was announced.[80]

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[79]Colin Legum (ed.), Africa Contemporary Record: Annual Survey and Documents 1974-1975 (London: Rex Collings, 1975), pp. A3-A15.

[80]Ibid.

The detente scenario stalled as political disunity between the nationalists persisted, guerrilla attacks increased, and the release of detained leaders stopped. South Africa's policy change nevertheless had critical results: the nationalists' top political leaders were released and the South African para-military contingent was withdrawn by August 1975, opening a widening public rift between South Africa and Zimbabwe. In October 1975 Smith criticized South Africa's detente effort as futile and argued that it caused Muzorewa to balk at an internal settlement. Premier Vorster demanded an apology, which Smith made publicly.[81] Between August 1975 and August 1976 the South African incentive to abandon political support of the Smith regime increased. In August 1975 South African forces entered Angola on the presumption that they would receive American support but, while the United States criticized the Cuban presence, its support was not forthcoming. South African troops eventually withdrew under mounting international and domestic[82] criticism. In July 1976 South Africa came under further pressure

[81]Martin and Johnson, p. 237.

[82]See Kenneth W. Grundy, Defense Legislation and Communal Politics: The Evolution of a White South African Nation as Reflected in the Controversy Over the Assignment of Armed Forces Abroad, 1912-1976 (Ohio University: Papers in International Studies, No. 3, 1978).

when the Soweto riots erupted. For South Africa a "worst case" scenario was clearly at hand: the Cuban presence raised the possibility of a conventional attack from external sources, without western support for South Africa, and combined with a Soweto-like domestic uprising.[83]

South Africa's own difficulties thus discouraged a supportive role for the Smith regime when the Kissinger initiative took place in the latter half of 1976. Instead, there was a strong incentive to pressure the Smith regime to accept the American plan. With no regional patron and faced with increasing guerrilla activities, budget deficits, and manpower shortages, the Smith regime had no choice but to accept black majority rule.[84]

The announcement that black majority rule was acceptable changed the conditions of the Zimbabwean conflict. Whereas previous efforts were directed at the downfall of the Smith regime and although the Kissinger initiative failed, the self-acknowledged political demise of the Smith regime could henceforth be presumed. Efforts now focused on the black replacement of the Smith regime. There were several contenders for power: within Zimbabwe there was the UANC of Muzorewa and ZUPO (led by Chief Chirau) and, externally,

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[83]William Gutteridge, "South Africa: Strategy for Survival", Conflict Studies 131 (June 1981): especially 14-21.

[84]See John Day, "The Rhodesian Internal Settlement", World Today 34 (July 1978): 268-276.

there was ZANU, ZAPU and FROLIZI. Each of these groups had regional patrons and it is the role of the frontline states as patrons of ZAPU and ZANU that was critical to the ensuing power struggle.

Before 1974 African nations supported ZAPU and ZANU through the OAU and the ALC. Since these bodies were unable to play a large role in the liberation effort in Zimbabwe, the burden of support fell on neighboring states and Zambia in particular. Between 1974 and 1979, African nations' support was characterized by three developments.

First, the frontline states replaced the ALC as vanguard of African liberation. The idea of regular contact between states bordering on liberation targets first surfaced during the Angolan conflict and the group intially consisted of five members, Presidents Kaunda of Zambia, Machel of Mozambique, Khama of Botswana and Nyerere of Tanzania. President Neto of Angola later joined, and, as host of the ALC, Tanzania assumed the leadership role within the frontline states. The staff of the ALC was incorporated with the respective foreign policy-making staffs of the frontline states. The frontline states became part of the "progressive" group within the OAU and, as their actions were often controversial, they relied on the support of Nigeria to sway the OAU as a whole. Compared to the old ALC, the frontline states were a far more effective lobbying

group. They were closely involved with ZAPU and ZANU as host states, most of the presidents were former guerrilla leaders, and they were skilled at influencing more powerful states like Nigeria and Britain.[85] Second, the frontline states (and the OAU) paid more attention to the role of extra-continental powers in southern Africa. One manifestation of this was pressure on the United States to repeal the Byrd Amendment. Another manifestation was the call for more stringent sanctions and observance of them.[86] Third, the two closest frontline states, Mozambique and Zambia, were exposed to the adverse effects of the Zimbabwean dispute. Zambia, for example, lost its access to the Beira pipeline and had to acquire its oil through other routes, its trade with Zimbabwe declined sharply, and hence was forced to rely on Southern trade, railways and ports.[87] Mozambique, similarly, suffered from the border closure, the initiation of sanctions and border raids.[88]

From the beginning of the conflict it was clear that ZAPU and ZANU were wholly reliant on the frontline states.

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[85] Cervenka, pp. 62-63.

[86] Legum, Western Crisis, p. 48.

[87] Richard Hall, The High Price of Principles (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1969), especially pp. 161-177 and 230-244.

[88] The cost of one year of sanctions for Mozambique was estimated at between 70,000,000 pounds and 82,000,000 pounds. Martin and Johnson, p. 226.

They, in effect, determined where ZAPU and ZANU headquarters and bases were located, influenced the training and equipment ZAPU and ZANU received, could (and did) close bases and political headquarters, and detained leaders. As discussed earlier, these factors played a critical role in the effectiveness and indeed viability of ZAPU and ZANU. Although frontline states' support derived from principled support of majority rule, the escalation of hostilities and their adverse economic effects produced an incentive to end the conflict. The frontline states' support of a particular Zimbabwean organization was essentially based on self-interest: support of the Muzorewa regime would not end the conflict, whereas ZAPU and ZANU, who were responsible for guerrilla actions and who were cooperating in the Patriotic Front, alone could end the conflict. Stated differently, the frontline states opposed the Muzorewa regime not because it was "insufficiently black" but because its military establishment was controlled by the same personnel as the Smith regime and because it excluded the Patriotic Front. In fact, the war did escalate most under the Muzorewa regime with border raids on Mozambique and, for the first time, a raid on Zambia. More ominously, the Muzorewa regime launched an emergency recruitment campaign, aimed at producing a 25,000 man army loyal to Muzorewa by January 1980.[89]

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[89]"Rhodesia - the clearest outcome and the best", Manchester Guardian, March 16, 1980, p. 1.

In broad terms, the goals of the frontline states coincided with the Anglo-American proposals. There was still the question of any Zimbabwe regime's legal status, but British policy after the internal settlement came to view the cessation of guerrilla war as the overriding question.[90] When the British made an offer for an inclusive constitutional conference at the 1979 meeting of the Commonwealth, the frontline states thus pressured the Patriotic Front to participate.[91] The expectations of the British government and the frontline states nevertheless diverged. Since Muzorewa's UANC won 64.9 percent of the black vote in the 1979 election, Britain thought it would defeat the Patriotic Front. The frontline states, however, expected the Patriotic Front to win the elections.[92]

2.3. The Domestic Environment

As previously discussed, the initial UDI period eliminated the moderating influences from the white political spectrum and a hardened and cohesive Rhodesian Front used all the means at its disposal to maintain itself. Sanctions

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[90] Legum, Western Crisis, p. 210.

[91] The PF was reluctant to enter negotiations, arguing that they were on the verge of military victory; they too, however, believed that they would win the elections. Martin and Johnson, pp. 315-316.

[92] Martyn Gregory, "Rhodesia: From Lusaka to Lancaster House", World Today 36 (January 1980): 11-18.

and the effort to counter them accentuated the structural features of the economy and, although it did not lead to the economic chaos Britain predicted, it did cause some problems. After 1974, however, the economic, political and other problems of the Smith regime increased.

First, the Smith regime experienced a financial crisis. Defense expenditures rose from Rh $77 million in 1975 to Rh $96 million in 1976, Rh $146 million in 1977 and Rh $197 million in 1978; in 1978 defense expenditures amounted to 40 percent of the total budget, as against 25 percent in 1976.[93] The rise in defense expenditures was combined with a declining growth rate; in real terms the GDP fell by 3 percent in 1976 and 7 percent in 1977.[94] With sanctions cumulatively exercising an adverse effect on trade and investment and hence the availability of foreign exchange and with the regime unable to raise revenues by taxation, the Smith regime was forced to devalue twice (in October 1977 and April 1978) and to borrow money. Public debt between 1965 and 1974 amounted to Rh $590 million; in 1978 alone the Smith regime was forced to borrow Rh $240 million, bringing its foreign indebtedness to Rh $189.[95] The economic

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[93]Grundy, "Social Costs": 456 and Michael Raeburn Black Fire! (London: Julian Friedmann, Publishers, 1978), p. 238.

[94]Roger Riddell, "What Economic Road", Africa Report (May-June 1978): 54 and Day, "The Rhodesian Internal Settlement": 271.

[95]Riddell: 53.

difficulties led to and were compounded by emigration by economically active whites. While white migration still showed a small annual net gain in 1972, a net loss started to occur in 1973. Between 1976 and 1977 the net outflow increased by 26 percent and included large numbers of white professionals.[96]

Second, the shortage of public funds increased the need for priority planning and it was clear that the rural black areas--the scene of the guerrilla actions--were deprived of funds. Under the policy of community development the black councils were entitled to raise their own funds when public support was insufficient, but when guerrilla actions increased most of the Ministry of Internal Affairs' funds went into the construction of protected villages. In addition, guerrilla actions prevented the generation of local revenue as ZAPU and ZANU urged blacks not to pay taxes and school and cattle-dipping fees and attacked government-owned stores and beerhalls.[97] Faced with a shortage of funds and local opposition, the regime's rural black administration disintegrated. By 1977 the black councils were being disbanded as district commissioners resumed direct rule.[98] Approximately 1,000 black schools were forced to

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[96]Wilkenson, p. 307.

[97]Hodges: 16.

[98]Michael Bratton, Beyond Community Development: The Political Economy of Rural Administration in Zimbabwe (London: Catholic Institute for International Relations, 1978), pp. 34-45.

close and about 25 percent of the black educational population left without educational access. By March 1979, 155 of 450 black hospitals were closed.[99] Cattle diseases reappeared with the closing of about 6,500 of the 8,000 cattle-dips which, combined with cattle seizures as collective fines, led rural blacks to lose one-third of the total herd.[100] The rural situation was further worsened by population instability. By 1979 about 750,000 blacks found themselves removed to protected villages, about 150,000 blacks fled to Mozambique and Zambia, and 500,000 migrated to the security of urban areas. If the number of blacks who joined the guerrillas is added, almost a quarter of the black population was "directly uprooted by the war."[101]

Third, the strain of counter-guerrilla warfare produced political divisions within the Smith regime. To gain the support of the ANC the regime in 1975 appointed a Commission of Inquiry into Racial Discrimination which published a report that proposed, among other things, the repeal of certain forms of racial discrimination and the Land Tenure Act.[102] While the Smith regime did not accept this Quenet

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[99] Ibid.

[100] Anthony R. Wilkenson, "The Impact of the War", in W.H. Morris-Jones and Dennis Austin (eds.), From Rhodesia To Zimbabwe (London: Frank Cuss, 1980), pp. 119-120.

[101] Grundy, "Social Costs": 460.

[102] Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Racial Discrimination (Salisbury: Government Printer, 1976).

Report as a whole, it did implement some proposals, such as the ability of blacks to own urban property. In the critical Vorster-Smith meetings of September 1976, Smith still enjoyed the support of the RF-membership. Smith, however, did not fully inform the RF of South African pressure nor his acceptance of it and hence acquired a mandate to negotiate with Kissinger.[103] Following Smith's acceptance of majority rule, the support of the UANC gained new importance and Smith proposed the repeal of the Land Tenure Act. Although the Land Tenure Act was scrapped the RF divided and Smith had to rely on the support of black parliamentarians to have it passed. The chairman of the RF resigned and twelve members were expelled. They formed the Rhodesian Action Party (RAP), which advocated a more forceful counter-guerrilla campaign. Those who felt Smith did not go far enough in repealing offensive legislation formed the National Unifying Force (NUF).

Except as factors causing the exhaustion of the Smith regime, these problems and their implications remained in the background at the Lancaster House conference. In the forefront were efforts to devise an acceptable and workable transition to a new regime.

3. The Transitional Arrangement

The Lancaster House conference produced several

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[103] Martin and Johnson, p. 250.

agreements. One agreement concerned the transitional period before an independence date, wherein Britain assumed full colonial authority in Zimbabwe, represented by a governor (Lord Soames). Another agreement produced a ceasefire, effective on December 28, 1979, and under the authority of a Ceasefire Commission composed of a military aide to the governor, one senior commander of the security forces and one of the Patriotic Front. The contending parties were to disengage and the guerrillas to assemble in 16 assembly points (APs) by January 4, 1980. This disengagement was to be supervised by a 1,200 man Commonwealth Monitoring Force. Britain would supervise internationally-observed elections after a two-month period.[104]

The conference also produced an independence constitution. The most salient aspect of this constitution was that it created a legislature with a 100-member lower house, with 20 seats reserved for whites, and a senate. The head of state would be a president, i.e. Zimbabwe would be a republic. The constitution can be amended by a two-thirds vote in the Senate and a 70 percent vote in the lower house. The existing judicial system was preserved, as was the civil service. The public service commissions were required to

[104] See Southern Rhodesia: Report of the Constitutional Conference, Cmnd. 7802 (September-December 1979) and Wiseman and Taylor, pp. 7-13 for more details. See also "It Seems Like A Miracle", Time, November 26, 1979, pp. 62-64 for an account of the conference itself.

pay civil service pensions and uphold internal regulations. With regard to the military establishment, the forces of the Patriotic Front and the Muzorewa regime would be demobilized and then integrated, in equal proportions, into a conventionally styled military establishment under the authority of a High Command and the Ministry of Defense. Finally, the constitution recognized private property and land could not be acquired by compulsory means. The "land problem" would be solved by foreign (especially British and American) aid for development and settlement.[105]

The constitution was a product of 47 plenary sessions, in which major differences existed among the three parties (Britain, the Patriotic Front and the Muzorewa regime). The final product thus was a compromise; no single group fashioned the constitution to suit its own interests. With regard to the two Zimbabwean parties, their willingness to make compromises was undoubtedly influenced by uncertainty about the outcome of the elections. Although both were confident that they would win, there was no guarantee of victory and either could in the future be an outvoted parliamentary minority. Considerations of power thus required a "neutral" constitution. Most conspicuously, the

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[105]The recognition of private property and guarantees against expulsion from it is contained in the Bill of Rights of the constitution under "Freedom of Deprivation of Property." For a critique see "Shortcomings of British plan for compensation", Manchester Guardian, November 11, 1979, p. 9.

constitution was a victory of the political over the military leaders. While the senior commanders participated in the Lancaster House conference, they were relieved of their operational command during the transition period[106] and their armies would be demobilized. The new military establishment would be a creation of the political leadership.[107]

In view of the fact that ZAPU and ZANU were armies rather than political parties, their assembly intc the assembly points was smoother than expected. The Commonwealth Monitoring Force was largely unarmed and could not enforce compliance by the estimated 16,000 guerrillas who were required to assemble within only seven days. Only a fraction of the guerrillas reported within the first five days, but thereafter the number increased and by January 7 there were 18,500-20,000 people gathered in the assembly points. There were 219 violations of the ceasefire, with ZIPRA accountable for 36, ZANLA for 134 and the security forces for 14,[108] which led Lord Soames to employ the regime's

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[106]Operational command, the PF argued, would be a "recipe for a coup." Wiseman and Taylor, p. 9.

[107]The new army would be composed of equal representation of those who fought the war, and training was started by officers of a British Military and Advisory Training Team. The regime security forces, ZANLA and ZIPRA would each have a member on military high command. Ibid., p. 66.

[108]Martyn Gregory, "Zimbabwe 1980: Politicisation through Armed Struggle and Electoral Mobilization": 75.

security forces (in particular, the black Rhodesian African Rifles) against the guerrillas. This act was controversial, as Britain was accused of bias against the Patriotic Front,[109] but gradually a sense of trust was established.[110]

In the elections for the white parliamentary seats in February 1980, the RF won all 20 seats.[111] In the context for the remaining black seats, the Patriotic Front was at a distinct disadvantage. The UANC of Muzorewa had participated in the 1979 elections but neither ZAPU nor ZANU had operated as political parties within Zimbabwe since 1964. The Patriotic Front combining ZAPU and ZANU, moreover, was a negotiating construct; it had "no headquarters or offices, except the two co-chairmen, no bureaucracy--in short no existence except as a negotiating construct or alliance of convenience."[112] The electoral campaign again revealed the divisions between ZAPU and ZANU. ZAPU changed its name

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[109] Wiseman and Taylor, p. 20.

[110] The most senior ZANLA commander, Tongogara, was killed in December 1979 in a car accident in Mozambique.

[111] Throughout the elections there were rumors that the RF was about to oust Smith and replace him with David Smith (Finance Minister under the Muzorewa regime). The NUF boycotted the elections on the grounds that it was racially segregated. Martyn Gregory, "The 1980 Rhodesian Elections - a first-hand account and analysis", World Today 36 (March 1980): 181.

[112] Rotberg, Suffer the Future, p. 263.

to Patriotic Front to stress unity and did not publicly criticize Mugabe or ZANU, but they could not establish a common electoral strategy or platform with ZANU.[113] ZANU's electoral strategy emphasized the importance of the rural vote. A large number of guerrillas remained in the rural areas[114] controlled by ZANLA to organize electoral support.

ZANU (PF) under Mugabe's leadership won 63 percent of the votes, winning all the seats in Manicaland, Victoria and the northeastern areas of Mashonaland North. In the western areas of Mashonaland North and South, ZANU (PF) did slightly worse, winning 6 of 8 seats in the former and 14 of 16 in the latter. Nkomo's PF (or ZAPU) did well in the west (Matabeleland North and South), winning 15 of 16 seats. In the Midlands, ZANU (PR) won 8 seats and the PF (or ZAPU) 4. The UANC of Muzorewa won only 3 seats (in Mashonaland North and South). None of the other parties won any seats.[115] Thus Mugabe's ZANU (PF) won 57 of the

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[113]Gregory, "The Rhodesian Elections--a first-hand account and analysis": 182-183.

[114]This reduced the number of guerrillas that could gather at the assembly points. That the number of people in the points (20,000) exceeded the estimated number of guerrillas (15,000-16,000) is attributed to the fact that the guerrillas sent surrogates (mujibas and women) and the return of more than 200,000 refugees. Wiseman and Taylor, pp. 54 and 59 and "Playing with guns" Newsweek, January 14, 1980, p. 51.

[115]These included a ZANU party, led by Sithole, and a Zimbabwe Democratic Party (ZDP) led by Chikerema.

80 black seats, Nkomo's PF (or ZAPU) 20 seats, and the UANC 3 seats. In terms of the share of the vote, ZANU (PF) won at least 80 percent of the popular vote in the eastern provinces; in most of these areas, Nkomo's PF (or ZAPU) was outvoted by the UANC. In the western areas, the position was reversed. In Matabeleland North and South, Nkomo's PF (or ZAPU) won at least 80 percent, while ZANU (PF) could only manage a 10.4 percent in the North and 6.85 percent in the South. Only in the Midlands were there signs of greater balance, with ZANU (PF) winning a 60 percent share and Nkomo's PF about 28 percent.[116]

Roughly speaking the electoral support of ZANU (PF) and the PF (or ZAPU) coincided with, respectively, the operational areas of ZANLA and ZIPRA, and the Mashona and Matabele living areas. Whether the electoral behavior of blacks is correleated with tribal or any other socio-economic factor is nevertheless difficult to establish with certainty. The exact number of the Zimbabwean population, the number of voters and their areas of permanent residence were all unknown. For example, the only breakdown that was given was a provincial-regional one and this does not coincide with tribal patterns. The only significant factor appears

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[116]Martyn Gregory, "Zimbabwe 1980: Politicisation through Armed Struggle and Electoral Mobilization": 62-65.

to be the guerrilla war itself. During it, ZANU (PF) established its influence in certain areas, had the organizational resources to conduct a campaign there, and was untainted by any collaboration with the Smith regime. Nkomo's PF also established itself in certain regions, but these were less populous and Nkomo was tainted by charges of opportunism in his negotiations with Smith. The UANC seemed to suffer most from collaboration, as it was almost eclipsed in the election returns.[117]

Thus the negotiations, elections and arrangements that ended the Zimbabwean conflict both confirmed and denied the legacy of guerrilla warfare. The large guerrilla armies generated by the war were required to demobilize and a portion integrated into a new conventionally-styled military establishment supervised by the civilian-political leadership. Yet the armies provided the organizational resources and ready-made regional constituencies on which the respective groups contested the election. Thus ZANU (PF) won the election and the Mugabe regime assumed power on April 18, 1980.[118]

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[117] Ibid. Although there were many acts of intimidation, especially in the northeastern areas, observers were satisfied that the elections were "free and fair." Wiseman and Taylor, pp. 93-94 and 155.

[118] For an account of the proceedings, see "A Final, Priceless Reward", Newsweek, April 28, 1980, pp. 47-49.

The Mugabe regime operates under a constitutional order that preserved the police, judicial and bureaucratic apparatus; that the respective groups chose to operate under this order was a reflection of the political self-interest of their leaderships.

The constitutional arrangements of the ending of the Zimbabwean conflict raise the question whether the experience of guerrilla and counter-guerrilla warfare altered, in any fundamental sense, the structural features of Zimbabwean society. In this regard, four developments require elaboration.

First, impoverished and overpopulated even before UDI, the black rural areas' experience of guerrilla warfare deepened the rural crisis. Land was either devoid of population or heavily overgrazed, cattle (and thus social status, wealth and political power) lost, and schools, hospitals and stores closed.[119] Clearly, rural blacks paid dearly for their role in the guerrilla war. Urban pressures also consequently increased as unemployed refugees crowded the urban areas in vast shantytowns.[120]

Second, while emigration reduced the number of whites, white farmers remained the most influential group through

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[119] See Martin Meredith, The Past is Another Country: Rhodesia 1890-1979 (London: Andre Deutsch, 1979), pp. 305-309.

[120] "Whoever Says We're Safe Lies", Time, April 30, 1974, pp. 39-40. In Salisbury alone there were 60,000 uprooted black squatters. Richard Hull, "The Continuing Crisis in Rhodesia", Current History 78 (March 1980): 107-108.

their role in the RF and as one-fifth of the economically active whites. Sanctions and guerrilla warfare added to their importance. With regard to sanctions, the regime was forced to rely on agricultural exports as its manufacturing trade flagged, giving farmers generous state aid and loans. As regards guerrilla war, farmers who wished to buy or develop land in the northeastern and eastern areas most affected by guerrilla actions were virtually subsidized by the regime.[121]

Third, the regime's self-maintaining efforts led to the growth and centralization of the public sector. Expansion can be measured in several ways. Public employment rose from about 40,000 in 1964 to 78,000 in 1969 and to about 118,000 in 1978. This made the public sector by far the largest single employer in Zimbabwe, and public servants' earnings about one-quarter of total economic earnings.[122] The largest proportion of these employees were in the field of education (including black education), followed by internal affairs and then defense.[123] Overall

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[121]Wilkenson, "From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe", pp. 303-304.

[122]Bratton, "The Public Service in Zimbabwe": 448.

[123]Wiseman and Taylor, p. 16.

there were 40 specialized civil service departments, resorting under the authority of 20 ministries. These departments exercised "direct rule from the center" by withholding funds from local units, or by investing central government employees in local areas with quasi-judicial and para-military powers under the umbrella of martial law and emergency regulations. The expansion of the public sector increased the number of black public employees, but in proportional terms they did not increase (about 74 percent of the whole) and, moreover, blacks were under-represented in the senior, tenured positions (10 percent).[124]

Fourth, the effort to counter sanctions led to agricultural and mineral diversification. In agriculture, tobacco was replaced by cotton and sugar as chief exports, and production of peanuts, tea, soybeans, maize and sorghum increased. In mining, copper became the major product, supplemented by chromium, nickel, silver, iron, asbestos and gold. With a few exceptions (such as the domestic textile industry), however, these products were exported and hence their value was subject to fluctuations. With regard to manufacturing, its share of the GDP increased from approximately 18 percent in 1965 to about 23 percent in 1977 but, as the 1974-1979 period showed, its development is contingent

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[124]Bratton, "The Public Service in Zimbabwe": 450-459. See also D.G. Clarke, "The Growth and Economic Impact of the Public Sector of Rhodesia", Rhodesian Journal of Economics 6 (September 1972): 48-60.

on the availability of foreign capital and protection from especially South African manufacturers.[125]

In short, the 15-year conflict accentuated and therefore more clearly revealed the structural features of Zimbabwean society. While the Mugabe regime differs from previous regimes in that its political legitimacy is not disputed, its policy options are, like those of previous regimes, effectively constrained by these structural features. In an immediate sense the constraining role of these structures is further complicated by the highly competitive nature of the black elite and by the problems presented by the demilitarization of a people-in-arms.

4. Conclusion

This chapter raised the question of why the war ended in an election. It was argued that this question can best be understood by noting (a) the role of the Smith regime's and the guerrillas' regional patrons and (b) the role of exhaustion of all parties concerned. In the first years of the conflict (1965-1973), the guerrillas posed no serious threat to the Smith regime and Britain thus was forced to resolve a dispute characterized by international-legal issues. Britain tried to force the Smith regime into negotiations by means of economic and diplomatic pressure but the

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[125] Rotberg, Suffer the Future, pp. 242-246 and Legum, Western Crisis, pp. 229-234.

hardened regime managed to evade this pressure by mobilizing its economy on a war footing and by relying on South African (and, to a lesser extent, Portuguese) aid.

After 1973, the Zimbabwean conflict changed fundamentally as guerrilla actions progressively increased. Thus the Smith regime was severely weakened by its counter guerrilla operations and the cumulative effect of sanctions and, when its regional patron (South Africa) withdrew its support, it had no choice but to announce its own political demise. This announcement in 1976 again shifted the grounds of the conflict, as the search was now for a suitable black replacement. The Smith regime (and South Africa) wanted a "moderate" black group or at least not Mugabe's ZANU in power and thus drew Muzorewa (UANC), Sithole and Chirau into an internal settlement. The Muzorewa regime (or rule by the "moderates"), however, increased the level of hostilities, which alarmed the frontline states and Britain which, for economic and political reasons, wanted an end to the conflict. Under the aegis of the Commonwealth the frontline states and Britain thus developed a plan to end the conflict and all the regional patrons involved pressured the concerned groups to participate.

By the ending of the conflict in the latter half of 1979 and early 1980, none of the Zimbabwean contenders were thus masters of their own fate. The respective leaders

behaved according to what they were, namely contenders for power who seek to maximize their power. These considerations did not produce extremism at the Lancaster House conference; rather they produced compromises as no group wanted to be a future victim of a biased legal order. The group that did win the following elections clearly did so on the basis of its organizational resources, particularly its military personnel. It inherited an order, however, in which those organizational resources are transformed and an order whose structural features (and hence problems) were accentuated by the experiences of the 15-year conflict.

CHAPTER VI

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

This study has addressed the question why a particular kind of revolution occurred in Zimbabwe. The examination was informed by two theoretical traditions, namely the theoretical literature on revolutions in general and the theoretical literature on African upheavals, especially the work of those scholars who argue that African revolutions are not caused by nor lead to socio-economic transformations. Following the structural approach developed by Eisenstadt, Paige, Skocpol and Wolf, the analysis has then sought to determine whether a crisis within the Zimbabwean regime coincided with a rural uprising.

The analysis pursued several avenues. First, it focused on the nature of the white community and its relation to the state (central political power and bureaucracy) and the economy, as well as to international pressure. Second, the nature of black political life since 1888 was examined, with particular attention paid to the socio-economic constraints and legal regulations under which blacks lived, what the political implications of those conditions were, and the organizational forms black collective action took in response to these conditions. Third, the struggle for power between 1962 and 1979 was examined in order to determine the nature

and effectiveness of black collective action, which blacks were most active in the struggle and why, the organizational forms generated by the struggle for power, the nature of the black elite or leadership, and the nature and effectiveness of the regime's counteractions. Finally, the manner in which the conflict ended was examined.

1. Zimbabwe 1888-1965: The Emergence of a Political Crisis

The study shows that state power in Zimbabwe prior to 1965 was the preserve of whites who systematically excluded blacks from electoral and other political power. This gave the successive Zimbabwean regimes in the period prior to 1965 a very narrow support base. Although the regime's support was narrowly based on the whites, not all whites participated equally in the political process. Public policy-making was dominated by the executive, seen not as cabinet dominance but as the dominant role of the prime minister, and by the public bureaucracy. These political actors operated at some remove from the political parties and the legislature, as there was no populist political tradition in white politics, at least not until the 1960s. In the absence of such a tradition, some whites, (including white farmers and mining interests) exercised political leverage with the executive-bureaucratic alliance. The political prominence of these groups was largely a reflection of Zimbabwean society before the Second

World War but, although the changes brought by the war resulted in the rise of manufacturers and the decline in the number of miners, white farmers maintained their political leverage in the executive-bureaucratic alliance. The policy-making alliance was highly susceptible to external political pressures, primarily because it was in agreement with British imperial aims in southern Africa. This voluntary cooperation with British aims was reflected in the opposition to the political developments of South Africa, particularly to the course of South Africa's public policy directions after the rise of Afrikaner nationalism since 1900.

The Zimbabwean regime's opposition to South African policies is ironic, for there is a similarity and relatedness between Zimbabwean and South African political development. The arrival of the Matabele in the area north of South Africa and the initial white settlement, for example, was a direct outgrowth of the dynamics of South African society. Later developments in Zimbabwe, such as land apportionment and the systematic exclusion of blacks from state power, is also similar to South African practice. Yet Zimbabwean whites were opposed to South Africa's political directions, especially after the rise of Afrikaner nationalism after 1900.

Before the Second World war Zimbabwe's economy was of the colonial export type. Initial white settlement was premised on the hope of discovering a "second Reef" but when this

failed to materialize white farming and mining became the mainstays of the economy. There were some secondary industries, but they were dominated by the activities surrounding the extraction and export of primary goods. The export-oriented industries encountered several difficulties before the Second World War as they were subject to fluctuations in world market prices, overproduction and ecological disasters. This led the state to aid and regulate economic production; even before 1940 the state in Zimbabwe had adopted an interventionist posture as far as the economy was concerned.

During and after the Second World War Zimbabwe experienced strong economic and political pressure. The political pressure to adopt racial reforms as a prelude to the creation of the Central African Federation soon evaporated, but the pressure for increased production was sustained throughout the 1950s. With its powerful bureaucracy and its interventionist posture, the Zimbabwean regime embarked on a policy of modernization, aided by the enlarged market created by the CAF and the influx of capital from British and CAF sources. The policy of economic modernization was particularly aimed at increasing the number of secondary industries in Zimbabwe, as well as increasing the output of white and black farmers. By 1965 the economic results of this policy were mixed. Economic diversification did occur as the number of secondary

industries and the volume and value of agricultural production increased. Yet each of the economic sectors was still vulnerable. Black agricultural output was steadily diminishing as a result of political opposition to economic reforms and some questionable economic reasoning on the part of the regime. White farmers did increase the volume of their output, but its dramatic rise in value was attributable to favorable world market conditions. These conditions would not necessarily prevail in the future, but white farmers increasingly relied on tobacco production which was geared to the export market. The contribution of manufacturing to the GDP increased, but production was of a limited range of low-quality goods geared to the needs of black consumers and their limited buying power and still faced competition from high quality imports.

The white regime's efforts to reform the economy encountered considerable opposition from whites and blacks alike. This opposition emanated mainly from the rural areas, where reforms threatened rural customs and security and undermined tribal political authority, threatening to deprive white farmers of their increasing demand for black laborers. The regime attempted to adjust to the loss of white political support by creating a black middle class of a moderate political character, but this met with black disinterest and opposition in some instances. With its support base still

narrow, the regime in the early 1960s encountered renewed international pressure, this time in the form of pressure for racial reform in exchange for the granting of independence. This pressure radicalized the regime's reform program as it allowed blacks formal political participation in the legislature and proposed to abolish the land apportionment legislation.

These proposals led to the demise of the UFP regime. The white rural-based opposition grew rapidly and, as the farmers alone or as a proportion of the electorate could not defeat the regime, they developed a potent party-organization moulded by a populist philosophy. This Rhodesian Front organization defeated the UFP, transformed the mode of governing in Zimbabwe from the dominance of the executive bureaucratic alliance in policy-making to one where policy-making was dominated by the extra-parliamentary role of the RF organization. The RF also abandoned the reforms of the 1950s and was prepared to achieve independence by unilateral means, as was reflected in its Unilateral Declaration of Independence in November 1965. UDI brought renewed international pressure, but the RF seemed initially to thrive on such pressure; it remained cohesive, used all the state means at its disposal to maintain itself, and reversed many of the moderate and multi-racial features of Zimbabwean life, inviting comparisons with a one-party state and South African

race policies.

For all its power, the RF was actually in the grip of a political crisis. Its power was unevenly distributed and, like its predecessors, it had a narrow support base. Previous efforts to create a black middle class had failed and in the early 1960s blacks began to oppose participation in the white electoral process. With UDI this political crisis acquired international-legal proportions as the Smith regime, judged by the standards of regime legitimacy prevailing in Africa since 1945, was found to be illegitimate. This increased international pressure. As yet the regime suffered no obvious financial crisis. Although its public debt rose, the regime's survival now depended on the ability of its diversified economy to sustain a growth rate in the face of that international pressure and the ability of the regime to quell any revolt from the blacks.

2. Black Zimbabwe 1888-1962: The Conditions of Political Action

The study shows that the first 30 years of white rule introduced many of the changes that would leave black life as it was known before 1888 in a condition beyond recall. Many of the changes introduced came in the wake of black resistance to the imposition of white rule, ironically conceived as actions that defended blacks against white encroachments.

Black life in Zimbabwe between 1888 and 1962 functioned under the impact of at least three crises. First, there was a demographic crisis as the number of blacks increased from an estimated 500,000 in 1888 to 3,550,000 in 1961. The steadily increasing number of blacks occupied land whose supply was limited by law; this gave blacks in the reserves a density of 25 per square mile in 1961, as compared to 10 per square mile in 1941. By the 1960s an estimated 30 percent of the blacks entitled to land by custom were, indeed, landless. Second, blacks lived under the impact of an ecological crisis. In Zimbabwe conditions for farming are generally harsh and suitable farmland is limited to the central highlands and the northeastern areas. The manner in which the reserves were created resulted in the allocation of land to blacks in areas where the quality of the soil was most questionable. With the best farmland allocated to whites, blacks lived only on the reserves where the combination of demographic pressure and soil quality resulted in the steadily diminishing ecological capacity of the soil and hence the diminishing productive capacities of black farmers of the reserves. Third, there was a political crisis as the political authority of the tribal leadership was undermined and then re-introduced in a bureaucratic form.

Is there a common denominator among these changes? Certainly the changes in the conditions of black life did not

result from their exposure to rampant commercialism. Blacks were threatened by the encroachments of whites, their desire for farmland, and their need of black labor. Blacks were also exposed to new notions, such as private property, wage labor, electoral politics and so forth. But the small number of local markets in which blacks successfully participated were soon replaced by a labor and production market regulated by an interventionist state. According to government regulations the entry of blacks to the cash economy could come mainly as wage laborers. Entry as producers or owners of private property was limited to the small number of purchase farmers. By 1962 this left blacks in a situation in which where they had been exposed to notions associated with commercialism and capitalism, but in which few were actually commercialized owners of private property.

As suggested by the above, the use of state power by the settlers is the common denominator of changes in black life. Initially the white regimes assumed that blacks would be progressively drawn into wage labor and enter the spiral of socio-economic progress associated with white life. Under this doctrine of economic assimilation, tribal life was beyond recall and reserved land only a temporary refuge. When the settlers achieved self- or responsible government, however, they used state power to reconstitute tribal life in a form that was politically understood and desired by the

whites in general and the Native Department in particular. After the Second World War state power was again used in an attempt to reconstitute tribal life as it was desired by the white regime for economic reasons. Clearly the changes in black life can, then, best be seen as a result of the use of state power to affect economic and political changes, rather than of blacks' exposure to the dislocations brought by rampant commercialism.

3. The Struggle for Power: International Nationalism, Guerrilla War and the Response of the Regime

Although blacks lived under the impact of three crises deriving mainly from the use of state power, the likelihood of spontaneous and locally-led political action was remote. Structurally the black population could be divided into the blacks of the reserves, the purchase area farmers, black laborers on white corporate and single-owned farms, and urban wage laborers. This structure was derived from methods of land apportionment and the need of blacks to supplement their subsistence needs with wage labor. In each of the black structures, conditions discouraged blacks from engaging in collective political action.

In the reserves, local leadership and councils were avenues of bureaucratic control rather than local autonomy. Even if blacks were to seek alternatives for political expression and independence, these required government consent and,

should this requirement be ignored, the regime had a vast array of means to suppress local political initiatives. As regards farmworkers, their position was even worse as they lived under the all-encompassing control of the employers and their assistants. Discontent did occur, but this tended to be expressed in non-political forms, such as damage to property and absenteeism, and could be mediated by employers in a variety of ways. Urban blacks had engaged in collective action but these were irregular and because of the realities of urban geography and regime repression they were difficult to sustain. Compared to the above, the purchase area farmers seemed to have the greatest scope of freedom of action, but their small number and the small size of the land they commanded militated against a powerful political role in guerrilla warfare.

While blacks were unlikely to engage in spontaneous political action by the 1960s, the decade preceding it had produced a nationalist elite that abandoned the self-conscious elitism of earlier organizations and sought to ally itself with popular black action. Elsewhere in Africa, black nationalist leaders were assuming power and the nationalist elite of Zimbabwe was exposed to these developments in the Central African Federation by having contact with the leaders of the nationalist movements in Malawi (then Nyasaland) and Zambia (then Northern Rhodesia).

Zimbabwe's membership in the CAF, however, was also counter-productive from the point of view of collective action in that the violence in the two northern territories led the Zimbabwean regime to take action that would preempt such action in the southern territory. Thus the leadership of the nationalist organizations were arrested and detained, the organizations declared illegal, and any black organizational activity beyond desired channels was restricted. This limited the tactical scope of the nationalist groups, particularly with respect to their access to rural areas.

Although the 1950s brought rural based black discontent in Zimbabwe, spontaneous black collective action in the early 1960s was unlikely. Most blacks, e.g., those in the reserves and rural and urban wage laborers, were for several reasons discouraged from engaging in collective action and the elites that sought to encourage such action were decimated by regime repression. Eventually the black nationalist organizations were forced into exile, from which it was far more difficult to organize and lead guerrilla warfare.

As Skocpol and others have suggested with regard to revolutionary conflict in the non-Western world, the conflict in Zimbabwe was initially highly asymmetrical. In Zambia the nationalist groups' action revealed their weaknesses. First, the nationalists were divided into two organizations

(ZAPU and ZANU) and there were divisions even within the respective organizations. Second, the nationalists were unsure as to whether they should concentrate their efforts on foreign-diplomatic activity or on a guerrilla struggle within Zimbabwe. Although they prepared for guerrilla struggle during the period between 1962 and 1970, they focused mainly in their international audience. Third, the groups were in a period of organizational transition as substitute leaders became the effective heads of the organizations and as they struggled to become entities capable of waging guerrilla warfare. Fourth, in Zambia the organizations were in exile condition, which produced morale and discipline problems, exaggerated claims and factionalism. Finally, Zambia had drawbacks as a base for infiltration, as it only allowed narrow corridors of infiltration into areas which were sparsely populated and had a harsh terrain. Thus the initial guerrilla attacks were clumsy and usually counterproductive. In contrast the Smith regime had a well-organized defense establishment and an extensive intelligence network that could alert it to guerrilla groups and their location.

Given the nature of guerrilla infiltration and attacks during the initial period, the Smith regime scored only a qualified victory, but it saw this as decisive and became overconfident. Until 1970 the regime was indeed confident

of its ability to maintain itself. The Rhodesian Front, in which rural interests were still overrepresented, dominated the legislature and the bureaucracy, overwhelmed the political parties and forces of moderation, and maintained its own cohesion. Sanctions and other international pressures did not shake their confidence and produce political concessions. The regime brought the economy under full state management, encouraged agricultural diversification and the development of more secondary industries, and replaced Britain with South Africa as its main trading partner. As regards the blacks, the regime made no noteworthy attempts to "win the hearts and minds" of black Zimbabweans. In fact the regime felt confident enough to upgrade the political authority of the traditional-tribal leadership (seen as representatives of the blacks as a whole), passed a new land act which left much of the previous land apportionment unaltered and increased segregationist practices.

Yet the Smith regime was not wholly invulnerable. One vulnerability was the attrition factor of guerrilla warfare which, while still modest, were growing in scope. Another vulnerability was that the sanctions' cumulative effect deprived the Zimbabwean economy of foreign exchange, capital and investment. This produced priority planning in which certain societal sectors, like black education in the rural areas and the transportation infrastructure, were

deprived of funds and deteriorated. Finally and most importantly, the Smith regime became deeply dependent on the financial, military and political support of South Africa.

After 1970 the asymmetry between the contending parties disappeared but the contest still fluctuated. The Smith regime's intelligence network failed to alert the regime to an important development, ZANU's links with FRELIMO and the switch in the focus of guerrilla actions from the western areas adjacent to Zambia to the northeastern areas adjacent to Mozambique. With the help of FRELIMO, ZANU then gained organizational access to the reserves and the purchase areas in the northeastern areas. When the Portuguese coup occurred, the scope of this organizational access increased dramatically. The regime security forces were still able to launch search and destroy missions against the guerrillas, but they were hampered by the support ZANU received in the area.

In general, Skocpol's and Wolf's identification of the peasant groups, here simply seen as rural blacks most active in revolutions, are supported by the nature of revolutionary activity in Zimbabwe. Rural blacks from all population groups supported ZAPU and ZANU, but only after these organizations had acquired access to the rural areas. However, the support given to the organizations varied. In the reserves and the purchase areas the organizations enjoyed

freedom of movement because these areas were located in territory adjacent to Mozambique and Zambia, the guerrillas often acquired the loyalty and support of local authorities (i.e. tribal chiefs) and tribal solidarity discouraged counter-guerrilla actions and, most importantly, because the regime until the early 1970s concentrated its repressive forces in the western regions. Contrarily, blacks employed on white farms could support the guerrillas mainly by supplying information and not reporting their presence in the area, for they were within the repressive reach of their white employers.

With regard to the nature of the nationalist elite, events in Zimbabwe show how devastating the loss of a leadership element can be in developing an effective organization and opposition. Although leadership as a symbolic matter can be sustained while leaders are incarcerated, leadership also is a matter of daily administration of organizational affairs. While the loss of the leadership element may occur as a result of regime repression, the leadership may also destroy its own effectiveness by personal rivalry and factionalism. In this regard the nationalist elite in Zimbabwe was characterized by its competitiveness. This competitiveness was related to a variety of factors, such as personal animosities, tactical and training differences, competition for a limited supply of organizational positions and the uncertainty of the exile environment, but the common demoninator seems to be

personal and organizational ambitions. For most of the Zimbabwean nationalist elite the most formative experience was the struggle for power itself, which lasted from at least 1955 (with the reconstitution of the ANC) to 1979. Competiveness is thus best seen as deriving from personal and organizational desires to acquire and maintain power; whatever tribal, regional, socio-economic and other differences existed were manipulated to suit the pursuit of power.

The organizational forms generated by the guerrilla struggle were loosely styled military organizations rather than political parties. As such the military leadership was antagonistic towards the civilian-political leadership and, in the case of ZANU, eventually led to the displacement of political leaders by military ones in the organizations' major decision-making body. During the struggle these military leaders dominated decisions about local actions and were interested mainly in securing freedom of action for the guerrillas rather than building alternative political structures. Because of the way the conflict ended, by negotiation and election, the organizational resources of the military commanders were crucial in mobilizing electoral support, but simultaneously the compromises made by the leadership at the Lancaster House conference requires the demise of the military organizations as guerrilla entities.

4. Sanctions, Negotiations and the Effects of Guerrilla Warfare

The ending of the Zimbabwean conflict underscores Gurr's caution not to expect clearcut military victories in revolutionary conflicts. By the end of 1979 ZAPU and ZANU actions were steadily increasing, but it was uncertain whether they would be capable of, for example, invading Salisbury by military force. Moreover, the regional patrons of the respective groups, on whom the groups had become wholly dependent, were exposed to the adverse effects of the war and were willing to pressure Britain to devise a plan that would end the conflict by other than military means. When Britain then devised a plan for ending the conflict on electoral grounds, the regional patrons pressured the respective groups to accept it.

In the Lancaster House agreements the parties to the conflict chose to preserve most of the major aspects of the old order because it suited organizational and personal struggles for power. The structural features of the old order were, moreover, accentuated by the guerrilla war. First, the lands previously designated as reserves are heavily overgrazed, their population uprooted, property (cattle) destroyed and schools, hospitals and stores either destroyed or in a state of disrepair. This not only brings rural pressure but also urban pressure as blacks, unable to sustain themselves in the rural areas, crowd the towns in search of wage labor. Second,

ZANU as the major political party commands a bureaucracy that was expanded and centralized during the guerrilla struggle. It is by far the most important single employer in Zimbabwe (public servants' earnings are the largest proportion of all economic earnings) and it provides the Mugabe regime with a vast array of organizational resources. Third, the economy was further diversified as a result of the struggle, but each of the sectors are still dependent on the availability of foreign capital, exchange and investment. In particular, the struggle deepened Zimbabwe's dependence on South Africa. As was the case during the course of Zimbabwe's history, the course of its future development will be influenced by the dynamics of South African society.

The Mugabe regime's policy options are, like those of its predecessors, constrained by the structural features of the Zimbabwean society. In an immediate sense the constraining role of these features is further complicated by the competitive nature of the black leadership and by the problems presented by the demilitarization of a people-in-arms. The Mugabe regime differs from previous regimes, however, in that its political legitimacy is not questioned, except in Matabeleland, and that it had, as the election results show, a wide political support base, at least until the end of 1952.

According to the definition of revolution here adopted, namely a form of change simultaneously affecting several dimensions of society in a fundamental and progressive manner over a period of decades and culminating in a violent struggle for political control, the events in Zimbabwe can clearly be described as a revolution. But, in summary, what kind of revolution occurred in Zimbabwe?

The preceding discussion shows that a revolution originated in a pre-1945 Zimbabwe which, while it had been exposed to some modern socio-economic and political forces, lacked fully modernized economic, social and political structures. In this transitional environment state power, characterized by a highly bureaucratized internal composition and operating at some remove from popular white political pressures, attempted to implement socio-economic reforms when it was faced with external pressures generated by the Second World War. These attempted reforms (or modernization) encountered black and white rural based opposition. The white opposition then captured state power, suspended the reforms, and with a narrow political support base attempted to maintain itself under increasing external pressure. This crisis in state power eventually coincided with black collective action led by a non-rural elite and based on the participation of rural blacks in guerrilla warfare. During the ensuing struggle for state power the respective groups became dependent

on regional patrons and it is the pressure of these patrons, combined with that of Britain, that forced the struggle to an electoral conclusion.

Thus the fundamental reality animating Zimbabwean political life was its lack of modernity manifested in, among others, a dependent role in the world economy, a domestic economy only partially industrialized and reliant on the export of a few primary products, a subservient political relationship with Britain, and the non-recognition of the principle of equality in political affairs. This lack of modernity rendered the Zimbawean regime vulnerable to external pressure and it is a bureaucratized regime's response to that pressure that set in motion events that culminated in the installation of a black regime in 1980. To view the events in Zimbabwe as another case in the decolonization of Africa would, then, not be incorrect, for it illustrates the formal aspects of a subservient relationship with Britain. Similarly, the use of a perspective emphasizing racial exclusivism can be useful insofar as it reveals the denial of political equality and its consequences. However, these perspectives fail to capture the extent to which a lack of modernity, in different guises, permeated Zimbabwean life, cannot explain the Zimbabwean regime's vulnerability to external pressure beyond noting the existence of anti-colonial forces in Zimbabwe and the desire of Britain to rid itself

of a troublesome territory, and cannot explain the post-1939 reforms except as a decades-long act of hypocrisy by a regime expressing the racial fears and hatreds of whites.

Since the revolution in Zimbabwe has yet to run its full course, it is important to note that the regime change of 1980 came about as a result of the recognition of the principle of equality in political affairs. But the fundamental reality of being an only partially modernized society faces the new regime as much as it did its predecessors. Indeed the struggle for state power deepended Zimbabwe's structural problems and it still faces external pressure, now chiefly from South African sources.

5. Revolutions, African Revolutions, and the Structural Perspective: The Zimbabwean Case

On the basis of the preceding description of its nature it appears that the Zimbabwean revolution comfortably resides in the category of revolutions that occur in non-Western or transitional environments. The Zimbabwean case, moreover, demonstrates that it is impossible to understand the origins and, equally important, the course and nature of these reovlutions without systematically relating the attributes of the society, such as population structure, economy, geography, and political life, to revolutionary developments.

With regard to African revolutions, the Zimbabwean case shows that the relationship between socio-economic development and political participation is more problematic than suggested by the existing literature. While there are differences among the theoretical conceptions, a common presumption is that socio-economic development increases political participation, whether in the form of class action or a desire of recently urbanized individuals to be absorbed by political institutions. While the socio-economic development of Zimbabwe may have increased political awareness, the nature and extent of political participation and collective action was thoroughly influenced by regime repression, the availability of groups that seek to encourage political action, and the availability of regional patrons for such groups. As such the theoretical arguments that revolutions in Africa are rare because the requisite socio-economic developments have not taken place, such as arguments stressing class formation, are less useful than those that systematically incorporate the effect of political conditions that discourage collective and individual participation.

Knowledge generated by a comparative study of African revolutions would be useful to address the debates about the causes, course and consequences of revolutions such as those in Africa, Angola, and Mozambique. In the same vein, a comparative study of African and non-African revolutions

(like that of Paige though, as will be argued, not using the categories suggested by him), could yield useful information. Broadly speaking the conflictual or violent latter period of the Zimbabwean revolution is similar to the Maoist conception of guerrilla warfare. However, while it was argued that this violence could not be understood without knowledge of the preceding socio-economic and political changes, the question arises whether the nature and extent of these changes is similar to that of, say, the French, Chinese or Russian revolutions. Were the changes affecting rural blacks' life, for example, similar to those affecting Chinese peasants?

As regards the debate within the structural perspective concerning the place of peasants, this study tried to present the conditions of rural black life in Zimbabwe as fully as possible. Although, the Zimbabwean case illustrates the difficulty in generating reliable demographic data about peasant life, there are a variety of studies and supportive data to draw reasonably concrete conclusions. Studies on Zimbabwe showed, for example, that rural blacks had multiple sources of income, but proportional figures are unknown. As indicated earlier, the categories and theoretical predictions of Skocpol and Wolf were useful; rural blacks from all the population categories could be mobilized to participate in the revolutionary movement. In particular, Skocpol's emphasis on the role of regime repression and peasant autonomy and

solidarity is supported by the western geographic focus of the Smith regime's repressive forces which opened the way for mobilization in the eastern regions, by the proximity (or lack of autonomy) of black farmworkers to their white employers which made them less successful participants in the guerrilla struggle, and the role of solidarity among blacks in the reserves and the purchase areas in allowing ZAPU and ZANU freedom of mvoement in their areas.

Since blacks in dissimilar positions participated in revolutionary activity, the availability of political groups that seek to encourage and ally themselves with collective action naturally becomes crucial. In this regard it is important to note that the emergence of such groups and their access to the rural population was strongly influenced by external factors. Black activists in Zimbabwe were influenced first by fellow activists from South Africa and then those from the northern territories of the Central African Federation; these activists could avail themselves of doctrines on guerrilla warfare and other tactics that were not locally developed and, most importantly, revolutionary groups later acquired regional patrons. The participation of rural blacks with dissimilar backgrounds also suggests that there are different modes of participation in revolutionary activity. This participation can range from simply not reporting guerrillas in the area to actually joining the guerrilla

armies; the theoretical development of these distinctions by structuralists can be most useful to resolve the debate about which peasants are most revolution-prone.

For Zimbabwe the last point is particularly important, for, as the structural literature suggests, the role of peasants in revolutions is often a tragic one. The political support of peasants is crucial in causing the downfall of the old regime but, especially if they are not fully mobilized by the revolutionaries and incorporated in revolutionary organizations, their political demands are often forgotten by the new regime. Hitherto the support of rural blacks was crucial to the development of the revolution in Zimbabwe; its remaining development will show whether these rural blacks' role is also a tragic one.

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The final copies have been examined by the director of the dissertation and the signature which appears below verifies the fact that any necessary changes have been incorporated and that the dissertation is now given final approval by the Committee with reference to content and form.

The dissertation is therefore accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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